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Abstract  
 
This Modular PhD thesis argues for a more detailed treatment of agency than has 
previously been employed in critical linguistics. I present a framework for analysing four 
aspects of the linguistic representation of agency. The framework classifies the strengths 
of the different possible representations of agency in each of these four aspects. This 
framework is then applied to three areas of discourse concerning the 2011 Fukushima 
nuclear disaster. First, I compare domestic and foreign reporting of the disaster, and argue 
the less critical stance of domestic reporting is due to a greater emphasis on technological 
rather than human agency. I then examine representations of responsibility in three 
official reports into the causes of the Fukushima disaster, and argue that each report 
diffuses responsibility in different ways, according to their institutional aims. Finally, I 
look at the kinds of agency attributed to Fukushima in pro and anti-nuclear media opinion 
pieces, and argue these reflect an interpretation of the disaster as a unique event in pro-
nuclear arguments, and as evidence of the inherent danger of nuclear power in anti-
nuclear arguments.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1: Thesis aims 
My goal on this PhD is to develop a framework for analysing how linguistic 
representations of action express different degrees of agency. In Module one I looked at 
a number of approaches to classifying the linguistic representation of action, in order to 
see how they might help in the development of this kind of framework. I found Van 
Leeuwen’s (2008) sociosemantic approach to be the most useful, because it is a flexible 
analytic system that identifies how social meanings can have multiple linguistic 
realisations. I argued that this is appropriate for measuring a concept such as agency, 
because agency is not tied to specific linguistic forms. In Module two I then applied Van 
Leeuwen’s sociosemantic framework to two texts in order to evaluate its effectiveness. I 
concluded the framework was useful in identifying different kinds of action and 
explaining how actions encompass differing levels of power. However, I also found the 
need for more clarification of the underlying theory, and the need to supplement the 
framework with ways to measure other aspects of agency. Based on this groundwork in 
Modules one and two, in this thesis I present a framework for analysing the level of 
agency in linguistic representations of action. I show how this framework can be used to 
investigate agency in a contentious topic. As I explained in Module two, my area of 
interest is nuclear power. In this thesis I focus on representations of agency in different 
areas of discourse concerning the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. 
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The objectives I have outlined show that my work can be considered part of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA). Generally speaking, CDA tries to link a specific social 
practice such as a text or communicative act to the larger social structures and forces that 
it is part of. It acknowledges the dialectical relationship between language and social 
structures, and is concerned with how social actors produce representations of social 
practices (Fairclough, 2001, p. 204). Work falling under the scope of CDA includes 
numerous different theoretical and analytical approaches, and is not defined by any 
singular methodology (Wodak, 1999, p.186). The commonality is using a systematic 
approach to analysing language in order to make claims about representations in discourse. 
For Van Leeuwen, CDA should focus on “discourse as the instrument of the social 
construction of reality” (1993, p. 193). Central to this construction of reality is the 
representation of action. Van Leeuwen emphasises that language is a recontextualisation 
of social practice, or what people ‘do’, and at the core of this is action (2016, p. 140). For 
a discipline concerned with power relations expressed in language, and with action central 
to this, a key theoretical concern should be representation of the power of actions.  
 
Much CDA work to date has analysed the power of actions by looking at agency (e.g., 
Fairclough, 1989; Stubbs, 1996; Janks, 1997: Oteiza and Pinto, 2008; Seo, 2013). While 
this work has been useful, it has taken a somewhat limited view of the concept of agency, 
and taken a limited view of the linguistic manifestations of agency. In this thesis I argue 
for the benefit of a more multifaceted approach. I present a framework for analysing 
different aspects of agency and for classifying different levels of agency of action. By 
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applying the framework I demonstrate what it can reveal about agency. The theoretical 
aim of this thesis, then, is to offer a more detailed linguistic analysis of agency. 
 
Research in CDA should seek to provide a better understanding of social concerns or 
problems (Van Dijk, 1990, p. 10). As I shall discuss in the next chapter, the Fukushima 
disaster was, and still is, an important social issue, and one in which the representation of 
agency is central. There is a fair amount of academic literature on the topic of Fukushima. 
Some of it is scientific, concerning technical aspects of the disaster and the study of 
radiation (e.g., Holt et al., 2012; Ryu and Meshkati, 2014; Ochiai, 2015). Some addresses 
political and policy implications of, or responses to, the disaster (e.g., Butler et al., 2011; 
Jorant, 2011; Wittneben, 2011). Some analyses the overall cultural impact of the disaster 
(e.g., Furukawa and Denison, 2014; Pizziconi, 2015; Morris-Suzuki, 2017). Very little, 
however, is specific linguistic analysis. The literature which does address discourse on 
Fukushima is overwhelmingly based on impressions of texts, as opposed to systematic 
analysis (e.g., Hamblin, 2012; Downer, 2013; Tollefson, 2014). There is little 
investigation of how portrayals of the event may have affected its interpretation. With the 
work in this thesis I therefore add to an understanding of discourse concerning Fukushima. 
I investigate how representations of agency contribute to differing interpretations of the 
crisis. I show how these representations construe blame, responsibility and the need for 
future action in different ways. The analytical aim of this thesis is thus to provide a 
detailed linguistic study of discursive responses to the disaster. 
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1.2: Thesis structure 
In chapters two, three and four I set the groundwork for the analysis. In chapter two I 
discuss the topic of Fukushima. I explain why it is a suitable issue for CDA, and in 
particular why it lends itself well to an examination of agency. I also provide background 
information on the incident itself. In chapter three I address the concept of agency in CDA. 
I discuss how it has previously been approached. I argue that the concept is 
underdeveloped and used in a vague manner, and argue the need for a more nuanced 
understanding. I explain how I will approach the measurement of agency, based around 
different facets of the ‘power’ of an action. In chapter four I introduce a four-part 
framework for measuring the agency of linguistic representations of action. Each part 
covers a different aspect of agency, and identifies different levels of agency. I exemplify 
the different categories in the framework and discuss how they embody different levels 
of agency.  
 
In chapters five, six and seven I use the framework to address this overall question: 
§ What does the investigation of agency reveal about ideological differences in the 
representation of the Fukushima disaster? 
Each chapter looks at a different area of discourse related to the Fukushima disaster, each 
involving a different struggle over agency. The chapters move chronologically from 
initial media reporting, to later official investigations into the causes of the disaster, and 
then on to the representation of Fukushima in the debate over whether or not to use 
nuclear power. Covering these three areas allows me to apply, test, and demonstrate the 
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framework on different areas of discourse, and for different analytical goals.  
 
In chapter five I compare initial reporting of the disaster in a Japanese and a non-Japanese 
news source. I use the framework to look at overall trends in reporting. This chapter asks: 
§ How do representations of agency reflect a more neutral or critical reporting stance? 
I investigate the claim that Japanese reporting was not sufficiently critical of the situation 
at the Fukushima nuclear plant and the potential danger it posed. I argue that Japanese 
reporting was more descriptive and neutral, whereas foreign reporting was more 
evaluative and critical. I attribute the comparatively less critical tone of domestic 
reporting to a focus on technical rather than human agency.  
 
In chapter six I look at official reports into the causes of the disaster. I use the framework 
for a close reading of the forewords to these reports. The issue here is how responsibility 
for the disaster is represented. This chapter asks: 
§ What is the relationship between representations of agency and attribution of 
responsibility for the Fukushima disaster? 
I show the different ways in which each report obfuscates responsibility for the disaster, 
and I show how the agency attributed to different actors reflects the institutional purposes 
of each report. I discuss why this diffusion of responsibility is problematic.  
 
In chapter seven I look at the agency of the Fukushima disaster in media opinion pieces 
about nuclear power. I examine how representations of agency by pro and anti-nuclear 
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power articles contribute to different interpretations of the disaster. This chapter asks: 
 How does the agency attributed to Fukushima in media opinion pieces reflect pro and 
anti-nuclear arguments? 
I show how each side of the debate allocates different levels of each aspect of agency. I 
link these trends to how pro-nuclear articles take a more ‘objective view’ of Fukushima 
as a lesson for improvements, compared with how anti-nuclear articles take a more 
‘common sense view’ about the unacceptable scale of the disaster.   
 
For reasons of space chapters five, six and seven focus on analysis, and I discuss the 
implications of these results in more detail when concluding in chapter eight. This chapter 
brings together my findings and discusses how they relate to other literature on 
Fukushima and on nuclear power in general. It then evaluates the framework, explaining 
what it can offer CDA, and assessing the strengths and limitations I found in the course 
of my research. It finishes by discussing the wider implications of my study of Fukushima. 
I argue that my work shows the benefits of an approach which treats agency as a 
multifaceted phenomenon and which distinguishes different levels of agency. 
	 	 	
	 	
 7  
2. THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER 
 
In this chapter I provide background information in order to contextualise my analysis of 
discourse on Fukushima in chapters five, six and seven. I begin by explaining why nuclear 
power and Fukushima lend themselves to CDA investigation. I then give a brief history 
of nuclear power in Japan, to show how the strength of the nuclear power lobby created 
conditions in which a disaster became more likely. Following this I explain what exactly 
happened in the Fukushima disaster and what the effects have been, to emphasise the 
importance of responsibility for what occurred. I finish by discussing the man-made 
nature of the disaster and why responsibility is contested, to underline why this topic is 
suitable for my aim of testing out a framework for analysing agency in language. My 
central point is that although Fukushima was caused by humans, this was not immediately 
apparent, and thus representations of agency have significant potential to influence 
interpretations of the disaster. 
 
2.1: Nuclear power and Fukushima as CDA topics  
Much early CDA work provided important insights into major sociocultural fields of 
tension, such as racism, sexism, or other forms of discrimination. Many studies 
investigated power imbalances and ideological manipulation (e.g., Fowler et al., 1979; 
Fairclough, 1989; Wodak, 1991; Hoey, 1996; Van Dijk, 1996). In general, these addressed 
issues on which there is a consensus that they are problematic, and which involve fairly 
clear relations between powerful and less powerful social groups. This is undoubtedly 
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valuable, but it somewhat limits the topics of investigation. As Blommaert argues, CDA 
should be about not just power abuses but about power ‘effects’ (2005, p. 1-2). With this 
in mind, one way of demonstrating the continued relevance of CDA is by looking at other 
areas of discourse (Billig, 2008, p. 832; Luke, 2002, p. 98). In particular, this can be done 
by addressing issues in which the power relationships involved are not so clearly one-
sided, or issues which are not clearly divided along traditional political lines (Merkl-
Davies and Koller, 2012).  
 
Nuclear power fits the criteria of being a more nuanced discursive phenomenon. Pollock 
et al. argue that it is a complex issue without ideological history, and so is not easily tied 
to traditional political values (1993, p. 31). Similarly, Stoutenborough et al. explain that 
“The complexities of nuclear power suggest that attitudes cannot be easily summarized 
in terms of partisanship and/or political ideology” (2013, p. 177). The topic is multi-
dimensional in that the debate over nuclear power involves different views on, among 
others things, environmentalism, economics, energy security, and safety. The University 
of Birmingham Policy Commission on the future of nuclear energy in the UK notes that 
there are “large variations in opinion on nuclear issues according to gender, age and socio-
economic group” (2012, p. 41), and describes nuclear energy as “a very politically 
sensitive issue at the best of times” (2012, p. 13). It is a topic in which the interplay of 
power interests and ideological positions is more complex than many traditional CDA 
concerns, and which cannot be easily reduced to an oppositional relationship of the 
powerful against the powerless. Finally, as I argued in Module two, nuclear power has 
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not received much attention in CDA literature and so I feel there is something to 
contribute here. 
 
From a practical perspective, nuclear power is particularly important at the present 
moment. Alongside growing awareness of the catastrophic dangers of global warming, 
there is the approaching end of fossil fuel supplies, meaning alternative sources of energy 
are urgently required. Climate change is one of the most pressing global issues, so 
environmentally friendly fuel sources (of which nuclear power claims to be) are 
increasingly necessary. Nuclear power accounts for about 13.5% of global electricity 
production (Joskow and Parsons, 2012). It involves massive initial financial investment, 
as plants are designed to last a long time. This means policy makers that opt for nuclear 
are committing to it for a sustained period of time. As a consequence, nuclear power 
increasingly requires active public support rather than passive acceptance. 
 
The Fukushima disaster itself is important because it is the second most serious nuclear 
accident in history. As the following background will show, it had major human, 
economic and environmental consequences, and there was a struggle over defining 
responsibility for the incident. One reason it seemed so shocking was because it had been 
many years since the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in 1986. Another reason is that it 
happened in Japan, a country with a reputation for safety and technological expertise. 
This meant that the excuses or explanations that could be made for previous disasters 
were less feasible. Attributing failure to outdated technology (as happened in Chernobyl 
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and Three Mile Island) was not an option in the case of Fukushima, and neither was 
blaming it on the deficiencies of a foreign enemy power (as happened for Chernobyl). In 
this sense Fukushima is the most significant recent challenge to the use of nuclear power. 
Pizziconi argues that it constitutes an instance of a "critical discourse moment" (2015, p. 
162). Such moments shake the current beliefs of language users, and make previously 
taken-for-granted discourse visible and susceptible to re-evaluation. Butler et al. also 
describe Fukushima as a “critical discourse moment”, arguing it is an event in which the 
culture, frames, and interpretative packages of nuclear power became visible (2011, p. 
11). The competing interpretations surrounding the disaster provide a prism for 
examining attitudes to nuclear power. The Fukushima disaster occurred in 2011, so a 
sufficient period of time has now passed to look back and evaluate discursive responses.  
 
2.2: Nuclear power and the nuclear industry in Japan  
2.2.1: The establishment of nuclear power 
To properly understand how the Fukushima disaster came to pass, it is necessary to 
understand the history and culture of the nuclear energy industry in Japan. The first 
Japanese nuclear power plant was built in 1966. Despite initial public resistance to nuclear 
power due to its association with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, politicians, businessmen, and 
scientists argued that commercial nuclear reactors would facilitate the technological 
advancement and industrial restructuring necessary to maintain rising national income 
and living standards in the Japanese postwar recovery (Kelly, 2015). Since then 10 
different energy companies have constructed plants, with a total of 55 in operation. 
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Although there was local resistance to building new plants, power company advertising 
and government promotion of nuclear power in the mass media helped to win over 
opposition, as did significant government subsidies for areas accepting plants (Hara, 
2013), which are predominantly in poorer rural locations. In an analysis of Japanese 
newspaper coverage of nuclear issues in the 1970’s and 1980’s, Jones et al. (2013) found 
the press portrayed the shift to nuclear energy as an inevitable process, and coverage 
suggested that local residents seemed comfortable with the safety measures in place. 
Questions of national economic growth and energy independence remained the political 
and media focus of the period.  
 
After its establishment, nuclear power enjoyed a relatively uncontested status in Japan. 
Opposition took the form of citizen groups rather than party political action, and centred 
on environmental concerns rather than safety issues (Fujigaki, 2015). An interesting point 
about the relationship between nuclear power and national culture is made by Kelly 
(2015), who explains that the increasing Japanese acceptance of nuclear power, if used 
for peaceful purposes, was seen as fitting with the deep-rooted Japanese ideology of 
techno-nationalism. In other words, mastery of scientific and technical matters is seen as 
a national characteristic and source of pride. From a more practical perspective, Japan 
was until recently the second largest economy in the world, but suffers from a paucity of 
domestic energy supplies, meaning energy requirements are large and energy security is 
small. Hermwille neatly describes the dominant Japanese attitude to nuclear power prior 
to Fukushima thus: “Japan is a densely populated, relatively isolated island group and has 
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no appreciable fossil resources of its own. Nuclear power is the only means to secure 
energy supply” (2016, p. 241). Nuclear power, then, slowly and surely became entrenched 
in Japan. 
 
Prior to Fukushima Japan had the third largest number of operational nuclear power plants 
in the world (after the U. S. and France), producing about 30% of Japan’s electricity 
(World Nuclear Association, 2017). The Figure overleaf gives an indication of the scale 
of nuclear power generation in Japan. It shows the sites of major reactors in relation to 
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Figure 1: Nuclear plant locations in Japan (Holt et al., 2012, p. 3) 
	
The Figure emphasises the large number of reactors Japan had in operation at the time 
and their coastal locations. Plants are situated in coastal areas because of the huge water 
requirements for cooling nuclear reactors, which means it is cost-efficient to have ready 
access to seawater.  
 
2.2.2: The Japanese ‘nuclear village’  
An essential concept for understanding the causes of the Fukushima disaster is the 
Japanese term ‘Genryoku Mura’ (meaning ‘nuclear village’). The term refers to a 
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widespread group of institutional and individual pro-nuclear advocates. These include 
power utilities, nuclear vendors, the bureaucracy, the Diet (Japan’s parliament), the 
financial sector, the media, and academia (Kingston, 2012). The nuclear village has long 
been a major force in Japanese institutional culture, one that Kelly describes as 
“extremely powerful and deeply entrenched within Japanese society” (2015, p. 61). It 
maintained a firm commitment to nuclear power in Japan. Moreover, its depth and size 
has previously been enough to insulate pro-nuclear policies from changing public opinion 
and ensure continuing institutional support for nuclear power (Hymans, 2011). The 
various elements of the nuclear village constitute a mutually supportive group with a 
shared interest. 
 
Perhaps inevitably, the strength of the nuclear village’s interconnections became 
problematic. One manifestation of the insidious effect of such a close-knit group is the 
long established practice in Japan of ‘amakuradai’ (‘ascent to heaven’), in which 
government officials retire to lucrative jobs within the industry sectors they have 
previously been responsible for. For instance, for five decades the director of the 
government agency in charge of energy was usually hired as a vice president of Tokyo 
Electric Power Company upon retiring (Noboyuki, 2011, p. 6). There was not sufficient 
distance between the regulators and the regulated, and those doing the regulating had an 
interest in maintaining cosy relationships in order to secure a highly-paid position in the 
future. This phenomenon is termed ‘regulatory capture’, by which regulators charged 
with promoting the public interest defer to the wishes of the industry they ostensibly 
 15  
control and instead advance the industry’s own agenda. This had long been the case in 
Japan (Ramsayer, 2012). Such regulatory capture is the most obvious example of how 
close collusion among the nuclear village produced structural weaknesses.  
 
What is more, the nuclear industry in Japan has a somewhat patchy record on safety. 
While different in scale, Fukushima is far from an anomaly in the history of nuclear power 
generation in Japan. Carpenter (2012) notes numerous covered-up accidents, and argues 
these resulted from a misguided assumption of Japanese technological superiority. For 
instance, prior to Fukushima there were 14 lawsuits brought by private citizens claiming 
that nuclear companies had ignored safety risks (Downer, 2013). The most prominent 
incident was the Tokai accident of 1999, named after the area of Japan in which it 
occurred. This involved an accidental release of radioactive smoke, which required 
families living near the plant to be temporarily evacuated and a further 300,000 people to 
stay indoors. At the time this was the third most serious nuclear accident in history after 
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. To give another example, in 2007 the government 
reported that seven Japanese utilities had falsified safety records for thirty years 
(Hirakawa and Shirabe, 2015). In short, the industry had previously exhibited disturbing 
weaknesses with safety and transparency. 
 
Despite all this, one reason for the lack of challenge to the nuclear village is that there is 
a long history of nuclear power companies advertising in mass media, and the government 
promoting nuclear energy in the mass media (Hara, 2013). Up until the Fukushima 
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disaster, stories about the benefits of nuclear power and advertisements for nuclear power 
companies regularly appeared in national newspapers (Kinefuchi, 2015). This meant that 
media companies reliant on advertising revenue from the nuclear industry were 
disincentivised from promoting a strident anti-nuclear line, for fear of losing this financial 
support. What is more, there has been extraordinary political continuity in Japan. The 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been in almost uninterrupted power since the Second 
World War. Noboyuki explains how the Liberal Democratic Party and the electrical 
industry gradually “forged an unbreakable bond over the decades, by sharing the benefits 
of the easy money made in monopolized nuclear energy projects” (2011, p. 5). Business 
and government assisted each other: the government by creating favourable economic 
conditions for the nuclear industry, and the industry by providing financial support and 
political backing in return.  
 
To sum up, persuasion by elites overcame resistance to nuclear power, and Japan came to 
rely upon it heavily. The nuclear village developed as a group of pro-nuclear advocates 
covering numerous public spheres, with significant power, and with an investment in the 
continuation of nuclear power. This was not an ideal situation to encourage the rigorous 
scrutiny and safety protocol necessary for such a technology, and it set the stage for the 
Fukushima disaster.  
 
2.3: How the Fukushima disaster unfolded 
On March the 11th 2011 Japan suffered what was termed the ‘triple disaster’ of an 
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earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown. This was the largest disaster in Japan since 
World War II, with an overall death toll estimated at 15,849 (National Police Agency of 
Japan, 2016). It began when a magnitude 9 undersea earthquake occurred off the 
northeastern coast of Japan (as seen in Figure 1). The bulk of the devastation came from 
the resulting tsunami, which was higher than the sea walls built to protect coastal towns. 
The third aspect of this triple disaster occurred in Fukushima, a largely rural prefecture 
about 160 miles north of Tokyo. It took place at Fukushima Daiichi (‘Fukushima number 
one’), a site hosting six nuclear reactors constructed in the 1970s, and operated by the 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). As will become apparent, TEPCO is a major 
part of the story of the Fukushima disaster.  
 
The plant is located on the coast and relatively close to the earthquake epicenter, so 
suffered the full brunt of the tsunami. When the tsunami hit land it was fifteen metres in 
height, taller than the six metre protective seawall installed to guard the plant. Three of 
the six reactors were in operation at the time. In line with standard safety protocol, these 
reactors automatically went into shutdown when the earthquake hit. This shutdown 
involves the insertion of control rods which halt the chain reaction which sustains power 
generation. These control rods require constant cooling, as do the spent nuclear fuel pods 
in a separate structure at the plant. Cooling requires a consistent power supply from the 
electricity grid, or if this fails from the backup power generators at the plant. The problem 
for the Fukushima plant was that the earthquake and tsunami damaged the external power 
supplies and almost all the internal power supplies. Furthermore, the tsunami inundated 
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the backup diesel generators and washed away the fuel tanks in the reactors. Consequently, 
there was no means of cooling the radioactive material (Hasegawa, 2012). This is a worst-
case scenario for a nuclear plant, as without cooling meltdown occurs. Meltdown means 
that the heat from continuing radioactivity is enough to convert the cores of nuclear 
reactors into liquid, which then melts. As a result, radioactivity escapes into the outside 
environment. This is what happened at Fukushima.  
 
Four hours after the government became aware of the situation, they declared a nuclear 
emergency and issued an evacuation order to people within a one mile radius of the plant. 
This was later extended to six miles and then twelve miles, with those living between 
twelve and eighteen miles urged to stay indoors or evacuate voluntarily. Two days later, 
on March the 13th, TEPCO began pumping in seawater to cool the reactors, which had 
begun melting. Stabilising the plant proved difficult because the lack of power supply 
hampered relief operations, and because radiation levels at the plant were such that repair 
workers could only safely operate for limited periods. TEPCO struggled to provide 
sufficient water to cool the cores, and the radiation releases continued. The disaster was 
eventually classified as a Level 7 nuclear accident by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, a level equal to that of Chernobyl. This is the highest level on the scale, and is 
used for disasters involving significant environmental releases of radiation. 
 
2.4: Effects of the Fukushima disaster 
In terms of human effects, two workers were killed during the disaster itself after being 
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trapped in a building and drowning. Furthermore, in the process of evacuating a hospital 
inside the radiation zone twenty one patients died of dehydration or hypothermia. On a 
wider scale, according to prefectural authorities and local police 1,656 people in 
Fukushima Prefecture have died from stress-related illnesses and other maladies brought 
on by the Fukushima disaster (more than died in the earthquake and tsunami). Another 
434 have died in neighbouring Iwate Prefecture and 879 in Miyagi Prefecture (The Japan 
Times, 2014). As regards the effect of radiation, this is a disputed topic. Some studies 
indicate a slightly increased risk of thyroid cancer for children in the area (Ochiai, 2015). 
For the most part, fortunately, it seems the radiation release has not had the dangerous 
effects that some predicted. Both the World Health Organization and the United Nations 
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation concluded that radiation 
releases from Fukushima did not pose a threat to the Japanese population (Perrow, 2013).  
 
Although Fukushima Prefecture is largely rural, a sizable population lived within the 
evacuation zone, or close enough to feel concerned about the danger of radiation and so 
relocate. Figure 2 on the next page shows major towns relative to the Fukushima plant 
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Figure 2: Evacuation zone and surrounding urban areas (CNN, 2011) 
	
There were an estimated 150,000 evacuees (Stoop, 2015). Many of these still cannot 
return because their homes lie in contaminated areas, and others do not wish to return 
because they see no future livelihood in the area. Struggles for financial compensation 
for this upheaval are ongoing, and some evacuees faced stigma and suspicion as ‘nuclear 
refugees’.  
 
In financial terms, the Japanese Government reports the costs of decommissioning the 
damaged reactors at 4.5 trillion yen (Hosoe and Tanaka, 2012). The Japan Center for 
Economic Research estimates the economic losses resulting from Fukushima to be 
between 520 to 650 billion dollars (Downer, 2013). Other estimates put the entire cost of 
the disaster at 40-50 trillion yen (McNeill, 2012). TEPCO, the power company 
responsible for the plant, lost 81.2% of its market capitalisation, and had to be 
nationalised in June 2012 through a trillion yen injection of public capital (DeWit, 2016). 
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Radiation also had a harmful impact on agriculture, as the water used to cool the reactors 
became radioactive and leaked into the surrounding land and the Pacific Ocean. This 
affected farming in the agricultural prefectures surrounding Fukushima and fishing in 
nearby areas of the Pacific, as produce from these areas was unsafe for consumption.   
 
Efforts to stabilise the stricken reactors have been ongoing. Over a period of months 
TEPCO got to grips with cooling the reactors and reducing radiation leakage. All reactor 
units at the site were declared to be in cold shutdown (meaning below 100 degrees 
Celsius) by December the 16th, 2011. As of writing, the current measure in place is a wall 
of ice around the site, which is engineered to prevent radioactive ground water running 
off into the surrounding environment. The decontamination process continues, and it is 
not certain when it will be complete. Estimates suggest the environmental cleanup will 
take 40 years (Joskow and Parsons, 2012).  
 
2.5: The extent of human responsibility for Fukushima  
A key theme in the analysis chapters to come is the level of human agency involved in 
discourse on Fukushima, so it is essential to understand the degree to which the disaster 
was man-made. The nuclear village culture detailed above has been widely identified as 
allowing the conditions in which a disaster could have occurred. Multiple sources attest 
to the human factors that lead to the plant being inadequately prepared for an event of this 
sort. For example, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan concludes the root causes of the 
disaster were mainly organisational issues (2015). The Independent Investigation 
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Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident describe a plethora of causes, including 
weaknesses with Japan’s nuclear regulation and its paper tiger status, lax assumptions that 
plant power would never be lost, a failure to improve nuclear facilities after Chernobyl, 
fear by industry workers of speaking out on safety problems, TEPCO’s lax attitude 
towards safety, structural collusion between power companies and the government, and 
links between power companies and the media. It calls these examples of the “corrosive 
power” of the nuclear village in Japan (2014, xi). The potential effects of a natural disaster 
were neither unknown nor unforeseeable. Years before the disaster scientific studies 
identified the possibility of a large earthquake and a resulting major tsunami of sixteen 
metres at the Fukushima site. Neither TEPCO, government regulators, nor the Japanese 
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency took this seriously.  
 
Decisions taken by TEPCO made it more likely that Fukushima would occur. TEPCO 
had been aware since 2006 that the Fukushima Daiichi plant could face a station blackout 
if flooded (World Nuclear Association, 2017). In the 2012 Fukushima enquiry Japan’s 
Trade Minister testified that the Japanese nuclear regulator had rejected global standards 
for disaster response out of fear that implementing them “would undermine public trust” 
(cited in Kubota, 2012a). TEPCO President Hirose Naomi acknowledged the utility was 
aware of necessary safety improvements long before the disaster, but failed to act because 
they feared the political, economic and legal consequences of implementing new 
measures (Lukner & Sakaki, 2013, p. 16). Ramsayer (2012) explains how TEPCO greatly 
underplayed the risk of a large earthquake and tsunami, and argues that it did so to avoid 
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financial obligations. TEPCO conducted in-house research in 2008 which indicated 
Fukushima was vulnerable to a massive tsunami, but decided against building a higher 
seawall because it was deemed too expensive. However, TEPCO withheld this knowledge 
from the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency until March 7, 2011 (Investigation 
Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of TEPCO, 2012, 
p. 6-7).  
 
The impact of financial considerations stretches back to the construction of the plant. The 
Fukushima site was originally on a bluff, which was demolished during construction to 
allow cheaper and easier transportation of building material by sea (Ladkin et al., 2013). 
Were this bluff still there it would have absorbed the impact of the tsunami and left the 
plant intact. Another way to illustrate failures at Fukushima is by comparison to other 
nuclear reactor sites. The Onagawa nuclear plant is located closer to the earthquake 
epicenter than Fukushima (as can be seen in Figure 1), and so was subjected to stronger 
seismic shocks and a higher tsunami. However, safety measures worked as planned and 
Onagawa experienced no problems. This plant is run by a different energy company that 
implemented stricter safety procedures (Ryu & Meshkati, 2014). Put simply, the company 
responsible for the Fukushima plant made economic decisions on safety issues that 
created the conditions for a disaster such as Fukushima.   
 
In addition to a lack of prior protection, the response to the disaster was inadequate. 
Funabashi and Kitazawa explain that those involved:  
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“were thoroughly unprepared on almost every level for the cascading nuclear 
disaster. This lack of preparation was caused, in part, by a public myth of ‘absolute 
safety’ that nuclear power proponents had nurtured over decades and was 
aggravated by dysfunction within and between government agencies and TEPCO, 
particularly in regard to political leadership and crisis management.” (2012, p. 12)  
TEPCO’s lack of readiness for station blackout was further compounded by their lack of 
planning and training for severe accident mitigation (World Nuclear Association, 2017). 
There was no plan in place to deal with a total loss of power, so they had to improvise a 
reaction on the spot. The governmental response was also deemed insufficient. Lacking 
a protocol for the situation at hand, the government initially allowed TEPCO control over 
the management of the crisis, but later the Prime Minister Naoto Kan become frustrated 
at a lack of information and stepped in to take direct control. Transparency in information 
sharing was widely criticised. In particular, the period of March the 14th to 16th became 
known as “the darkest hours of the crisis”, when knowledge of radiation leaks emerged 
but the potential scale of harm remained uncertain. At this time the government privately 
considered a worst-case scenario of ordering Tokyo to be evacuated (Funabashi, 2012). 
Official information about radiation was seen as confusing and inconsistent, which led to 
public mistrust of official sources (Brumfell and Fuyuno, 2012). Some have argued that 
the government deliberately sought to play down danger, while others have attributed the 
disorganised response and confusing statements about the situation at the plant to a lack 
of central crisis control and to genuine uncertainty about radiation levels (Simone, 2014). 
Regardless of the reason, the point here is that as well as failing to prevent a disaster, there 
was a failure to plan for the event of a disaster.  
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2.6: The importance of agency in discourse on the Fukushima disaster 
The Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident states 
that “There were numerous – often conflicting – reports on what went wrong and what 
went right, who did what, and who did not” (2014, p. ix). Similarly, Hamblin comments 
that “The weeks and months that followed the Fukushima nuclear crisis were marked by 
hasty and opportunistic moves to assign or avoid blame for the unfolding disaster” (2012, 
p. 1-2). In the case of Fukushima allocation of agency is a complex topic because 
numerous factors contributed to the disaster. Although blame on the part of the nuclear 
village has been clearly established, it is muddied by the sheer extent of the nuclear village. 
This made (and still makes) defining the level of culpability for the disaster challenging, 
and indeed this spread of responsibility will emerge as a theme in the analysis to come.  
 
The implications of the representation of agency and responsibility are important for a 
number of areas. One is the size of financial compensation for evacuees and those whose 
livelihoods depend on agriculture and fishing. This is relevant in chapter six when I 
discuss TEPCO’s investigation into the disaster. Although lawyers for TEPCO argued in 
court that the company was not responsible for the damage from radioactive materials 
because TEPCO did not own the radioactive materials (!), they lost and have had to pay 
compensation to those affected (Jones, 2013). Besides this, however, in terms of holding 
those in power to account there have been few repercussions. Hopson writes that “Beyond 
the ritual removal of TEPCO’s CEO and some populist media outrage, there has been 
little attempt to address the issue of human responsibility” (2013). A citizen’s group 
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brought a legal case against three ex-TEPCO chairmen, who pleaded innocent to charges 
of professional negligence resulting in death and injury (Kikuchi, 2017). As of writing, 
this case in ongoing. In terms of political responsibility, in 2017 a district court in Tokyo 
ruled that government negligence contributed to Fukushima because the government had 
failed to take adequate regulatory measures to prevent the disaster (McCurry, 2017). 
However, this case was a private compensation claim for 137 people who had to evacuate 
their homes, and thus had no governmental implications. For the most part there was little 
chance for wider political repercussions as those in charge of the response to Fukushima 
were soon out of office: the Prime Minister resigned in August 2011 and the Democratic 
Party of Japan (who were the ruling party at the time of the disaster) lost power in the 
2012 round of national elections.  
 
In a wider sense there are also implications for Japan, in that the institutional failings that 
led to Fukushima are a challenge to trust in authority. The representation of the severity 
or otherwise of these failings could affect a change in public mood. This is relevant when 
I analyse domestic and foreign media reporting of the crisis in chapter five, and when I 
analyse official reports into the disaster in chapter six. What is more, in the longer term 
the issue of responsibility is important for the future of the nuclear industry and the energy 
debate. The question is how much the disaster undermines public and political faith in 
nuclear energy. According to Pidgeon et al. (2008) the public will accept nuclear power 
as the least bad of a number of bad options as long as it is considered safe. Representation 
of the scale of the disaster and the degree of corporate responsibility for it are key to this 
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public support. This is relevant to chapter seven, which looks at how Fukushima has been 
portrayed in the media debate over the use of nuclear power.  
 
To conclude, Fukushima is a disaster with major human costs, and with major human 
causes. I have explained why agency is a significant and contested issue for these events, 
and why this makes the portrayal of agency important. Having now established the 
background to the disaster, in the next chapter I move on to the theoretical background of 
my analytical approach.  
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3. TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING AGENCY  
 
In this chapter I discuss the treatment of agency in Critical Discourse Analysis. I stress 
its importance in the discipline to underline why a specific framework for the concept 
would be useful. I then discuss the approach to agency in CDA, showing how it has 
usually been equated with the grammatically-based idea of causation. I argue that a more 
expanded view of linguistic manifestations of agency would be beneficial, as would a 
more multifaceted treatment of the phenomenon. I propose moving from a view of agency 
as ‘where the cause of action resides’ (as it is often used in CDA) to a wider concept as 
‘power to influence the world’. Based on my overview of the limitations of existing 
approaches, I finish by outlining the requirements of a framework for capturing linguistic 
representations of agency. By the end of this chapter I will have shown why the study of 
agency is important, how it has been studied, the limitations of previous approaches, and 
how the study of agency can be improved on. This will contextualise the following 
chapter, in which I present a framework for the classification of representations of agency.  
 
3.1: The centrality of agency for CDA 
A central concept in social science is the idea of ‘power’, and as Wodak and Meyer 
explain “there is almost no social theory that does not contain, suggest or imply a specific 
notion of power” (2016, p. 9). They go on to state that a defining feature of CDA is a 
“concern with power as a central condition in social life, and its efforts to develop a theory 
of language that incorporates this phenomenon as a major premise” (2016, p. 12). There 
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is frequently a focus on experiential aspects of language, because these tend to be viewed 
as constructions of reality. Central to such representation is action, as action is the core 
of experiential meaning. Agency and action are thus fundamental concerns, and Van 
Leeuwen states simply that “Agency…as a sociological concept, is of major and classic 
importance in critical discourse analysis” (2008, p. 23). For instance, the effect of 
different representations of the agency of an action could highlight or background an 
action, make an action seem powerful or weak, dramaticise or downplay an action, or 
increase or decrease the clarity of responsibility for an action. In turn, these effects could 
represent ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups as stronger or weaker, could represent certain actors as 
guilty or innocent, or could assign credit or blame for actions. Changing levels of agency 
might contribute to the maintenance or change of power relationships. In short, agency is 
central to struggles over the definition of events and the representation of actors, which 
are mainstays of CDA work.  
 
3.2: The CDA approach to agency  
Looking at how CDA has investigated agency, what is perhaps the first treatment is the 
pioneering Language and Control (Fowler, Hodge, Kress, and Trew, 1979). In this, Trew 
explains that his process of analysis is to use Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics 
to analyse clauses for agency. He argues “we need a way of systematically applying to a 
text or discourse a theory like Halliday’s which analyses clauses in terms of how they 
present agency and transaction”. He describes the first part of his analytic process as 
involving “a sorting of the terms of a text into categories of process and participant and 
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then using this as a basis for abstracting the distribution of agency and interaction amongst 
participants” (1979, p. 123). He presents a matrix of actors and actions in a text in order 
to map transitivity. Basically, Functional Grammar provides the theoretical and analytical 
base. With this in mind then, it is useful to find a specific Functional Grammar 
explanation of agency. Halliday (1985) and Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) seem to use 
the term without a definition, but treat it for all intents and purposes as causation and as 
expressed through the transitivity system. A slightly more concrete definition is provided 
in Thompson’s Introducing Functional Grammar, referring to agency as “representation 
of participation in processes” (2004, p. 138).  
 
From here, the treatment of agency appears to have developed along these functional 
lines. In one of the formative and most influential CDA works, Language and Power, 
Fairclough presents a framework of ten questions to apply in text analysis. Under the 
‘Grammar’ section of the framework, one question is “Is agency unclear?” (1989, p. 11). 
He links this question to causality, responsibility, and to the grammatical categories of 
active/passive and nominalisation. Fairclough states that “One should be sensitive to 
possible ideologically motivated obfuscation of agency, causality and responsibility” 
(1989, p. 124). So here agency is viewed as a grammatical phenomenon, and is part of 
the experiential metafunction. An example of a thorough and systematic analysis along 
these lines is Stubbs (1996, Chapter 6). He compares a corpus of two textbooks on 
environmental issues, finding that the textbook with an explicitly ’environmental’ stance 
allocates greater agency to forces responsible for environmental destruction, whereas the 
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‘standard’ textbook includes less representation of agency when describing 
environmental destruction. Stubbs also treats agency as a grammatical phenomenon, 
connected with verb forms, akin to causality: for him it is “causality, agency, 
responsibility and blame” (1996, p. 123).  
 
Numerous CDA studies have used the concept of transitivity to look at the representation 
of responsibility (see among others Janks, 1997; Li, 2010; Seo, 2013; Reyes, 2011; 
Machin and Mayr, 2013; Rajandran, 2013). Indeed, this has been something of a 
mainstay. More recently, there have been practically oriented guidebooks aimed at 
summarising CDA techniques for new practitioners. One representative guide to what 
might be considered common approaches is Machin and Mayr’s How to do critical 
discourse analysis: A multimodal introduction (2012). In this they comment that 
“transitivity patterns, especially in the manipulation of agency at the grammatical level, 
can be significant in terms of language and power” and “there is a theoretical assumption 
… that the levels of an actor’s agency are directly correlated to material process types 
and that individuals or groups not involved in such processes are presented as being weak 
agents” (2012, p. 111). All this would suggest that the functionally-influenced theoretical 
approach has stuck.  
 
There are, however, some examples of a more nuanced approach. One such study is 
Galasinski and Marley (1998), who compare representations of agency in British and 
Polish newspaper reporting on foreign countries. They discuss patterns in reporting on 
 32  
countries perceived as ‘elite’ or ‘non-elite’, and comment on how transitivity and agent 
inclusion or omission represent countries with greater or lesser agency. The contribution 
they make is to acknowledge that agency is about degrees rather than simply presence or 
absence, but unfortunately they do not provide any specific guidelines for determining 
what these degrees might be. A more systematic approach is Stamou (2001), who 
analyses the representation of different social groups in Greek newspaper reporting of 
protests. Stamou identifies 27 different combinations of transitivity and actor presence or 
absence, ranking these for the clarity of causation (2001, p. 670-671). This is a detailed 
and comprehensive treatment of a classic CDA concern – how verb form can highlight or 
background responsibility. A more recent paper taking a similar approach is Dreyfus, who 
argues that “one of the ways the extent to which people take responsibility for their past 
actions can be explored is ideationally through the system of voice and agency” (2017, p. 
374). The useful innovation she makes is to organise possible representations along a 
cline of responsibility, based on agency in material clauses (2017, p. 379). She applies 
this to six example situations to discuss how and why different degrees of agency were 
used. As with Galasinski and Marley, however, the analysis of agency is limited to 
transitivity.  
 
The strength of these three approaches is that they attempt to distinguish between levels 
of agency. The limitation is that they do not extend to other, more metaphorical, 
representations of action. One study which does cover more linguistic ground is Merkl-
Davies and Koller (2012), who analyse corporate documents on arms sales. They show 
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how impersonalisation absolves corporate management in the arms business of the 
outcomes of their decisions. They argue that the different ways “obfuscation of agency” 
is achieved are through the linguistic features of ‘Impersonalisation’, which include the 
sub-types of referential vagueness, passivation, grammatical metaphor and conceptual 
metaphor (2012, p. 182). While this approach has a wide linguistic scope, a limitation is 
that their analysis only identifies the absence of agency, rather than any kind of scale of 
its presence. In addition, what constitutes their four categories is not defined, and there is 
no sense of how much or how little these linguistic features may obscure agency. 
Nevertheless, this study points the way forward in that it recognises agency as a more 
complex feature of texts.  
 
3.3: Assessing the analysis of agency in CDA 
The strength of the approach to agency in CDA is that it is systematic, as a Functional 
Grammar analysis is based on clear and replicable criteria. Undoubtedly, the work 
described so far has been effective in showing the ideological purposes and effects of 
texts. However, I believe there are two areas of concern. The first is simply the lack of a 
definition of agency in the literature. Indeed, the more I searched for a definition the more 
noticeable this absence became. The closest I could find is in Baker and Ellece’s Key 
Terms in Discourse Analysis, which for the entry under ‘agency’ states “Linguistic 
agency refers to how characters or objects are represented in relation to each other” (2001, 
p. 4-5). It is noteworthy that none of the CDA work which investigates agency feels a 
need to define what agency is. It is unproblematically taken for granted as being (or 
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seeming to be) causation. This is not necessarily bad, but it somewhat begs the question 
of why not use the term ‘causation’ if this is what is really being investigated.  
 
The conceptual and linguistic views of agency as causation seem to have been mutually 
reinforcing. However, the possibilities of a broader view can be seen by its treatment in 
other disciplines. For instance, in Sociology debates over agency concern the locus of 
individual agency and its relationship to wider social forces, and questions concern the 
limit of free will and the ability to make individual change (Archer, 1982; Sewell, 1992; 
Hays, 1994). This view of agency, then, tends towards the ability of an individual to exert 
their will. Alternatively, in Philosophy the treatment of agency concerns whether agency 
exists if an act does not change anything in the environment, whether there is more agency 
if there is more change as a result of an action, and whether agency exists if the prior 
intention of an action and the resulting change bear no resemblance to each other 
(Frankfurt, 1978; Fuchs, 2001; Paul, 2012). This view of agency might be described as 
conscious volition. These two approaches suggest ways in which the concept could be 
expanded in CDA.  
 
The second concern is the limitations of the dominant Functional Grammar approach. If 
agency is akin to causation and only resides in clause structures there is only so far this 
can take us. As has been pointed out, sociological agency does not always correspond to 
linguistic agency (Van Leeuwen, 1995, p. 87; Ahearn, 2001, p. 123; Farrelly, 2014, p. 
53). Focusing on transitivity treats agency as a process of actors working on each other 
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in explicit ‘lines of causation’. As Goatly (1996) explains, the transitivity system assumes 
a binary opposition between the existence of one agent or no agent, and between clearly 
identifiable causes which are either included or excluded. Thibault calls this “the billiard 
ball model of physics” and argues that while it makes the world easy for us to process 
and understand, it does not reflect the more complex interaction of forces in reality (1993, 
p. 136). Cause and effect are not always so simple in real life. Another problem is, as 
Bednarek points out, the systemic view assumes a system of choices in which if one thing 
is present then another is absent. This may not capture the subtleties and multiplicities of 
meaning, or the interplay between words, and thus a more comprehensive view of the 
different effects of language might grasp more of its meaning (2006, p. 216). I do not 
mean to argue that the functional linguistic approach is invalid, and indeed I draw on it 
myself, as the following chapter will show. The point, however, is that it is only one of 
the available choices, and a more comprehensive analysis of agency would be beneficial.  
 
3.4: Requirements of a framework for measuring agency  
The aforementioned theoretical vagueness is somewhat inevitable considering that 
agency is itself an abstract concept. It can be problematic, though, if one wishes to make 
specific claims about where agency exists and where it does not exist, or make claims 
about varying degrees of agency. In developing a framework I therefore need to set the 
boundaries with more clarity.  
 
In their explanation of the underlying principles of CDA, Chouliaraki and Fairclough 
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(1999) argue that a dialectical view of language is necessary to account for the interaction 
of structure and agency, and to allow for the way in which discursive practices may 
reinforce or subvert relationships of power. They explain that social practices have an 
irreducible reflexive dimension, in which people produce representations of what they 
do. Agency therefore “entails reflexivity”, and they emphasise that people can 
consciously pursue strategies in discourse (1999, p. 15). In this sense agency is an active 
power with an inherently discursive aspect, and from an analytical standpoint it is 
necessary to consider the different ways in which it may be manifested. The 
anthropologist Ahearn argues that agency is multifaceted and we must consider how 
agency is constituted by the norms, practices, institutions, and discourses through which 
it is made available. She makes the simple point that words which have taken on new 
meanings in academic discourse need more precise definitions, and proposes this: 
“Agency refers to the socioculturally mediated capacity to act” (2011, p. 112). I move 
from this social anthropological slant to a CDA style conception of “the linguistically 
mediated power of action”.  
 
My approach is thus to move from a view of agency as the source of action to agency as 
power to affect the world. Of course, the phrase ‘power to affect the world’ is itself 
imprecise, and begs the question why not simply use the term ‘power’ instead of ’agency’. 
However, from the above survey of how agency has been studied it seems that the term 
has been used to identify different varieties of the power of action. This would therefore 
seem to be a suitable entry point. Power is also a good starting point because, as I argued 
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above, CDA is concerned with the manifestation of social power relations in language.  
The discussion so far suggests the utility of a multifaceted conception of agency, in which 
there are a number of factors comprising this ‘power’. The advantage of this approach is 
that it allows CDA practitioners to go beyond a binary conception of agency, in which 
agency is present or absent, or in which representation of agency is simply a question of 
transparency versus mystification. So practically speaking, traditionally agency has 
equated to responsibility and the questions have been something like ‘does agency exist?’ 
or ‘does a use of language obscure agency?’ It is perhaps more useful to ask ‘what kind 
of agency is represented?’ and ‘what level of agency is represented?’ Such an approach 
does not preclude the classic CDA concern with mystification, but expands upon it. 
 
Having argued the benefit of a broader conception of agency in language, I shall now 
detail the requirements of an analytic framework to effectively measure the agency of 
actions. These requirements fall under three areas. First, it should recognise different 
types of agency. As I explain further in the next chapter, I propose four aspects of agency 
that can be studied: 
1. ‘Coreness’. The action may be more or less clear, and the connection between the 
actor and the action may be foregrounded or backgrounded.  
2. ‘Effect’. The action may have a more or less powerful physical effect on the world.  
3. ‘Intensity’. The action may be more, or less, intense.   
4. ‘Freedom/Constraint’. The action may be a freedom to act as one wishes or to 
influence others to act as one wishes. Conversely, it may be a constraint on one’s 
actions from an internal or external source.  
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These four aspects are independent of one another. For example, an action may be 
extremely congruent but may have little force. To give an (invented) example: 
A) The	woman	whispered	in	the	man’s	ear.	
The verbal representation ‘whispered’ is congruent and straight-forward. It is easy to 
understand what exactly happened and who is responsible. On the other hand, the action 
‘whispered’ is not a powerful one. It does not have a significant effect on the world and 
is markedly less forceful than other forms of communication such as ‘shout’. To take 
another case, an action may show the freedom to act as one wishes, and may have a strong 
effect on the physical world, but may be represented vaguely. For example (invented): 
B) The	woman’s	comments	forced	the	man	to	commit	suicide.	
Here the woman is represented with the power to influence the man to act. The effect is 
a significant physical action by the man. The precise nature of the woman’s action is less 
obvious, however, as the nominalisation ‘comments’ does not show the length, number, 
or nature of the comments. These two brief examples illustrate the independence of 
different types of agency. One goal of a framework is to capture this interplay of different 
kinds of power.  
 
Second, a framework should not approach agency as a binary concept whereby it either 
exists or does not. Rather, it should allow for levels of agency, and attempt to explain 
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E) The	criminal	behaved	aggressively.	
Examples C, D and E could all refer to the same action, but they give different 
impressions. In C the action is connected closely to an agent (the criminal), and the link 
between the ‘criminal’ and the ‘punch’ is clear. The action ‘punch’ can be clearly 
envisaged. In D the connection between agent and action has to be inferred, and the 
representation of action is the nominalisation ‘attack’, which makes the exact nature of 
the action less clear. In E the action is a neutral term ‘behaved’, with the ideational content 
mainly supplied by the adverb of manner ‘aggressively’. This kind of detailed textual 
analysis and commentary is a classic part of CDA, but the idea of identifying levels of 
difference has seldom been an orienting principle behind analysis.  
 
Third, a framework should allow that agency is not a linguistic concept. As such, it may 
not directly translate into linguistic realisations. A framework should not assume a one to 
one relationship between form and function. It should be flexible enough to encompass 




Examples F, G and H all express the idea that the ‘completion’ was in doubt but that it 
nevertheless occurred. They all show the ability to do an action. The objective should not 
be to focus on one linguistic form that can embody agency, but to cast a wide net that 
captures as many manifestations as possible.   
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To conclude, in this chapter I have argued that while agency is a core issue in CDA, the 
conception of agency is unclear and its treatment is somewhat limited in scope. I have 
argued for the benefit of a more expanded view. In the next chapter I build on this by 
presenting a framework which addresses the three requirements I have just described: 
covering multiple aspects of agency, measuring levels of agency, and encompassing 
different linguistic representations of agency. 
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4. AN ACTION-AGENCY FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter I present a framework for analysing agency in representations of action. 
The framework covers multiple aspects of agency and links linguistic representations of 
an action to the levels of agency they give this action. I begin by describing the theoretical 
basis for my approach, introducing the framework, and explaining the key decisions in 
its design. I then go through the four sections of the framework in turn. I explain what 
aspect of agency each section measures. I present a table organising the categories in each 
section according to level of agency. I define each category, and discuss why these 
categories have different amounts of agency. Examples from my research on discourse 
on Fukushima are used to illustrate categories. Following this is a master chart bringing 
together these four sections and the categories within them to form a complete network 
for the classification of representations of agency. I finish by discussing some more 
complex categorisations that emerged in the course of my research.  
 
I hope that this chapter provides a toolkit for others who wish to investigate agency. As 
the framework is a detailed treatment of the topic there is a good deal of information to 
present here. It is important to sufficiently describe and exemplify the theory before 
proceeding to application. However, I am conscious of the amount of new material, and 
with this in mind try to keep it as simple as possible. My aim is to give an understanding 
of what each part of the framework measures, and then demonstrate this further in the 
analysis chapters that follow.  
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4.1: The sociosemantic approach  
As I argued in the previous chapter, measuring agency requires a flexible framework that 
does not assume a one-to-one relationship between form and function, and that allows 
room for interpretation. In my first Module I reviewed different linguistic approaches to 
studying action, and I identified Van Leeuwen’s (2008) sociosemantic approach as 
suitable for analysing agency because of its flexibility. This approach identifies critical, 
sociosemantic categories and links these to grammatical and rhetorical realisations. The 
advantage of this is, as Van Leeuwen explains: 
“There is no neat fit between sociological and linguistic categories, and if Critical 
Discourse Analysis, in investigating for instance the representation of agency, ties 
itself in too closely to specific linguistic operations or categories, many relevant 
instances of agency might be overlooked. One cannot, it seems, have it both ways 
with language. Either theory and method are formally neat but semantically messy 
(as in the dictionary: one form, many meanings), or they are semantically neat but 
formally messy (as in the thesaurus: one concept, many possible realisations).” (2008, 
p. 24) 
This recognises the difficulty of tying communicative effects to linguistic forms, and 
takes a ‘critical’ approach by prioritising sociological categories. As Wenniger explains, 
the strength of Van Leeuwen’s work is that it focuses on sociological agency and provides 
a network of different choices for its expression (2010, p. 596). While my framework 
draws upon a range of linguistic concepts, then, the underlying approach is the idea of 
mapping ‘agentive level’ onto ‘linguistic form’. For example, the framework has a 
category of ‘Ability’, which means the outcome of action was in doubt but the actor was 
able to successfully do it. The multiple ways that this can be expressed are all included in 
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this category of ‘Ability’.  
 
4.2: Framework overview 
The framework has four sections, each covering a different aspect of agency. Each section 
consists of different categories. These categories convey differing degrees of agency, 
from more to less. A representation of action may fall under multiple sections of the 
framework, or may only fall under one. However, it can only belong to one category in 
each section. Potentially, then, an action can have anything from one level of one kind of 
agency, up to four different levels of four different kinds of agency (although this is rarely 
the case). This does not mean that the more sections an action falls under, the more 
agentive it is, it simply means that an action is potentially analysable in terms of these 
four phenomena. The four sections of the framework are: 
1. Coreness 
2. Effect  
3. Intensity  
4. Freedom/Constraint  
This order corresponds to how commonly this feature of agency is represented in a text. 
In other words, instances of Coreness are most frequent, Effect less so, and so on.  
 
The level of detail for analysing agency is potentially vast. However, as Van Dijk argues, 
it is important that CDA tools are accessible to as wide a range of practitioners as possible 
(2001, p. 97). I have therefore tried to identify a workable number of categories for 
analysis that capture the key differences in agency without making application of the 
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framework cumbersome. I have also tried to avoid new terminology, which can be off-
putting for potential users (Fairclough, 1999, p. 207; Martinez, 2007, p. 126). With this 
in mind I use familiar terminology wherever possible and explain my interpretation of 
these concepts. Where I have adapted an already established term I use the original 
terminology. The points mentioned here are broader considerations informing the 




4.3.1: Overview of Coreness 
Coreness is about how clearly an action is represented as an active process (as an ‘action’) 
and how clearly this is linked to the agent of the action. It addresses how word form and 
clause positioning affect the salience, prominence, or clarity of a linguistic representation 
of action. As the review of agency in CDA in the previous chapter showed, this has been 
a traditional concern because it is about responsibility; if an action is central then the actor 
is clearly agentive in being responsible for the action. Coreness answers the question “To 
what degree is the action clear and connected to the actor?”, or “To what degree is 
responsibility for actions foregrounded or backgrounded?” 
 
Figure 4.3 overleaf shows the different categories within Coreness. The table is organised 
hierarchically to reflect different degrees of agency. The higher the category the more 
agency it conveys, with strongest at the top and weakest at the bottom.  
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Figure 4.3: Categories of Coreness  
	
As the Figure shows, Coreness involves a basic division between Dynamic and Static 
action, and further categories within this. I now describe and exemplify the categories, 
beginning with the strongest level of agency (Projection) and finishing with the weakest 
(Relational).  
 
4.3.2: Coreness categories  
Dynamic categories 
Dynamic categories represent the action as a process, whereas Static categories represent 
the action as an artifact or quality. Dynamic action is construed in verbs and Static action 
in non-verbal representations (with the exception of the Relational category of Static 
action). This distinction is analytically important because Dynamic action is more 
congruent and thus foregrounds the actor as the one responsible for the action. A verb 
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represents an action as a process in motion that is directly connected to the actor. 
Furthermore, a verb can be modified according to tense and aspect, so it appears more 
under the actor’s control and subject to the actor’s decision making. Another reason 
Dynamic action is more agentive than Static action is because every clause requires a 
process at its core, whereas Static action is more peripheral to the clause. The underlying 
principle here is that the transitive clause is prior ontogenetically (Schleppegrell, 1997, p. 
246) and ideational metaphor downranks information (Halliday, 1985, p. 693). It is easier 
to attribute responsibility to a concrete action than an abstract one; knowing exactly what 
happened means knowing exactly what the actor is responsible for. All Dynamic 
categories are representations as active processes, but the different grammatical 
permutations highlight the connection to the actor to different degrees.  
 
Projection 
Projection is when the action is construed as a verb which frames the rest of the message. 
It is often verbs of communication and thought, which present further content as the 
‘domain’ of the actor. These are akin to Projecting clauses in Functional Grammar 




Projection has the strongest Coreness because the action is foregrounded – this 
communication or view controls the following information. Caldas-Coulthard explains 
that the power of this kind of embedding is how it allows the text producer to mold, 
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control or manipulate the presentation of events (1996, p. 259).  
 
Activation 
This is when the action is construed as the main verb in a clause. For instance:  
3. The	earthquake	and	tsunami	have	killed	more	than	10,000	people.	(Windridge,	2011)	
4. The	 six	 targeted	 reactors	have	been	 safely	producing	about	40	 terawatt-hours	of	 zero-
carbon-emissions	electricity	per	year	(one	terawatt-hour	equals	1	billion	kilowatt-hours).	
(Bryce,	2016)	
Activation has a high level of Coreness because the representation is a pattern that would 
be considered unmarked. This congruent grammatical formulation places the action at the 
centre of the clause and conforms to our ‘expected’ information pattern.  
 
Embedded 






National	 Diet	 of	 Japan	 Fukushima	 Nuclear	 Accident	 Independent	 Investigation	
Commission,	2012)	
Although this is a Dynamic representation in the same way as Projection and Activation, 
it is slightly less foregrounded by being downranked in the clause. It is a step back from 
communicative centrality. Projection, Activation and Embedded are all verbs in active 
voice, but the salience is slightly different for each one.  
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Ellipsis 
Ellipsis is a kind of catch-all category for grammatical constructions which in some way 
increase the number of actions in the sentence, but in doing so ellipt the link between 
actor and action. The action is construed as a verbal form, but without direct attachment 
to the actor. For example:  
7. However,	 the	Liberal	Democratic	Party	 (LDP)-led	government	that	was	 launched	 in	 late	
2012	retracted	the	previous	administration's	strategy,	and	adopted	a	policy	of	maintaining	





In example 7 ‘while’ adds more action but in doing so also slightly weakens the link 
between the Liberal Democratic Party and the action ‘aiming to decrease’. In example 8 
the phrase ‘in order to’ adds the action ‘ensure’ into the sentence while also distancing it 
from the actor (the implied actor here being a universal ‘we’). The category of Ellipsis 
covers the numerous cases where the action itself is clear and congruent but the 
connection to the actor is slightly less clear. A certain ‘mental leap’ is required that 
reduces the strength of the link between actor and action.   
 
Facilitated 
This is when the action is construed as a dynamic verbal process, but there is another 
actor involved in causing or facilitating the process. For instance (actors underlined):  
9. The	government	later	instructed	the	prefecture	to	expand	the	area	of	evacuation	to	a	20-
kilometer	radius	of	the	Fukushima	No.	1	plant.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011a)	




In 9 ‘the prefecture’ is ultimately responsible for doing the action of ‘expanding’, but it 
is not represented as entirely their own action – it is initiated by the government. In 10 
the writer ‘I’ is making a claim on the actions of others, so the action ‘to end’ is 
encouraged, urged, or suggested by an outside force. In a Facilitated representation the 
action is Dynamic, but the link between actor and action is downgraded by virtue of the 
previous actor instigating the action. The term I use – ‘Facilitated’ – comes from Wenniger, 
who argues that Activation/Passivation as a binary is too narrow. She argues that cases 
such as “The government helped them to build new homes” constitute a separate category, 
which she terms ‘facilitated agency’ (2010, p. 610). In a similar vein, Mulderrig uses a 
sociosemantic-inspired category of ‘Managing Action’. This involves a cline of coercion, 
in which two actors are conflated as responsible for the action. She explains how such 
hypotactic expansion of verbal groups presents multiple actions as one action, thereby 
taking a step back in agency “both grammatically and socially” (2011, p. 50). This 
category can thus be thought of as a middle ground between active and passive. 
 
Passivation 
This is when the action is construed as a passive verb with the actor stated. For instance: 
11. Such	 energy	 sprawl	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 backlash	 in	 numerous	 states,	 including	 Maine,	
Vermont	 and	 New	 York,	 where	 proposed	 wind	 projects	 are	 being	 opposed	 by	 local	
governments	and	environmental	groups.	(Bryce,	2016)	
12. In	 addition,	 studies	 show	 that	 when	 nuclear	 energy	 facilities	 close	 prematurely,	 they	
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are	more	 often	 replaced	by	 natural	 gas-fueled	 power	 plants,	 not	 other	 clean	 energy	
sources.	(Kirk	&	Whitman,	2016)	
The passive structure reverses the unmarked word order, and thus the connection between 
actor and action is weaker than when the verb is in active voice. This is a downranking 
of the salience of the actor, and thus the clarity of their responsibility. 
 
Inferable passive 
This is when the action is construed as a passive verb and the actor is not stated, but can 




badly	 damaged	 in	 Friday's	 devastating	 earthquake	 and	 tsunami.	 A	 building	 housing	 a	
reactor	was	destroyed,	but	authorities	said	the	reactor	itself	was	intact.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	
2011b)	
In 13 it is clear from context that TEPCO are reporting their own action of ‘detecting’ 
radioactivity. In 14 it can be inferred that the ‘explosion’ in the first sentence is the actor 
responsible for ‘destroying’ the ‘building’ in the second sentence. An inferable passive is 
less salient simply because the actor is not directly mentioned. The connection between 
actor and action is filled in by the reader rather than by the text. The use of passives 
without an agent as a way of backgrounding responsibility is a classic CDA concern.  
 
Static categories 
Static categories represent an action in ways other than a verbal process (with the 
exception of the final category Relational), or by what is referred to as grammatical 
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metaphor (Halliday, 1985; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). Static actions are less 
agentive than Dynamic ones because they are less directly connected to the actor, less 
easily modifiable, and because their reification makes them seem less under the control 
of the actor. 
 
The first three categories are Engaging, Engaged and Disengaged. The linguistic form for 
these three categories is nominalisation. However, not every nominalisation is necessarily 
an ‘action’. As Halliday and Matthiessen explain, nominalisations can be verbal 
nominalisation (such as changing ‘press’ to ‘pressure’) and adjectival nominalisation 
(such as changing ‘hot’ to ‘heat’), and these ideational metaphors present processes and 
qualities as if they were entities (2004, p. 637). For my purposes, if a nominalisation 
(whether from verb or adjective) can be traced back to a representation of an action then 
it can be classified under the framework.  
 
Engaging 
This is when a representation of action is construed as the actor responsible for another 
action. For instance (in red): 
15. Venting	of	mildly	radioactive	steam	continued	at	reactors	2	and	3,	and	officials	warned	
that	an	explosion	was	possible	in	reactor	3's	building.	(BBC,	2011a)	
In example 15 ‘venting’ is the actor responsible for ‘continuing’. Engaging is also when 
the representation of action is the Identified in a Relational process (Halliday and 
Matthiessen, 2004, p. 231). For instance: 
16. There	are	two	dangerous	assumptions	currently	parading	themselves	as	fact	in	the	midst	
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of	the	ongoing	nuclear	crisis.	The	first	assumption	is	that	nuclear	energy	is	safe.	(Naidoo,	
2011)	
In 16 the action of ‘assuming’ is prominent in the clause in the sense that the clause is 
‘about’ this action. Engaging has the highest agency of the Static categories because of 
its cognitive salience.  
 
Engaged 
This is when the representation of action is construed as being acted upon by another 
actor. For instance:  
17. The	 towering	 explosions	 at	 the	 nuclear	 plant	 in	 Fukushima	 have	 seized	 the	 world’s	
attention	more	than	any	other	aspect	of	Japan’s	tsunami	tragedy.	(Hastings,	2011)	
In example 17 the action of the world’s ‘paying attention’ is acted upon (‘seized’) by the 
‘explosions’. Engaged is also when the representation is the Identifier in a Relational 
process (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004; 234). For instance:    
18. Uncounted	 among	 the	 casualties	 so	 far,	 but	 having	 unquestionably	 sustained	 critical	
damage,	is	the	already	shaky	confidence	of	the	world	in	nuclear	power.	(The	New	Zealand	
Herald,	2011)	
In 18 the action of ‘being confident’ is acted upon in the sense of being ‘uncounted’. The 
category Engaged is less agentive than Engaging because the clausal positioning as ‘acted 
upon’ makes it less prominent. 
 
Disengaged 
This is when the representation of action is construed as neither doing an action nor 
directly affected by an action, but as extra action in the clause. It is not directly involved 
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in a process. For instance:  
19. These	are	a	stark	reminder	of	the	risks	involved	in	nuclear	generation.	(The	Financial	Times,	
2011)	
20. Adding	 insult	 to	 the	 social	 injury	 of	 dislocation,	 hardship	 and	 the	 mounting	 "atomic	
divorces"	of	families	on	the	edge,	the	public	is	being	forced	to	pay	for	the	clean	up	–	a	
clear	failure	of	the	law	to	hold	the	nuclear	industry	liable	for	its	disasters.	(Naidoo,	2013)	
In examples 19 and 20 the action is included in the clause but is not represented as causing 
or being subject to any process. The category Disengaged is less agentive than Engaging 
and Engaged because it has a further layer of distance from the core of the clause – it is 
providing extra information. In this kind of representation the actor is "functionally 
decentred" from the activity (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p. 113). It increases the experiential 
density of a sentence while deflecting the arguability of the action (Eggins, 1994, p. 318). 
In simple terms, the action is less central to the clause and less connected to an actor, and 
these features make it less agentive in terms of Coreness.  
 
As may be clear, the categories of Engaging, Engaged and Disengaged are somewhat 
similar to the Functional Grammar concepts of Actor, Goal and Circumstance. However, 
they are identified on pragmatic (sociosemantic) rather than systemic grounds, hence the 
different nomenclature. The difference is that Engaging, Engaged and Disengaged refer 
to the relationship to other actions in the clause, and the terms reflect these levels of 
salience. Nominalisation has been an important, but debated, issue in CDA. For instance, 
on the one hand, noun phrases are an economical way of packaging information to 
represent what text producers feel is relevant and interesting, thereby reflecting their 
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values and beliefs (Caldas-Coulthard and Moon, 2010, p. 110). This effects of this could 
be to remove responsibility, present things as simply occurring, remove any sense of time, 
or allow classification and description of the action (Machin and Mayr, 2012). A 
representation which makes an action an object downranks it in order to prioritise 
something else, such as the sequencing of action, showing if the action is obligatory or 
optional, adding modality, adding purpose or legitimations, connecting processes, or 
making causal links (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 94). On the other hand, it is important not to 
automatically equate the powerful effects of nominalisation with manipulation. Billig 
(2008) points out that nominalisation is a wide term covering a variety of mental 
transformations, and Martin (2008) cautions that nominalisation is often used for 
rhetorical purposes that are not inherently sinister.  
 
Descriptivation 
This is when the action is construed as a feature or quality of the actor. The term 
Descriptivation comes from Van Leeuwen’s sociosemantic categories of action (2008, 
Chapter 3), on which this category is based. Descriptivation is perhaps the broadest of all 
the categories of Coreness because there are numerous ways to represent an action as a 
feature or quality. It can be adjectives, such as the Epithet to an Attribute in a Relational 
Attributive process type (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 216). For example:  
21. Nuclear	energy	is	an	expensive	and	deadly	distraction	from	the	real	solutions.	(Naidoo,	
2011)	
Halliday and Matthiessen classify Epithets into ‘experiential’, an objective property of 
the thing itself, or ‘interpersonal’, an expression of the speaker’s attitude towards the 
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thing (2004, p. 318-319). It is the experiential type which have the capacity to show action. 
Another kind of Descriptivation is pre-modifying adjectives in gerund form. For instance: 
22. Within	a	few	years	it	became	clear	that	nuke	plants	would	be	more	expensive	than	coal-	
and	 oil-fueled	 generation;	 by	 then	 an	 international	 juggernaut	 had	 been	 launched,	
spurred	 by	 U.S.	 trade	 credits	 to	 sell	 American-made	 reactors	 overseas	 and	 by	
manufacturers	such	as	GE	and	Westinghouse	offering	domestic	utilities	power	reactors	at	
loss-leader	prices.	(Hiltzik,	2014)	
In 22 the action of ‘offering’ is reduced from a Dynamic action to a characteristic of the 
companies ‘GE’ and ‘Westinghouse’. Similarly, Descriptivation can also be when the 
action is an ellipted embedded. For instance: 
23. Even	plants	located	in	areas	with	low	and	moderate	seismic	activity	are	designed	for	safety	
in	the	event	of	such	a	disaster.	(Moore,	2011)	
Without the full verbal expression ‘that are located’ the action is distilled to a descriptive 
quality of ‘plants’. Finally, Descriptivation may be in the form of adverbs. Halliday 
distinguishes nine kinds of adverb, one of which he terms ‘Quality’, that refers to how 
the action is done (1985, p. 65). For instance: 
24. Handled	safely	and	properly,	nuclear	generation	could	be	relatively	"green."	(Hiltzik,	2014)	
Here ‘safely’ refers to the nature of the action. It adds to the meaning of ‘handled’, for 
example by indicating more care, a slower pace, or with greater planning. Adverbs of this 
kind are relatively frequent. Martin and White argue that such ‘circumstances of manner’ 
are different to other kinds of circumstance because there is no inherent way in which a 
process can occur, meaning that these adverbs modify the process (2005, p. 146). This is 
the sense in which they have the capacity to represent action.   
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The representations included under Descriptivation have not traditionally been classed as 
‘actions’ in CDA. However, this is precisely the point – they are less ‘core’. The 
Descriptivation is based on an action, in the sense that it comes from how an actor acts. 
As Halliday puts it, “some part of the experiential structure of the clause is being 
downgraded to function as Epithet or Classifier” (1985, p. 322). As a category of agency, 
Descriptivation is less Core than the Engaging, Engaged and Disengaged categories 
because the action is distilled to the point it is not a participant in any process. A 
nominalisation has the grammatical potential to act, whereas Descriptivation is divested 
of this ability to act. Therefore, as a more abstract representation of action, with 
Descriptivation the link between actor and action is less clear, and this is reflected in the 
lower level of Coreness.   
 
Relational 
This is when the action is construed as a thing that simply exists. This category is intended 
to reflect a kind of ‘zero agency’ in which there is little Coreness because there is no 
actual action taking place. The term ‘Relational’ reflects the fact that most instances are 
akin to Halliday and Matthiessen’s (2004) idea of relational process types. They can be 
Attributive types where the Attribute is not a representation of action. For example: 
25. In	the	25	years	since	the	Chernobyl	disaster,	the	nuclear	industry’s	safety	record	has	been	
generally	good.	(The	Financial	Times,	2011)	
In 25 the verb ‘has been’ does not represent any sense of action, and instead sets up the 
evaluative ‘good’ as a characteristic of the nuclear industry’s safety record. As well as 
descriptions and features, Relational also includes verbs that signify existence. They can 
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be the verb in an Identifying type process. For example: 
26. Japan's	worst	previous	earthquake	was	of	 8.3	magnitude	and	 killed	143,000	people	 in	
Kanto	in	1923.	(BBC,	2011d)	
They can also be Relational processes of existence. For example:   




Relational is classed as Static action because these verbal representations are qualitatively 
different from those in the Dynamic categories. They are not actions in any Dynamic 
sense of something taking place. Relational has the least amount of agency because it is 
represented not as part of any process but simply as something that exists: there is little 
Coreness because there is not really an action taking place. From one point of view 
Relational actions are not actions in any sense of a representation of a process. However, 
the category is necessary to measure the agency of ‘existing’ rather than ‘participating’: 
identifying a lack of Coreness is equally important as identifying a high level of Coreness.  
 
To sum Coreness up, this feature of agency is important because it is an intrinsic feature 
of texts and instances of it are frequent (as reflected by the numerous categories). 
Coreness is about the power of ‘owning’ an action: the more congruent the representation 
of action and the more central the representation in the clause, the clearer and more salient 
the connection between the action and actor. It is about defining an actor through ‘action 
as behaviour’ (Dynamic) or through ‘action as characteristics’ (Static). Coreness is often 
at issue in an analysis of agency, and the kind of backgrounding and foregrounding it 
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measures is a classic CDA concern.  
 
4.4: Effect  
4.4.1: Overview of Effect 
Effect is about the nature of actions, specifically with regard to the change in the world 
that an action represents. This aspect of agency is the power to make a physical effect on 
the world: it is the sense of ‘acting on’ the world rather than ‘responding to’ the world. 
This section of the framework is influenced by the Functional Grammar concept of 
process types (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: Chapter 5), which from the experiential 
perspective are the core of the clause (Thompson, 2004, p. 87). What it does is to organise 
and somewhat modify the idea of process types to classify a specific aspect of agency. 
Effect answers the question “How much effect do actions have on the world?”. 
 
The Figure on the next page shows the seven categories of Effect, from most agency at 
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Figure 4.4: Categories of Effect  
I now go through each of these categories in turn.   
 
4.4.2: Effect Categories  
Influence 
This is when the action results in a change in another actor. The key point with Influence 
is that the action is not just doing something ‘to’ another actor, but making another actor 
‘do’ something or ‘change’ something. Influence can be causing another actor to act. For 




In example 28 ‘the risks of nuclear generation’ result in ‘some critics’ calling for a 
reduction or halt of nuclear generation. In addition, Influence can also be causing a change 
of state. For example:   
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29. Communities	for	miles	around	Fukushima	have	been	rendered	uninhabitable	for	decades	
to	come.	(Hiltzik,	2014)	
In 29 the change occurs in ‘communities’ around Fukushima (the actor here can be 
inferred as the Fukushima disaster). Influence has the most Effect agency because it 
affects a change in action or state. The idea of causation is a powerful psychological 
concept, and in Metaphors We Live By Lakoff and Johnson argue that it is "one of the 
concepts most often used by people to organize their physical and cultural realities" (1980, 
p. 69). There can be considerable social power involved in affecting another actor, and so 
a specific analytic category to capture this can prove useful.  
 
Interactive 
This is a physical action when the effect is represented as extending to another person or 
thing. In other words, something else is acted upon. For instance: 
30. But	if	we	continue	to	use	more	electricity	to	power	cars,	trains	and	other	vehicles,	demand	
for	electrical	power	will	probably	soar.	(Myhrvold,	2011)	
31. Part	 of	 the	 issue	 is	 that	 the	 marketplace	 doesn’t	 value	 one	 of	 nuclear’s	 greatest	
attractions:	 It	 reliably	 produces	 a	 lot	 of	 electricity	 without	 producing	 carbon	 dioxide	
emissions.	(The	Washington	Post,	2011)	
In example 30 ‘we’ act on ‘electricity’, and in example 31 ‘nuclear’ acts to make 
‘electricity’. Interactive actions have a high degree of Effect agency because they are 
physical actions with an observable effect on something else in the world.   
 
Instrumental 
This a physical action, but there is no representation of what is affected. Instrumental 
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actions are physical and can be observed, so have an effect on the world, but they are 
limited to the actors themselves rather than extending to an external actor. For instance:  
32. Those	systems,	which	should	begin	operating	when	water	levels	within	the	reactor	core	
fall,	are	critical	to	the	safety	of	the	reactors.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011b)	
In example 32 this process of ‘starting operation’ is represented as affecting only the 
systems themselves. Instrumental action can also represent a change in state or situation. 
In this case the change is represented as a physical manifestation that comes about by 





In example 33 the ‘burden’ is represented as acting on itself. Instrumental action is 
agentive because it is a physical action and thus an observable material process. However, 
there is less agency than Interactive because nothing is represented as affected by the 
action. The difference between Interactive and Instrumental reflects the difference 
between transitive and non-transitive action.  
 
The two categories of Interactive and Instrumental are both physical actions, akin to 
Material processes (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, Chapter 5). The terms ‘Interactive’ 
and ‘Instrumental’ are adapted from Van Leeuwen (2008, Chapter 3). From a critical 
perspective the key difference is that, as Van Leeuwen emphasises, the power to act on 
other things implies a sociological power that acting on oneself does not (2008, p. 90).  
 
 62  
Semiotic 
This is when the action is a communicative event. It is akin to the idea of Verbal process 
types (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, Chapter 5). It may be an actual speech act. For 
instance:  
34. Last	December,	a	 senior	US	State	Department	official	 also	 said	nuclear	 companies	will	
"find	it	difficult"	to	take	part	in	India's	nuclear	industry	when	they	are	exposed	"to	the	risk	
of	significant	financial	penalty."	(Naidoo,	2013)	
It can also be a method of communicating or conveying a message: 
35. In	fact,	the	disaster	shows	how	safe	nuclear	reactors	actually	are.	(Windridge,	2011)	
As there is no physical action and thus no demonstrable effect on the world, Semiotic is 
less agentive than Interactive and Instrumental. However, Semiotic action is agentive in 
that it projects a message outwards. As Searle (1976) argues in his theory of speech acts, 
communicative acts perform social functions. This assumes another participant that is 
affected, or at least the intention of affecting another actor, and in this sense 
communication has an effect on the world.  
 
Cognitive 
This action is one of ‘thinking’. It corresponds to the Cognitive sub-type of Mental 





ongoing	 dilemma	 of	 what	 to	 do	 with	 the	 thousands	 of	 tons	 of	 long-lasting,	 highly	
radioactive	"spent	fuel"	-	aka	nuclear	waste	-	still	piled	up	at	reactors	all	over	the	world,	
including	of	course,	at	the	still	volatile	Fukushima	site.	(O’Connor,	2012)	
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Cognitive acts are representations of psychological processes, so have less agency 




This is an internal psychological process of experience. It does not imply conscious 
volition or deliberation on the part of the actor. It is akin to the Perceptive, Desiderative 









Taken together, the categories of Cognitive and Experience are both internal processes 
that are not observable or verifiable. In this sense they have less Effect because they are 
psychological actions contained in the actor. Although Functional Grammar classes these 
both together as Mental processes, for my purposes they are different. Cognitive acts 
imply an active process of reflection or consideration, and this sense of conscious intent 
gives them a stronger degree of agency. Experience does not convey this controlled or 
volitional thinking: it is something that happens ‘to’ the actor. In this sense the actor is 
not changing their internal world, their internal world is being changed.  
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Characteristic 
This is when the action signifies the existence of a feature or possession of the actor. 
These actions have the least agency because there is no potential for change in the actor 
or wider world. Broadly speaking, they correspond to Existential and Relational processes 
(Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. Chapter 5). They can show the existence of 
something. For example:  
40. Fukushima	had	pumps	to	do	that,	but	the	earthquake	knocked	out	their	power	supply.	
(The	Independent,	2011)	
In 40 the action ‘had’ is the fact that these ‘pumps’ existed. Characteristics can also be a 
simple expression of being. For example:    
41. We	may	 not	 live	 in	 an	 earthquake	 zone	 on	 a	 geological	 fault	 line,	 but	 plants	 such	 as	
Sellafield	are	on	the	coast.	(The	Independent,	2011)	
Example 41 shows the location of ‘plants such as Sellafield’. Characteristics can also 
show an evaluation. For instance:  
42. So	far	the	releases	from	Fukushima	have	been	relatively	low,	but	continual	monitoring	is	
essential.	(Windridge,	2011)	
Characteristic can also be a Relational type characteristic with no ‘physical’ potential. For 
example:   
43. The	implications	of	all	this	for	the	rest	of	us	remain	unclear.	(The	Independent,	2011)	
This category of Characteristic, then, has no action in the sense of a process that occurs. 
The purpose of this category is similar to the Coreness category of Relational described 
above, in that it is ‘zero agency’. It measures the absence of agency to affect the world: 
having no effect is as critically important as having an effect. This is important because a 
lack of Effect agency means the actor is being defined by what they are rather than what 
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they do. Much CDA work has made good use of analysing process types, but leaves out 
relational and existential representations, or treats them as separate from other processes. 
Including this Characteristic category therefore allows a comparison between activity and 
inactivity, which is an important element of the amount of effect that an actor has on the 
world.  
 
To summarise Effect, the ideas here are not theoretically revolutionary, but they fit the 
concept of process types to a specific analytical purpose. Verbs are an obligatory 
component of the clause, and all verbs have a level of Effect. The agency encompassed 
in this fundamental core can be very revealing.    
 
4.5: Intensity 
4.5.1: Overview of Intensity 
Intensity is when the power of an action is increased or decreased. It addresses how an 
action may be comparatively more intense or less intense. Intensity answers the question 
“Which actions are made stronger or weaker?” 
 
This section of the framework is inspired by Martin and White’s Appraisal Theory (2005). 
Appraisal Theory is compatible with my overall approach because it maps forms onto 
functions, classifying the various linguistic means by which a communicative objective 
can be achieved. Martin and White detail the ways in which the intensity of processes and 
qualities can be scaled up and down (2005, p. 135-152), which they term ‘Force’. Their 
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classifications of increases in intensity apply to all qualities and verbal processes (2005, 
p. 148), but I alter this in two ways. I reduce this scope. I include all processes, but only 
include qualities that can refer to an action, as qualities that do not refer to an action are 
outside my area of concern. I also expand the scope. As well as qualities and verbal 
processes I include nominalisations that can refer to an action (as exemplified when I 
discussed Coreness).  
 
Unlike the previous two sections of the framework, Intensity does not apply to all 
representations of action. Intensity is either present or not present in an action, meaning 
it is a case of if it occurs. The different degrees of agency are shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
Figure 4.5: Categories of Intensity   
The basic division is between Increases and Decreases. Instances of Intensity Increases 
are more common than Intensity Decreases. As the terms imply, Maximisation and 
Minimisation are opposite concepts, as are Intensification and Deintensification. 
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4.5.2: Intensity Categories 
Expressions of Intensity stem from two basic principles. Either the nature of the action 
itself is comparatively more or less powerful, or the action is made more or less powerful 
by surrounding linguistic modifications. In the first case the word may be intrinsically 
(semantically) strong or weak. In the second case an extra word or words may be added 
to increase or decrease the power of the action. There are many possible manifestations 





The action is represented with the maximum possible power. This can be through added 
words which modify the action. For instance (actors underlined and Maximisation in red): 
44. Its	 successors	are	 radically	different	 in	how	they	work,	as	 is	 the	 regulatory	 framework,	
which	sets	astonishing	new	benchmarks	for	the	care	and	quality	required	at	every	stage	
of	the	process.	(Freer,	2012)	
The word ‘radically’ makes the difference in ‘working' as high as it could be. 
Maximisation can also be words which indicate the end of a scale. This is most 
prototypically with adjectives that are not modifiable with terms like ‘very’ or ‘slightly’. 
For example:  
45. But	hundreds	of	millions	of	people	live	near	the	world's	436	reactors	and	a	disaster	at	any	
one	of	these	reactors	could	be	catastrophic.	(Naidoo,	2013)	
Here ‘catastrophic’ connotes a maximal level of damage or harm.  
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Intensification 
The power of the action is increased from a ‘neutral’ or ‘unmarked’ level. I will provide 
more examples for Intensification because it is the most frequently occurring category of 
Intensity, but the principles here apply to all other categories. Intensification may be when 
an extra word increases the intensity of the action. For example: 
46. According	to	NISA	officials,	the	pressure	within	the	No.	1	reactor’s	containment	vessel	at	
the	No.	1	plant	sharply	fell	after	the	explosion	was	heard.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011c)	
The action ‘fall’ is modified by ‘sharply’, and thus given more intensity. This is a common 
form of Intensification because, as Martin and White explain, many verbal processes, 
especially those of motion, cannot be modified by grammatical terms such as ‘very’ and 
are instead modified by adverbs of vigour (2005, p. 146). Intensification may also occur 
because certain words have a stronger prosody compared to more ‘neutral’ words. For 
instance: 
47. The	 towering	 explosions	 at	 the	 nuclear	 plant	 in	 Fukushima	 have	 seized	 the	 world’s	
attention	more	than	any	other	aspect	of	Japan’s	tsunami	tragedy.	(Hastings,	2011)	
This is another common form of Intensification, simply because of the huge lexical 




The level of ‘safety’ of nuclear power is increased by comparison with other sources of 
energy. Another kind of Intensification is through repetition of vocabulary. For instance:  
49. Japan's	only	option	is	to	get	away	from	nuclear	power.	The	spent	nuclear	fuel	that	comes	
from	nuclear	plants	 is	nothing	but	a	burden,	and	 the	same	 is	 true	of	 the	plutonium	at	
research	facilities.	This	burden	grows	and	grows,	and	so	not	even	a	final	place	to	store	
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high-level	radioactive	waste	can	be	decided	upon.	(Yamada,	2016)	
The action ‘grow’ is made more powerful by repetitive emphasis. There are also 
metaphorical or figurative ways to increase the force of an action. For instance: 
50. Environment	groups	are	beginning	to	feature	Fukushima	in	their	energy	communications	
-	 and	 whatever	 actually	 happens	 at	 the	 site,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 become	 a	 major	 card	 in	
campaigns	to	promote	renewable	energy	above	nuclear.	(BBC,	2011b)	









Here the addition of ‘slightly’ reduces the Intensity of the ‘relief’ compared with an 
unmarked level. More metaphorical expressions are ones such as: 
52. However,	 Edano	 noted	 that	 insufficient	 cooling	 of	 the	 core	 may	 have	 caused	 excess	
hydrogen	to	accumulate	in	the	building	that	houses	the	core	containment	vessel.	(Asahi	
Shimbun,	2011c)	
Here the cooling is reduced in quality by being ‘insufficient’. I interpret this as a 
description of the force of the cooling, meaning that it is not strong enough.  
 
Minimisation 
The action has no power at all. It is nonexistent and the minimum possible. For instance: 
53. It	contributes	nothing	to	climate	change	and	lacks	some	of	the	more	obvious	drawbacks	
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of	fossil	fuel	generation--no	atmospheric	pollution,	no	acid	rain.	(Hiltzik,	2014)	
Here the action of ‘contributing’ is zero. To give another example:  




Again, here the ‘affect’ is nothing. With cases of Minimisation the action is negated and 
thus in some sense not an action at all. However, from a critical perspective the negation 
of the action is important. It is represented as nonexistent to emphasise the lack of agency, 
and so it has a specific rhetorical purpose.  
 
In summary, Intensity is more ‘semantic’ and less ‘grammatical’ than the previous 
Coreness and Effect sections. Instances of Intensity are less common because Intensity is 
not tied to the necessary grammatical components of a clause. Using Intensity is a 
decision to emphasise or de-emphasise certain actions, and this is what makes it relevant: 
identifying this aspect of agency can help to show the concerns of the text producer. It is 
important to include Intensity as an analytical concept because its somewhat abstract or 
semantic nature means it is overlooked by more formalist approaches, and also because 
it helps with my goal of treating agency as a gradable rather than binary phenomenon. 
 
4.6: Freedom/Constraint  
4.6.1: Overview of Freedom/Constraint 
Freedom/Constraint is about possibilities for action and limitations on action. Freedom 
 71  
exists when an actor is represented as being able to act as they wish, or able to make 
others act as they wish. Constraint exists when an actor is represented as being unable to 
act as they wish, or as having their actions limited by others. In other words, Freedom is 
about applying the actor’s will or objectives, and Constraint is about limitations on the 
actor’s will or objectives. This part of the framework is not tied to any single theoretical 
work, but combines previously disparate linguistic concepts for a specific purpose. Figure 
4.6 shows the categories in this section.  
 
Figure 4.6: Categories of Freedom/Constraint  
	
The basic division is between Freedom and Constraint. This is the presence or absence of 
agency. Constraints are a lack of agency, meaning that Imposition is a stronger lack of 
agency and Attempt is the least severe lack of agency.   
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4.6.2: Freedom/Constraint Categories  
Freedom categories 
Pressure 
Pressure is when the actor is able to impose their will on someone else, by making or 
encouraging them to do something. The most obvious example is what Halliday and 
Matthiessen term the high and medium varieties of ‘enhancing modulation’ causative 




In example 55 the ‘protection system’ makes the ‘public’ pay. More metaphorical 
representations of Pressure are through lexis which shows control. For instance:  
56. Noda	claims	Japan	can	not	maintain	 its	current	 living	standards	without	nuclear	power	
and	that	national	security	dictates	the	country	not	rely	too	heavily	on	imported	oil	and	
natural	gas.	(O'Connor,	2012)	
Here the word ‘dictates’ shows that ‘national security’ forces the country to be self-




Permission is when the actor allows or enables another actor to act as they wish. 
Permission includes what Halliday and Matthiessen term ‘low enhancing modulation 
causatives’ (2004, p. 513). For instance: 	
57. Its	central	thesis	is	that	we	have	allowed	economics	to	overtake	philosophy,	religion	and	
morality	as	the	dominant	ideological	force	in	our	world.	(Shukman,	2011)	
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In example 57 ‘we’ have the power to allow ‘economics’ to ‘overtake’. The examples in 
my research are all formal, but a more metaphorical representation would be something 
like (invented): 
58. They	okayed	his	going.	
Both Pressure and Permission involve power over another actor. The difference in agency 
is that with Pressure the desire for the action to occur resides in the actor, whereas with 
Permission the desire for the action to occur resides in another actor. In other words, the 
power to make others carry out one’s wishes is a greater Freedom than the power to allow 
others to carry out their own wishes.  
 
The categories Pressure and Permission are external, in that the actor’s agency affects 
another actor. These are more agentive because the ability to influence another actor is an 
interactive, or social, power. The next categories of Ability and Decision are internal, as 
they refer to the actor itself. They may imply, but do not require, such social power. 
 
Ability 
Ability is the freedom to manifest one’s will. This is often lexis indicating ability and 
success. It includes the sense of Dynamic modality as the ability to do something (Palmer, 
2001), or “an ascription of a capacity to the subject-participant of the clause” (Nuyts, 
2006, p. 3). For example: 
59. Millions	of	people	in	the	developing	world	still	live	in	poverty,	which	access	to	energy	can	
alleviate.	(Windridge,	2011)	
An example of a more metaphorical representation is: 




Here the ‘level of control’ connotes an ability (to control the situation). Ability also 
involves being free from an outside influence, or resisting obligations. For example: 
61. Tokyo	 Electric	 Power,	which	 runs	 the	 plant,	 said	 the	 reactor's	 containment	 vessel	 had	
resisted	the	impact.	(BBC,	2011c)	
In this example I interpret ‘resisted’ as overcoming the potential influence of the ‘impact’. 
The agency in an Ability is thus the capacity to act as one wishes or to act free from 
potential constraint.  
 
Decision 
Decision is the freedom to exercise one’s will by choosing how to act. The most straight-
forward cases are a relatively fixed set of verb-plus-infinitive or gerund constructions that 
indicate the actor’s volition. For example:  
62. In	 2011	 came	 the	 Fukushima	 disaster	 and	 the	 German	 government’s	 decision	 not	 to	
replace	existing	nuclear	reactors	when	they	reach	the	end	of	their	working	life.	(Barnham,	
2014)	
It also includes more metaphorical lexis showing that the actor could choose their course 
of action. For instance:  
63. Water	 levels	were	now	 falling	at	 reactor	2,	which	 is	 to	be	doused	with	 sea	water,	 said	
government	spokesman	Yukio	Edano.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2012b)	
In example 63 the phrase ‘is to be’ shows that the actor in charge of the situation at 
Fukushima has the power to make plans for how to deal with this situation.  
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I rank Decision as less agentive than Ability because a Decision represents the power to 
choose how to act, but Ability represents the power to manifest the act. It reflects a 
difference in the nature of the Freedom, between a volitional sense and an actionable 
sense. Although not as strong as the other senses of agency in Freedom, Decision is 
nonetheless important. Presenting oneself as choosing a course of action is one way to 
stress one’s own agency (Whittle and Mueller, 2016).  
 
Constraint categories 
Constraint is when the actor cannot impose their will, either because they are unable to 
do so or because an external force prevents them from doing so.  
 
Attempt 
This is when the success of the action is represented as not being under the complete 
control of the actor. In other words, the outcome of the action is not guaranteed. There is 
a lack of agency because the actor cannot ensure the imposition of their will. It is often 
the sense of ‘trying’. For instance:  
64. An	estimated	500	residents	were	still	trying	to	leave	the	area.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011b)	
In 64 the success of ‘leaving’ is not ensured. More metaphorical representations are ones 
such as:  
65. TEPCO	 has	 had	 difficulty	 removing	 heat	 from	 the	 reactor	 core	 as	 the	 emergency	 core	
cooling	system	(ECCS)	failed	to	work	after	the	March	11	magnitude-9.0	quake	shut	down	
the	reactor.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011a)	
In 65 it is uncertain whether ‘removing heat’ can be completed. Attempt is the least 
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‘Constraining’ of all the Constraints (meaning it is the least reduction in agency) because 
it implies difficulty but not impossibility. There is the implied or theoretical possibility 
that the actors will succeed. The analytic value of this category is how it identifies what 
is of concern for text producers: when the outcome of an action is marked as uncertain it 
is likely of importance.  
 
Inability 
This is a lack of ability to impose the actor’s will or fulfill the actor’s wishes. In addition 
to the simple use of ‘could not’, the most common examples are verb-plus-infinitive or 
gerund constructions indicating lack of ability or success. For example:  
66. Hundreds	of	thousands	of	victims,	who	fled	their	homes	to	escape	the	release	of	radiation	
from	the	crippled	Fukushima	nuclear	plant	still	 live	 in	 limbo,	unable	to	return	home	or	
rebuild	their	lives	elsewhere.	(Naidoo,	2013)	
An Inability can also involve a more metaphorical lack of control: 
67. It	 has	been	 shocking	 to	 see	one	of	 the	wealthiest	nations	 reduced	 to	 such	devastated	
impotence.	(The	Independent,	2011)	
In 67 ‘impotence’ represents a generalised inability to act. Inability is a stronger 
Constraint than Attempt because whereas with Attempt the outcome is in doubt but 
possible, with Inability the failure is certain.    
 
The categories of Attempt and Inability are internal, because the source of the Constraint 
is represented as being with the actor. The next two categories of Situational and 
Imposition are external, as the source of the Constraint is represented as an outside force 
beyond the actor’s control. They are stronger Constraints because the actor has less 
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influence over the action and is represented with less social power. Sealey makes a similar 
point in her corpus study of representations of constraint. She divides constraints into a 
‘dynamic’ sense of things people could not do, and a ‘deontic’ sense of what people are 
not allowed to do. She argues there is an important distinction between presenting the 
negative polarity as associated with the subject rather than with the social or economic 
conditions the subject is constrained by (2012, p. 206). 
 
Situational 
Situational means that the actor is forced into a negative situation by an outside force. 
The negative situation is one in which the actor cannot act as they wish. This category is 
not closely linked to particular grammatical forms. Rather, it is a representation indicating 
that the actor is unable to act because of an outside influence. For example: 
68. There	were	back-up	diesel	generators,	but	the	tsunami	rendered	them	ineffective.	(The	
Independent,	2011)	
In 68 the ‘generators’ are caused to be useless by the effect of the tsunami. Another 
example is: 
69. Reactors	 are	 the	 victim	 of	 low	 natural	 gas	 prices,	 aging	 infrastructure,	 costly	 post-
Fukushima	regulations	and	heavily	subsidized	wind	and	solar	power.	(Bryce,	2016)	
In 69 ‘gas prices’, ‘aging infrastructure’, ‘regulations’ and ‘subsidies’ result in a negative 
situation for ‘reactors’ (they are less viable). As the examples here show, the category 
Situational is heavily lexical and pragmatic, and thus require a certain amount of 
interpretation. Situational Constraints have an inherently passive, victimised sense of 
something happening to the actor which is beyond their control. This is frequently 
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represented lexically rather than grammatically.  
 
Imposition 
Imposition is when the actor is caused to do something against their will. This can be 
deliberate or can be the result of circumstances. One kind of Imposition is deontic 
modality of the “had to” kind. Lyons defines deontic commitment as the sense that 
speakers commit themselves “to the necessity of some course of action” and express 
“their will that something be so” (1995, p. 254). For example: 
70. Bailout	is	a	nasty	word	and	Washington	politicians	won't	like	providing	loads	of	cash	to	
companies	like	Exelon	(market	capitalization:	about	$30	billion).	Nevertheless,	if	keeping	
domestic	 carbon-dioxide	 emissions	 in	 check	 is	 really	 a	 priority,	 representatives	 and	
senators	will	have	to	act.	(Bryce,	2016)	
Another common representation includes ‘needs’, when the ‘need’ carries the sense that 
an actor must do something. For instance:  
71. We	as	a	nation	have	been	endowed	with	enough	sun	light	and	wind.	We	need	to	harness	
that.	(Kaira,	2011)	




Imposition is a stronger Constraint than Situational because in an Imposition the actor 
has to do something, whereas in Situational the actor cannot act in some way. The 
imposition of an outside force making an actor act implies a greater lack of agency.  
 
In conclusion, this section of the framework is perhaps more linguistically varied than 
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other sections, and relies more on pragmatic interpretation. In general, it relates to what 
has been termed Deontic and Dynamic modality, with deontic modality being obligations 
and permission, and dynamic modality being ability and volition (Bednarek, 2006, p. 21). 
Analysing Freedom/Constraint is similar to analysing Intensity, in that expressions of 
Freedom/Constraint are not a necessary component of a clause and so are less frequent, 
and thus more likely to be a deliberate choice on the part of the text producer. This section 
of the framework is important because the representations its captures are always related 
to agency: Freedom and Constraint is inherently agentive or non-agentive.  
 
4.7: The complete framework 
It is now time to bring everything together. I have detailed the four aspects of agency 
individually, but they combine into the overall framework in Figure 4.7 on the next page. 
This is a network of choices to classify the different aspects of agency that a 
representation of action may potentially embody.  
 
For reference, Appendix A is a complete application of this framework to the foreword to 
TEPCO’s report on the causes of the Fukushima disaster (which I discuss in chapter six). 
Appendix A marks up the text according to each of the four sections of the framework, 
with the different categories of each section highlighted in different colours.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 (overleaf): Action-Agency framework 
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4.8: The role of interpretation in applying the framework 
I have exemplified categories of the framework with prototypical examples in order to 
introduce them as clearly as possible. I have argued that the strength of this kind of 
sociosemantic approach is the flexibility it offers. However, as Wodak and Meyer explain, 
for any CDA approach, “at each level a number of selections have to be made” (2001, p. 
14). In this case choosing the flexibility of an intermediate analytical position between 
form and function means that applying the framework sometimes requires interpretation. 
In certain instances this involves assigning representations of action to one category rather 
than another, and in other instances it may involve deciding whether a representation of 
action falls under a category or not. I shall now illustrate this with some examples. These 
represent cases that I found challenging in the development and application of the 
framework. I discuss these cases firstly to justify the approach that I took to them, and 
secondly to indicate questions that any other researcher who chooses to use this 
framework is likely to face.  
 
When deciding Coreness, there are cases in which a passive verb is used, but it can be 
classed as Activation. For example:  
73. Tokyo	 Electric	 Power	 said	 four	 of	 its	 workers	 had	 been	 injured	 in	 Saturday's	 blast	 at	
Fukushima,	 250km	 (155	 miles)	 north	 of	 Tokyo,	 but	 that	 their	 injuries	 were	 not	 life-
threatening.	(BBC,	2011c)	
In example 73 the use of ‘injured in’ rather than ‘injured by’ foregrounds the workers, as 
opposed to the agency of the blast. Other, more ‘borderline’, cases of Activation are 
formal expressions such as:   
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74. If	the	government	is	to	continue	the	project	serious	revision	is	required.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	
2012b)	
Here ‘is to continue’ performs the same function as ‘continue’. Examples 73 and 74 
demonstrate the principle I operate on as prioritising (what I see as) the pragmatic intent 
of the language use. Another example of this can be seen with the category of Ellipsis. 




In cases such as these the word ‘forcing’ could be interpreted as an action linked to the 
‘protection system’, or as a neutral situation arising independently of the actions of the 
system. In this case I favour an interpretation as the action of the ‘protection system’, 
along the lines of a rewording such as ‘the protection system forces the public to pay the 
rest’.  
 
A case that frequently requires interpretation is deciding what constitutes an ‘Inferable’ 
passive. When applying this category I take a generous interpretation of when the actor 
can be inferred. The yardstick is whether the actor can be inferred based on general 





There does not seem to be any obscuring or manipulation here - the only possible actor is 
the nuclear regulators who are responsible for issuing ‘permission’. Although this 
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ambiguity with inferring actors is a general feature of language use and not specific to the 
framework I use, it nonetheless needs to be acknowledged. 
 
I take a generous view of what constitutes a representation of action, to try to include as 
much of the text’s meaning as possible. The most obvious case when this requires 
interpretation is for grammatical metaphor. For example, a more borderline case is:  
77. Malfunctions	at	nuclear	facilities	quite	properly	cause	alarm	but	such	alarm	takes	root	in	
the	public	imagination	at	least	in	part	for	spurious	reasons:	images	of	mushroom	clouds	
and	mad	 scientists	 spring	 to	mind	 and	 the	 horror	 is	magnified	 because	 the	 danger	 is	
unseen	-	of	toxins	invisibly	spread	on	the	wind	and	in	rain.	(The	New	Zealand	Herald,	2011)	
I take ‘public imagination’ here to be the general public’s thinking process. Although 
abstract, this represents an act of thinking. A similar example is expressions which show 
the manner of an action, such as: 
78. The	world	 has	 been	watching	with	 consternation	 the	meltdown	 at	 Japan’s	 Fukushima	
nuclear	plant	following	the	massive	earthquake	and	the	devastating	tsunami	that	hit	the	
country	10	days	ago.	(Kaira,	2011)	
The phrase ‘with consternation’ is like an adverb of manner in that it adds to the nature 
of how the ‘watching’ occurs. I interpret this ‘consternation’ as an additional action 
indicating a psychological process of apprehension.  
 
A final area to mention concerns the nature of Effect and Intensity. In regard to the Effect 
categories, Halliday and Matthiessen acknowledge that process types are not fixed 
categories, and indeed argue that the “systemic indeterminacy” by which categories blend 
into one another is an intrinsic feature of the system (2004, p. 172-173). Effect categories 
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are inspired by, rather than replicas of, process types, but the same indeterminacy can be 
seen. For instance: 
79. A	similar	cooling	system	breakdown	preceded	the	explosions	at	reactors	1	and	3.	(BBC,	
2011c)	
This is a kind of temporal sequence, but I interpret it as a representation of the physical 
activity occurring, and thus an Instrumental action. Similarly, deciding what constitutes 
an instance of Intensity sometimes requires judging semantics. Essentially, the test is 
whether a more extreme or less extreme reformulation of the word is possible. To give an 
invented example: 
80. The	storm	broke	the	sea	wall.	
This action of ‘broke’ might be represented with decreased power as ‘dented’ or with 
increased power as ‘destroyed’. This of course leads to the issue of deciding what 
constitutes the correct objective criteria for ‘broke’. Finding a standardised norm to base 
the criteria on is hard, as Intensity is relative to other possible actions. However, this issue 
is inevitable if one wishes to address an idea like Intensity. This is not to say that the 
difficulty invalidates the analysis, but the absence of concrete rules should be 
acknowledged.   
 
The discussion here emphasises that the concept of agency, as I have chosen to approach 
it, does not map directly and unambiguously onto the forms of the English language. 
Some degree of interpretation is inevitable in order to measure it. As Wodak argues, CDA 
is not about evaluating what is ‘right' or ‘wrong', but rather about justifying why certain 
interpretations of discursive events seem more valid than others (2001, p. 65). Flowerdew 
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makes a similar point, arguing that when multiple possibilities exist the most reasonable 
response is simply to explain alternatives and argue for the most plausible one (1999, p. 
1091). With this in mind, when the framework is applied in the following three chapters 
I will add a brief explanation if I feel my choice of category requires justification.  
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5. AGENCY IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN REPORTING OF THE 
FUKUSHIMA DISASTER 
 
5.1: Chapter aims  
In this chapter I investigate how differences in the representation of agency between 
foreign and domestic reporting may influence the interpretation of Fukushima. I compare 
reporting of the initial stage of the disaster in a Japanese news source (the Asahi Shimbun 
newspaper) and a British news source (the BBC). I take a quantitative approach, looking 
at overall trends in reporting. I am interested in the effect of patterns in the portrayal of 
agency. The research question guiding this chapter is: 
 How do representations of agency reflect a more neutral or critical reporting stance? 
 
Initial reporting of a disaster is important because it influences the future narrative that 
develops around the disaster. Cox et al. explain that: 
“research on the intersection of media and disasters has suggested that media plays a 
critical role in influencing not only public opinion about the salience of a disaster 
(Sood, Stockdale, & Rogers, 1987), but also attitudes toward and evaluations of the 
official response to the disaster and the preferred responses of those directly and 
indirectly affected (Gaddy & Tanjong, 1986; Garner, 1996).” (2008, p. 470) 
In particular, the way agency is represented affects how a disaster is interpreted later on, 
when questions of culpability and blame arise. As I explained in chapter two, this is 
relevant in the case of Fukushima because of the degree to which causes and 
responsibility could be contested.  
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5.2: Disaster timeline 
I focus on reporting of the beginning of the disaster. It is useful to briefly recap the main 
events at this time:  
 March 11th: a magnitude 9 earthquake caused a tsunami which inundated the 
Fukushima nuclear plant, disabling the diesel generators and most of the emergency 
core cooling system. An evacuation order for residents within 3 kilometres of the 
plant was issued. 
 March 12th: the plant’s backup battery power system ran out, and without sufficient 
cooling the nuclear fuel rods became exposed. An explosion occurred at the plant. 
The evacuation order was extended to 10 kilometres and later in the day to 20 
kilometres.   
 March 13th: lack of cooling began damaging one of the nuclear reactor cores. 
Seawater was pumped into the plant in an attempt to cool the reactors. Radioactive 
air was vented to release pressure in buildings and prevent further explosions.  
 March 14th: an explosion in one reactor building damaged another reactor building, 
beginning reactor core damage in this second unit and injuring a number of workers. 
The reactor's spent fuel pool became exposed to the atmosphere.  
 March 15th: two more explosions and a fire occurred. Radiation levels at the plant 
were confirmed as fatal.  
This initial period is important because it was when the situation at the plant steadily 
deteriorated and the potential for a serious nuclear disaster became clear.   
 
5.3: Differences in domestic and foreign reporting of the Fukushima disaster   
I have chosen to compare domestic and foreign news sources because significant 
differences have been noted between their reporting of the situation at Fukushima. Harlan 
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(2011) notes the measured response of Japanese media, compared with the sensationalism 
of some foreign media. He observes that domestic media tended to report factual 
information in a descriptive fashion, while foreign media focused on the potential for 
nuclear disaster. Similarly, Brason (2011) describes how the response to the crisis among 
domestic media was to remain calm, and by contrast foreign media tended to be more 
alarmist. Brason also argues that Japanese reporting lacked a critical focus, assessing the 
disaster itself rather than the policies of nuclear power that may have led to the disaster. 
Hara (2013) notes how the Japanese media blamed the authorities for their inability to 
avoid nuclear accidents whilst simultaneously helping to calm people about the accident. 
He argues this contradiction between apportioning blame and downplaying danger is 
likely because of links between the media, power companies and the government (2013, 
p. 32). In contrast, non-Japanese coverage of Fukushima honed in on the potential for 
nuclear disaster, presumably as this was the prime draw for their readership. Indeed, this 
went so far that the Japanese Foreign Ministry strongly criticised the foreign media for 
“excessive” reporting that was causing unnecessary panic, and asked them to be more 
objective (Friedman, 2011).  
 
One reason that has been given for the comparatively less critical tone of Japanese 
reporting is a reliance on official sources. Johnston (2011) explains that foreign media 
made more effort to include a greater variety of sources, whereas Japanese media made 
heavy use of official sources and were more trusting of these sources than foreign media. 
This is backed up by a more linguistically-oriented study by Morimura (2014), who 
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compared reporting of the disaster in the Japanese newspaper The Yomiuri Shimbun with 
The New York Times. Morimura found that the primary source for the Japanese 
newspaper was government officials and politicians, whereas the New York Times relied 
more on external sources such as experts and professors (2014, p. 64). A similar 
conclusion is made by Ito, who compared news coverage of the disaster by Japanese 
television stations. Ito claims that even the respected public broadcaster NHK did not 
report the crisis thoroughly, but only covered what the Japanese government and TEPCO 
said. Ito makes the damning conclusion that “Despite such an enormously dangerous 
situation, NHK consistently failed in reporting the real crisis” (cited in Arita, 2012, p. 47).  
 
Another feature that has been observed in Japanese reporting is the technical nature of 
coverage of the disaster. For instance, Hirakawa and Shirabe (2015) criticise Japanese 
reporting for rhetorically marginalising public anxieties over radioactive contamination. 
One of the ways in which this was done is by what they term ‘scienceplanation’, meaning 
technical explanations which imply that if people feel anxiety about risk it is they that are 
to blame because they are ignorant of science. This trend is also addressed in a study by 
Tollefson (2014), who examined the representation of Fukushima in the Japanese 
broadsheet The Daily Yomiuri. He identifies a similar technical approach to reporting 
that he calls an ‘ideology of technoscience’. Some of the characteristics he associates with 
this are representing radiation contamination as isolated, highly localised and posing no 
immediate threat to health, as well as normalising radiation and decontextualising 
technical information about the disaster. He makes one point that is particularly relevant 
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to my area of concern; he argues that this ideology of technoscience is characterised by 
language that is low in affect and by agentless constructions that avoid explicit 
assignment of responsibility for the disaster (2014, p. 312). This seems to be an 
observation rather than a systematically researched conclusion, so it is something that my 
analysis can help to investigate in detail.  
 
Clearly, given the range of media that could be termed ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ reporting, 
it is hard to make generalisations. However, the themes that emerge are comparatively 
less focus on danger, more reliance on official sources, and a less critical tone in Japanese 
media, compared with more focus on danger, use of a greater variety of sources, and a 
more critical tone in non-Japanese media. Another theme is the criticism of an overly-
technological slant to Japanese reporting that failed to take ordinary citizens’ concerns 
into account. Most of the literature discussed here is general commentary on 
characteristics of media reporting. In this chapter I therefore add a more specifically 
linguistic analysis of these issues, and show how my findings relate to the observations 
of others.  
 
5.4: Selection of texts and approach to analysis of agency in media reporting of 
Fukushima  
5.4.1: Source material   
I compare reporting in the English online version of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper and 
the BBC online news site. The Asahi Shimbun was established in 1879, has the second 
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largest circulation in Japan, and is read by an estimated 14 million people a day (Asahi 
Shimbun, Strength). It is politically left of centre. At the time its English language website 
contained a number of English versions of its main stories (this has now been expanded 
to a full English-language version of the newspaper). These stories are direct translations 
of the Japanese print edition of the newspaper (Asahi Shimbun, Site Policy). The BBC 
news website launched in November 1997. It is written by online journalists from the 
main BBC newsroom and from the BBC's specialist units (BBC, News Sources). I chose 
these sources because both are well-established media institutions and both are 
considered reputable hard news sources. In addition, initial reading suggests that both 
have a similar tone of straight-forward reporting of the situation in a concise fashion 
without overt authorial commentary. Some foreign coverage of Fukushima was certainly 
over-exaggerated and irresponsible, but the BBC reporting was professional and thus 
offers a more suitable comparison with domestic Japanese media.  
 
To find material I searched the websites of the Asahi Shimbun and the BBC through the 
time period of March 12th to March 15th 2011. I selected articles based on the level of 
detail about the disaster, choosing more detailed articles that contained more material for 
analysis. The tables overleaf show the dates, titles and word counts of the articles used. 
All articles are credited to the BBC or the Asahi Shimbun rather than specific reporters. 
Links for the articles are listed in Appendix B.  
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Table 5.4.1: Asahi Shimbun articles  







Table 5.4.2: BBC articles  
Date Title Words 
12	03	2011	 Japan	earthquake:	Explosion	at	Fukushima	nuclear	plant	 379	





As the tables show, I included one article from the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th. A fifth article 
was chosen to make the total word count for each source similar. The word count for the 
Asahi Shimbun texts is 3,451 words and the BBC texts is 3,659 words. This word count 
and five article sample size is enough for a preliminary exploration of how each source 
represented the disaster. 
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5.4.2 Analytical approach  
I first applied the framework to the articles. I present the results of this application, going 
through each of the four parts of the framework in turn (beginning with Coreness, then 
Effect, then Intensity, and finally Freedom/Constraint). I discuss both sources together so 
that each aspect of agency can be directly compared. The discussion of each section of 
the framework has two stages. I first compare the normalized frequencies of instances of 
each category of agency in each source, per 10,000 words. So for example I compare the 
normalized frequencies of each category of Coreness in the Asahi articles with those in 
the BBC articles. This shows general representational trends in each source. I then narrow 
the focus to compare the two actors that are most frequently represented in each source. 
These are the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Fukushima nuclear plant. 
(For clarity, when I refer to the plant as a specific actor I shall capitalise it as ‘Plant’). 
These actors are referred to in multiple ways in both sources. When deciding whether one 
of these groups was the actor, I included the various different lexicalisations of these 
groups, as well as the instances when they could be inferred as doing an action. The table 
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The degree of agency afforded to these actors is important because it could suggest the 
disaster was the result of management incompetence (in the case of TEPCO) or of 
technical malfunction (in the case of the Plant). As will be discussed in the next chapter 
when I look at official reports into the disaster, narratives of responsibility differed over 
the culpability of these actors. 
 
In the analysis I use the framework to identify and exemplify points of importance. I focus 
on differences between each source and how these trends paint different pictures of 
agency. I present quantitative information about the frequencies of each kind of action, 
exemplify these differences, and comment on the effect of these differences in light of 
the points mentioned in the literature review. My findings support what has been said by 
others. I link the representation of agency in the Asahi Shimbun to a more dispassionate 
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and neutral reporting style, and the representation of agency in the BBC to a more 
evaluative and critical reporting style. I show how representation of the Plant itself is the 
biggest difference between each source. I argue that in Asahi agency is clearer and more 
straightforward, but is associated with inanimate actors. I argue that an overreliance on 
official sources frames the disaster through the view of these official sources, which 
subtly backgrounds the danger involved. The result is a kind of technologicalisation of 
the disaster in the Asahi Shimbun. 
 
5.5: Comparison of Coreness in each source 
5.5.1: Overall Coreness 
First, I consider how Core the representations of actions are in each source. Table 5.5.1 
on the following page compares normalized frequencies of each category of Dynamic and 
Static action in each source, per 10,000 words. To recap, the table is organised so the 
strongest agency is at the top and the weakest agency is at the bottom. For reference, I 
also include the total instances of Coreness in each source and the ratio of Dynamic to 
Static action.    
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Table 5.5.1: Normalized frequencies of Coreness in each source 
Asahi: 466 instances overall, 72% Dynamic and 28% Static.  
BBC: 518 instances overall, 61% Dynamic and 39% Static.  
	
The frequencies of many categories of Coreness are similar in each source. The main 
difference is that Asahi has a greater amount of Dynamic action and the BBC a greater 
amount of Static action. In terms of specific categories, Asahi has more frequent Ellipsis 
and Embedded, and the BBC has more frequent Descriptivation and Relational. As the 
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tendency in Asahi and a more ‘evaluative’ tendency in the BBC. In terms of how critical 
each source is, Asahi reporting contains more details of what is happening, whereas BBC 
reporting contains more evaluation of what is happening and thus more representation of 
risk.  
 
The more frequent Dynamic action in Asahi reflects how Asahi tends to simply describe 
what is happening whereas the BBC adds more interpretation of events. For instance, here 
is a comparison of how each source represents an explosion that occurred on the 14th of 
March. Dynamic action is highlighted in red and Static action in blue (Coreness covers 
many of the linguistic forms in these extracts, so I only highlight those that are relevant 
for the discussion of each example): 






more	 serious	 incident	 than	 the	 previous	 explosions,	 which	 were	 thought	 just	 to	 have	
damaged	the	buildings	housing	the	reactors.	(BBC,	2011e)	
In example 1 Asahi represents the explosion with Dynamic Activation as ‘occurred’. It is 
simply a process that takes place. In example 2 the BBC reports the explosion but also 
includes an assessment with a Static Relational ‘would make it more serious’. The BBC 
provides an evaluation of the consequences of the explosion that Asahi does not. To 
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further illustrate, the next two examples compare reporting of falling water levels inside 








were	 fully	 exposed	 twice.	 International	 nuclear	 watchdogs	 said	 there	 was	 no	 sign	 of	 a	
meltdown	but	one	minister	said	a	melting	of	rods	was	"highly	likely"	to	be	happening.	(BBC,	
2011c)	
Asahi uses six Dynamic actions to provide a straightforward description of what is 
happening. It explains that nuclear fuel rods are exposed, but the consequences of this are 
unstated. In contrast, the BBC has less specific detail about what is happening, with two 
Dynamic actions explaining the situation, and has more about the consequences of what 
is happening. Two different sources are used to evaluate the possibility of meltdown with 
the Static actions ‘was no sign’ and ‘highly likely’. As a final example, the extracts below 
compare the representation of Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s message concerning 
the disaster: 
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Asahi paraphrases the content of the Prime Minister’s address, with Dynamic actions that 
focus on actions that local people should take. The BBC includes the instruction to locals 
to stay at home, but also the aspects of Kan’s address that evaluate the danger posed by 
radiation - the Static ‘is still a very high risk’ and ‘were at risk’. The three comparisons 
provided here are illustrative of a trend whereby the Asahi Shimbun concentrates more 
on what is happening, describing the processes accurately and congruently but without 
comment. In contrast, the BBC is more likely to balance descriptions of events with the 
implications of what is happening, and thus includes more about potential danger and risk.  
 
In addition to the overall difference between levels of Dynamic and Static action, Asahi 
features more instances of two categories of Dynamic action with slightly less Coreness 
- Embedded and Ellipsis. This is further evidence of the greater level of description of 
what is occurring in Asahi, as these features tend to occur when there is greater detail of 
what is happening at the plant. For instance (Embedded red underlined, Ellipsis red 
bold): 
7. Although	 the	 explosion	 on	 March	 12	 did	 not	 compromise	 the	 pressure	 vessel	 or	 the	
containment	vessel	of	the	No.	1	reactor,	there	were	still	concerns	that	an	explosion	could	




However, as well as simply reflecting the density of description, the fact that these 
categories are slightly less agentive forms of Dynamic action also means they can 
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background risk. For instance, here is a comparison of how the same lexis (‘spark’) is 
used differently in each source (Activation red and Ellipsis red bold): 
9. The	No.	1,	2	and	3	reactors	of	the	plant	were	shut	down	when	the	magnitude-9	earthquake	




A subtle difference can be seen here. In the BBC the actor is ‘news’ (from officials) that 
sparks fears, and this action has clearer Coreness with Activation. In Asahi, the actor 
responsible for sparking fears is the ‘failure of systems at the plant’, and the Coreness is 
weaker with Ellipsis. In other words, in the BBC the danger is both more Core and more 
closely associated with a human actor. To give another example (Dynamic red and Static 
blue): 
11. Although	 the	 explosion	 on	 March	 12	 did	 not	 compromise	 the	 pressure	 vessel	 or	 the	
containment	vessel	of	the	No.	1	reactor,	there	were	still	concerns	that	an	explosion	could	




In the BBC the actor ‘officials’ do an Activation ‘warned’ and there is a Static Relational 
assessment of the risk as ‘was possible’. The risk is clearly represented as coming from 
the human source (‘officials’). In contrast, in Asahi the source of risk is presented as 
‘concerns’, so is a Static Relational action with no named actor. The actor associated with 
risk is ‘an explosion’ doing an Embedded ‘could rupture’ then Ellipsis ‘releasing’. These 
examples illustrate how in Asahi the greater instances of Dynamic categories of action 
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which have slightly lower levels of agency can somewhat background representation of 
risk. It is not that danger is hidden, rather that weaker Coreness means there is more 
implication of agency.  
 
To sum up, the patterns of Coreness in each source reflect how Asahi uses a more 
straightforward ‘reporting the facts’ tone and the BBC includes more evaluation. Moving 
from trends in each source as a whole, I now look at the two main actors in each source: 
TEPCO and the Plant. I discuss each one in turn.  
 
5.5.2: TEPCO Coreness   
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Table 5.5.2: Normalized frequencies of Coreness for TEPCO 
Asahi Shimbun: 97 instances overall, 75% Dynamic and 25% Static.  
BBC: 59 instances overall, 76% Dynamic and 24% Static.  
	
The ratio of Dynamic and Static action is similar in each source. However, there are more 
overall instances in Asahi, so TEPCO is more prominently represented. One reason is 
because, as noted above, Asahi concentrates more on reporting what is happening rather 
than commenting on what is happening, so the actions of the principal actors feature more.  
 
When examining overall trends in each source I noted that Asahi incudes less evaluation 
of risk and in some cases backgrounds risk by representing potential danger with less 
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be interpreted negatively are more often Static, and actions without negative connotations 





Here the Coreness differs depending on the nature of the action. The Dynamic actions are 
things TEPCO say they will do to help, and thus ‘positives’. In contrast, the potentially 
negative action is Static - representation of a previous problem is Engaged (‘recurrence’), 
as is the representation of TEPCO’s previous inability (‘failure’). This kind of neutral 
passing on of official statements produces a subtle backgrounding of negative action. To 
give another example:  
14. Radiation	 levels	 exceeding	 legally	 established	 safety	 standards	 were	 recorded	 at	 the	
boundary	to	the	No.	1	Fukushima	site,	creating	an	emergency	situation	that	TEPCO	reported	
to	the	Ministry	of	Economy,	Trade	and	Industry	on	Sunday.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011b)	
Here there is a difference between the human and inanimate actors. TEPCO do two 
Dynamic actions of ‘reported’ (Embedded) and ‘were recorded’ (Inferable Passive). Their 
responsibility is clearer, but these actions are benign. In contrast, radiation is the actor for 
‘exceeding’ (Descriptivation) and ‘creating’ (Ellipsis). The actions of the human actor are 
more Core and neutral, whereas the actions of radiation are less Core and dangerous. To 
further illustrate, the following example is how Asahi reports the failure by TEPCO in 




 104  
The only human actors are ‘experts’, who do Projection (‘say’). The action by TEPCO is 
described as ‘three main phases’ and is represented with a Relational. When a Dynamic 
action of ‘failed’ occurs it is the ‘phase’ that failed, not any human agent.  
 
TEPCO is a more prominent actor in the Asahi Shimbun, and there are differences in the 
nature of actions that are foregrounded and backgrounded. This helps to frame an official 
evaluation of the situation as not something to worry about. Again, it is not that 
information is hidden in Asahi or skewed in the BBC, but that continuous patterns of 
representation over a number of articles add up over time to foreground or abstract risk.  
 
5.5.3: Plant Coreness   
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Table 5.5.3: Normalized frequencies of Coreness for the Plant 
Asahi Shimbun: 177 instances overall, 62% Dynamic and 38% Static.   
BBC: 127 instances overall, 44% Dynamic and 56% Static.  
	
The noticeable difference is that Asahi has a greater percentage of Dynamic action by the 
Plant than the BBC. This reinforces the point that Asahi contains more description of 
what is happening. There are also more instances of Plant action, and so an inanimate 
actor has a more prominent role in Asahi than in the BBC. 
 
This greater representation of the Plant in Asahi seems to be evidence of what has been 
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Asahi reporting (Dynamic action in red and words showing the Plant is the actor 
underlined): 
16. Edano	later	Sunday	provided	more	details.	He	said	that	after	the	fuel	rods	were	exposed	for	







There are many instances of Dynamic action here. The government spokesperson Yukio 
Edano, the human actor, does Projection three times (two cases of ‘said’ and ‘noted’) and 
Activation once (‘provided’). In contrast, the inanimate actors underlined are associated 
with the Plant and do all the ‘dangerous’ actions. This frequent representation of technical 
action suggests the source and causation of danger is the Plant, as opposed to those in 
control of the Plant. The point here is that technical descriptions are more foregrounded 
in Asahi and human agency is, by extension, backgrounded.   
 
In contrast, in the BBC there is a higher level of Static action by the Plant. This is because 
reporting of the Plant is more likely to include evaluations of danger. For instance 
(Descriptivation blue underlined):  
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The Plant has less agency because there are more abstract evaluations of the significance 
of what is happening rather than Core representations of what is going on. In other words, 
the Plant is less of an ‘actor’ and more of a signifier.   
 
5.6: Comparison of Effect in each source 
I now discuss Effect, to show the nature of actions included in each source.  
 
5.6.1: Overall Effect 
Table 5.6.1 on the following page shows normalized frequencies of categories of Effect 
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Table 5.6.1: Normalized frequencies of Effect in each source  
Asahi: 324 instances overall.  
BBC: 378 instances overall.  
	
The overall frequencies of most categories are reasonably similar. The difference is that 
Asahi has slightly more Interactive and Instrumental actions, whereas the BBC has many 
more Characteristics. This reinforces points I made when discussing Coreness. Interactive 
and Instrumental both refer to concrete physical effects, and these types of action are 
more frequent in Asahi because it has more straight-forward descriptions of the unfolding 
situation at the plant. In contrast, the BBC has more Characteristics because it includes 
more evaluation of the unfolding situation. As these points were exemplified previously 
I will not provide more examples, and will instead move on to discussing TEPCO and the 
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5.6.2: TEPCO Effect  
Table 5.6.2: Normalized frequencies of Effect for TEPCO  
Asahi: 64 instances overall. 
BBC: 41 instances overall. 
	
TEPCO has more overall instances of Effect in Asahi, and the difference is that Asahi 
features more frequent TEPCO Interactive action and slightly more frequent Semiotic 
action. This is primarily because, as mentioned already, there is much description of them 
doing things to the plant. Asahi has more about TEPCO’s efforts to deal with the situation 
at Fukushima, so they are strongly agentive in this sense, as they are represented with the 
power to affect the world. Given that TEPCO was having limited success in making the 
plant safe, one possible interpretation of this strong level of agency might be that TEPCO 
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analysis suggests a more positive interpretation, one in which they are portrayed as 
agentive in correcting the situation. For instance (Interactive actions in red):   
20. If	 coolant	within	 the	 core	 continues	 to	 evaporate	 and	 generate	 steam,	 the	 accumulated	
pressure	 could	 eventually	 rupture	 the	 containment	 vessel	 and	 release	 large	 amounts	 of	
radioactive	materials	into	the	atmosphere.	To	avert	that	scenario,	TEPCO	began	releasing	







In example 20 TEPCO is acting ‘to avert a scenario’, and in 21 to ‘cool reactors’, meaning 
their Interactive action is to protect as much as fix their mistakes. Their Interactive action 
is to stop something happening at the plant, with the responsibility for problems located 
in the plant itself. I mentioned previously how in Asahi official voices frame information, 
and this information is presented at face value with less analysis than in the BBC. The 
same phenomenon can be seen here in how the voices of TEPCO (20) and the Nuclear 
and Industrial Safety Agency (21) frame the descriptions of what is happening. So, as 
well as the voice of TEPCO being reported more often, the Interactive actions TEPCO 
are taking are more likely to feature in Asahi. The effect of this is complex. In one sense 
TEPCO are associated with the problems at the plant (a kind of guilt by association). In 
another sense, however, they are portrayed as struggling in a difficult situation and 
working hard to solve the problems. A close look at agency suggests the latter 
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interpretation. The comparatively stronger Effect for TEPCO in Asahi reporting gives 
more sense of taking responsibility for problems than being responsible for problems. 
 
Turning to the greater frequency of Semiotic action by TEPCO in Asahi, this supports the 
arguments made in Coreness about how official voices frame action, and how danger is 




officials	had	 informed	 them	that	water	 supply	mechanisms	 to	cool	 the	core	of	 the	No.	3	
reactor	all	stopped	at	5:10	a.m.	Sunday.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011b)	
Here officials are represented as communicating, and the agency of danger is located with 
inanimate things. This is important: human actors are less likely to be represented as being 
in control of, influencing, or contributing to physical actions which can cause harm. The 
effect of this trend is to uncritically reflect an official version of information, which 
depersonalises dangerous actions. This might be described as compartmentalising agency 
away from human and onto inanimate actors. 
 
The sources Asahi uses are exclusively TEPCO or government bodies. This reliance on 
official information in Asahi is one reason for the greater agency of TEPCO, as both their 
Interactive and Semiotic actions feature more. In contrast, the BBC balances these sources 
with independent experts and contrasting views. To illustrate: 
24. "If	the	explosion	at	the	Fukushima	nuclear	power	station	has	resulted	in	a	significant	release	
of	radioactive	material	then	this	will	soon	be	readily	apparent	from	the	radiation	monitoring	
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that	 is	 undoubtedly	 under	 way	 around	 the	 plant,"	 noted	 Richard	 Wakeford,	 visiting	
professor	in	epidemiology	at	the	UK's	University	of	Manchester.	(BBC,	2011b)	




Example 24 quotes a British University expert, and example 25 adds the interpretation of 
French nuclear experts of Japan’s classification of the disaster.  
 
The analysis here supports the criticisms that were leveled at Japanese media about a lack 
of critical or alternative perspectives. The characterisation of Japanese media as faithfully 
reporting official announcements without questioning them is borne out in my sources.  
 
5.6.3: Plant Effect  
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Table 5.6.3: Normalized frequencies of Effect for the Plant 
Asahi: 97 instances overall. 
BBC: 94 instances overall. 
	
Asahi represents the Plant with stronger Effect. Asahi features more frequent Plant 
Influence, Interactive and Instrumental actions, whereas the BBC has more 
Characteristics. In other words, the difference is between the Plant more often having a 
real-world Effect in Asahi and more often having a less agentive existence in the BBC.  
 
Asahi contains six instances of Influence for the Plant, which is the most powerful kind 
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27. At	the	No.	3	reactor,	pressure	and	water	levels	became	unstable.	At	one	time,	its	nuclear	
fuel	 rods	 were	 partially	 exposed	 after	 water	 levels	 fell,	 leading	 to	 the	 accumulation	 of	
hydrogen.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011d)	
Such Influence means the Plant has stronger agency and is thus implied as more 
responsible for what is happening. The Plant also has greater agency due to more frequent 




29. Edano	 told	 a	 news	 conference	 that	 the	 structural	 soundness	 of	 the	 containment	 vessel	
appears	to	have	been	maintained.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011d)	
This aspect of agency is important considering that the Plant features heavily in Asahi 
reporting. Frequent inanimate physical action, especially Instrumental action that has no 
direct effect on other material objects, contributes to the technicalisation of the disaster. 
It is a mechanical process that occurs on its own, as much as a mechanical process affected 
by people. In comparison to the high level of Interactive and Instrumental Plant action in 
Asahi, the BBC has more than twice as frequent Plant Characteristic action. For instance:  
30. In	the	middle	of	such	a	confused	and	changing	picture,	what	can	safely	be	said?	Firstly,	the	
reactors	 involved	will	 not	 operate	 again,	 even	 if	 there	 has	 not	 been	 a	meltdown.	 (BBC,	
2011b)	
31. In	the	meantime,	there	have	been	suggestions	that	an	incident	at	reactor	3	would	inherently	
be	more	dangerous	 than	at	 reactors	1	and	2	because	 it	burns	 "mixed	oxide	 fuel"	 (MOX)	
containing	plutonium.	(BBC,	2011c)	
As noted before, the higher frequency of Characteristics is because the Plant is evaluated 
in terms of safety more often in the BBC. The Plant acts less often in an agentive way to 
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affect the world, and is more often significant for what it represents as much as what it 
does.  
 
5.7: Comparison of Intensity in each source  
Analysing Intensity shows how often the agency of actions is strengthened or weakened.  
 
5.7.1: Overall Intensity 
Table 5.7.1 shows normalized frequencies of Intensity in each source. As with previous 
tables, strongest agency is at the top. 
 
Table 5.7.1: Normalized frequencies of Intensity in each source 
Asahi: 30 Increases and 10 Decreases.   
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There is a clear difference here: the BBC uses more frequent Intensity than Asahi, so this 
feature of agency is more common in BBC reporting.  
 
The lower level of Intensity in Asahi is a factor that contributes to its neutral tone of 
reporting. This tone is objective in that there is less (overt, deliberate, conscious) 
alteration of the way actions are represented. By contrast, the greater frequency of 
Intensity Increases in the BBC somewhat dramaticises the narrative. For example 




be	more	dangerous	 than	at	 reactors	1	and	2	because	 it	burns	 "mixed	oxide	 fuel"	 (MOX)	
containing	plutonium.	(BBC,	2011b)	
The use of such Intensifications in BBC reporting makes the actions more forceful and 
more vivid. To give a specific comparison, the following examples show how each source 
represents TEPCO’s use of water to cool fuel rods at the plant: 
34. Officials	battled	all	Monday	and	into	the	early	hours	of	Tuesday	to	try	to	keep	water	levels	




In example 34 from the BBC TEPCO is ‘battling’, whereas in example 35 from Asahi 
there is a more neutral description of the actions occurring - ‘use fire engines to pump in’ 
and ‘efforts to restore’. Both ‘efforts to restore’ and ‘battled’ are summaries of a group of 
actions, but in the BBC this is represented more strongly. Greater Intensity in the BBC 
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emphasises the struggle and potential danger of the situation. To give another example, 
here is how each source paraphrases an address by the Japanese Prime Minister 
(Intensification in red, Maximisation red underlined): 
36. Earlier,	 the	prime	minister	 said	 the	 situation	 at	 the	nuclear	 plant	was	 alarming,	 and	 the	
earthquake	had	thrown	Japan	into	"the	most	severe	crisis	since	World	War	II".	(BBC,	2011d)	




In 36 the BBC paraphrases what Prime Minister Kan said using the Intensifications 
‘alarming’ and ‘thrown’. When the BBC uses a direct quotation it includes a 
Maximisation (‘the most severe crisis’). In comparison, Asahi’s paraphrase of what Kan 
said uses the more neutral term ‘developments at the Fukushima plant’. In addition, the 
more frequent use of Intensity in the BBC extends to Intensifications of the Fukushima 





Stronger Intensity in the BBC means it is more explicit about the potentially negative 
effects of Fukushima - the consequences of the disaster have stronger agency. This 
reinforces the argument made previously about how there is more evaluation in BBC 
reporting and less in Asahi. In other words, Fukushima is more of a ‘story’ in the BBC 
and more of a ‘report’ in Asahi.  
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The greater frequencies of Intensity in the BBC create a more dramatic narrative, but 
more importantly the increased agency implies events and danger are more serious, and 
by implication responsibility for these events and danger becomes more serious. This may 
also partly be due to the BBC being written primarily for a native English speaker 
audience, and so perhaps drawing on a larger and more descriptive range of lexis. 
Nevertheless, the English-language versions of Asahi articles are direct translations of 
the Japanese originals, so should be accurate reflections of these originals.  
 
Moving on from overall trends, I now turn to how Intensity is used for each of the two 
main actors.  
 
5.7.2: TEPCO Intensity 
Table 5.7.2: Normalized frequencies of Intensity for TEPCO 
Asahi: 3 Increases and 2 Decreases.  
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Although the frequencies are not large, examination of these instances supports the points 
I made previously when discussing the effects of neutral reporting of official statements 








Example 40 is a government source, and the use of Intensity stresses the government is 
acting seriously. Example 41 does the same thing for TEPCO. One reason for these kind 
of examples is that Asahi more faithfully reports what was said, and therefore includes 
the Intensifications in the original statements. This reproduces the original information 
without interpretation. This faithful reporting of official statements extends to negative 
as well as positive news. For instance (Deintensification in blue):   
42. However,	 Edano	 noted	 that	 insufficient	 cooling	 of	 the	 core	 may	 have	 caused	 excess	
hydrogen	 to	accumulate	 in	 the	building	 that	houses	 the	 core	 containment	 vessel.	 (Asahi	
Shimbun,	2011c)	 	
In 42 the Deintensification ‘insufficient cooling’ is an abstract representation of less 
agency for ‘cooling’. However, this is attributed to the Plant and not TEPCO, meaning 
the reasons why there is not enough cooling and what has or has not been done to affect 
the cooling situation is unclear. In contrast, in the BBC action by TEPCO is more often 
Intensified because of the urgency of what they are doing, and in order to emphasise the 
drastic nature of their actions. This is not ‘positive’ information. For example:  





A notable difference here is that the Intensifications of TEPCO action are the BBC’s own 
reporting of what is happening, whereas in Asahi Intensifications tend to be verbatim 
quotes from TEPCO. In other words, in Asahi TEPCO intensify their own actions and 
provide a positive spin, whereas the BBC intensifies TEPCO actions and this produces a 
more negative spin. 
 
5.7.3: Plant Intensity 
Table 5.7.3: Normalized frequencies of Intensity for the Plant 
Asahi: 11 Increases and 5 Decreases.  
BBC: 18 Increases and 10 Decreases.  
	
The Plant is again a major difference between the sources: the BBC has greater 
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frequent actor in Asahi reporting, the actions of the Plant have more Intensity Increases 




that	 is	 undoubtedly	 under	 way	 around	 the	 plant,"	 noted	 Richard	 Wakeford,	 visiting	
professor	in	epidemiology	at	the	UK's	University	of	Manchester.	(BBC,	2011b)	
46. In	the	meantime,	there	have	been	suggestions	that	an	incident	at	reactor	3	would	inherently	
be	more	dangerous	 than	at	 reactors	1	and	2	because	 it	burns	 "mixed	oxide	 fuel"	 (MOX)	
containing	plutonium.	(BBC,	2011d)	
This increased agency for the Plant in the BBC is one factor in how the potential risk of 
the disaster is a bigger feature of their reporting. In contrast, in Asahi Intensity Increases 






These examples again reinforce how evaluation of the disaster is a feature of the BBC, in 
comparison to Asahi’s focus on describing the situation at Fukushima. However, a 
necessary point to make is that BBC reporting is not exclusively about emphasising 
danger. The BBC includes more frequent Deintensification, both overall and for the Plant. 
Some cases are similar to those in Asahi, when Deintensification is a result of reporting 
what is said by official figures. For instance:  
49. Chief	 Cabinet	 Secretary	 Yukio	 Edano	 said	 they	were	 closely	watching	 the	 remaining	 two	
reactors	at	the	plant,	5	and	6,	as	they	had	begun	overheating	slightly.	(BBC,	2011e)	
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However, as well as what is said by officials, there is also Deintensification in the BBC 






This lowers the agency of risk. The greater frequency of Intensity Decreases in the BBC 
is because of the greater overall amount of evaluation and interpretation of danger (the 
same reason as for the higher frequency of Intensity Increases). In this way the BBC has 
more about potential risks, but also more about lack of risk - there is simply more 
information about danger, be it large or small. It does not seem to be the case that the 
BBC is over-exaggerating the threat, but rather they are providing more of their own view 
on what is happening. In contrast, the lack of independent evaluation in Asahi seems to 
cede power to official sources.  
 
To summarise, the greater frequencies of BBC Intensity Increases and Decreases create 
a more dramatic effect and evaluate the danger of the situation. Asahi contains less use 
of Intensity, and this is one element of its more neutral tone compared to the BBC. In 
Asahi Intensity features less, and often when reporting the comments of official sources. 
This means that it is other voices rather than their own that add drama, and this reinforces 
how Asahi sticks to the official line when reporting events. For the BBC, the greater 
frequencies of Intensity may be in order to dramaticise the narrative, but also may simply 
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be because these events are extreme, hence their newsworthiness. Whatever the reason, 
in the BBC Fukushima is a more agentive, and thus more serious, disaster.   
 
5.8: Comparison of Freedom/Constraint in each source 
Finally, I examine Freedom/Constraint, to see the possibilities of and limitations on 
actions in each source.  
 
5.8.1: Overall Freedom/Constraint  
Table 5.8.1 overleaf shows normalized frequencies of Freedom and Constraint. To recap, 
the top is strongest agency and the bottom weakest, with Freedoms signaling the presence 
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Table 5.8.1: Normalized frequencies of Freedom/Constraint in each source  
Asahi: 16 Freedoms and 36 Constraints.   
BBC: 22 Freedoms and 21 Constraints. 
	
Asahi has just over twice as many Constraints as Freedoms, whereas the BBC has roughly 
half Freedoms and half Constraints. Asahi reporting features more limitations on agency, 
whereas BBC reporting is as much about how actors can exert agency as how they cannot. 
This is a broad observation, however, and it is more instructive to look at how Freedom 
and Constraint is used with the specific actors in each source.  
 
5.8.2: TEPCO Freedom/Constraint 
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Table 5.8.2: Normalized frequencies of Freedom/Constraint for TEPCO 
Asahi: 3 Freedoms and 8 Constraints. 
BBC: 0 Freedoms and 5 Constraints. 
	
Both sources represent TEPCO as subject to Constraint. In particular, both sources 
include Attempts - examples of TEPCO trying to do things. For instance (Attempts in 
blue):   





Both sources therefore represent TEPCO with a lack of control over what is happening. 
The difference between the sources is that in Asahi TEPCO have a certain level of 


































The verbatim quote in example 53 includes the official description of TEPCO’s 
‘response’, which emphasises their ability to control what is happening. In addition, 




55. After	 the	detection	of	cesium,	a	radioactive	substance	created	through	nuclear	 fission	of	
uranium	fuel	rods,	the	decision	was	made	to	pump	in	seawater	and	boric	acid	to	prevent	
damage	to	the	core	container,	NISA	officials	said.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011c)	
Examples 54 and 55 represent TEPCO’s capacity to choose how to act. In example 54 
the action is potentially negative because releasing radioactive material could be 
hazardous. However, analysing this in terms of Freedom/Constraint shows that it is an 
agentive action; it highlights the representation as a choice to act rather than a mistake. 
Such Freedoms give TEPCO a level of agency to influence the situation that is not present 
in the BBC accounts. As I argued when discussing Coreness, the higher level of agency 
for TEPCO could present them in a positive or negative light, depending on the kind of 
actions they are doing. The examples here represent TEPCO as fixing the situation, and 
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5.8.3: Plant Freedom/Constraint 
Table 5.8.3: Normalized frequencies of Freedom/Constraint for the Plant 
Asahi: 2 Freedoms and 21 Constraints. 
BBC: 4 Freedoms and 6 Constraints. 
	
As with the previous three aspects of agency, there are notable differences here. In Asahi 
the Plant is Constrained much more frequently with the categories of Inability and 






This reduction in agency for the Plant means the problem is represented as a case of 
equipment and systems failing, rather than (for example) inadequate control or planning. 
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these objects. The same effect comes from the higher frequency of Situational Constraints, 
such as:  
58. After	 Friday's	 massive	 earthquake,	 the	 external	 electric	 power	 supply	 to	 the	 No.	 1	
Fukushima	plant	was	cut	off,	and	emergency	generators	failed	to	work.	That	stopped	the	
emergency	core	cooling	system.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011c)	
59. The	 suppression	 pool	 also	 serves	 as	 the	water	 source	 for	 the	 reactor's	 emergency	 core	
cooling	system,	which	has	been	rendered	inoperable.	(Asahi	Shimbun,	2011d)	
These have an inherently passive sense because they present the actor (the Plant) as 
subject to circumstances beyond their control. The pertinent point here is how the higher 
frequency of Situational and Inability Constraints present the Plant as a ‘victim’. The 
source of Constraint is located with inanimate actors more than animate ones. While it is 
true that plant equipment failed, the focus on inanimate lack of agency suggests 
Fukushima is primarily a technological problem. 
 
5.9: Summary of differences in agency between Asahi and BBC reporting  
The research question guiding this chapter was: 
§ How do representations of agency reflect a more neutral or critical reporting stance? 
In terms of overall trends, the features of agency reflect a descriptive and evaluative 
tendency in each source, with Asahi covering Fukushima more as a report and the BBC 
more as a story. Asahi could be characterised as a more neutral style, in that events are 
represented in a straightforward manner without assessment of their consequences. This 
is because in Asahi action tends to be more Core, whereas in the BBC it is less Core 
because more evaluation is included. This difference is also reflected in the stronger 
Effect in Asahi, as it contains more material events, such as TEPCO’s efforts to solve 
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problems and the events taking place at the plant. Another reason for the more measured 
tone in Asahi is the lower frequency of Intensity, meaning there is less extreme agency. 
In contrast, the BBC adds more information about the potential danger of the disaster. 
The BBC does this through more Static actions evaluating risk, and through more use of 
Intensity to show the power of actions (and thus the level of risk they pose). Specific 
examples in the analysis showed how the agency of negative actions – dangerous or 
potentially dangerous ones – is foregrounded more clearly in the BBC than in Asahi. One 
reason for this is that Asahi relies on and faithfully reports official sources, meaning that 
official pronouncements frame the representation of events in Asahi. In contrast, the BBC 
balances this with independent alternatives to official voices. The result of these trends is 
that in Asahi acknowledgement of potential danger is more implicit, and in the BBC it is 
more explicit. The analysis therefore supports the idea that Japanese news sources were 
more neutral and focused on repeating official versions of events, and that they did not 
emphasise danger as much as foreign sources.  
 
It is important to note that while I found differences, these were differences in overall 
frequencies. The analysis does not show a drastically different manner of reporting, and 
does not suggest overt manipulation. Asahi does not obviously hide agency and the BBC 
does not obviously exaggerate it. Rather, the sources differ in degrees of agency, as 
opposed to its presence or absence. The features of agency reflect the content of the 
information included as well as a ‘critical’ or ‘uncritical’ reporting style. Of course, 
however, these are two sides of the same coin, in that choice of content is itself an 
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ideological choice. The heavily descriptive nature of Asahi reporting means a greater 
focus on technical aspects of the disaster. In Asahi agency is more Core, but is associated 
with inanimate actors. In this way the analysis supports the argument that the Japanese 
media ‘technicalised’ Fukushima.  
 
Looking at the main actors, in Asahi TEPCO and the Plant both have more agency. The 
comparatively greater agency for the Plant in Asahi reflects its more technicalised 
description of the situation. Actions at the Plant are concise and have more physical effect 
in Asahi, but are dramaticised less than in the BBC and are subject to more Constraints. 
There is a heavy focus on the Fukushima plant going wrong and human attempts to stop 
it, and less on what this may mean for the public. In terms of the consequences of these 
representations, it is important that in Asahi TEPCO is agentive and the source of 
Constraint is located with inanimate actors more than animate ones. Asahi gives TEPCO 
agency to make changes on the world, meaning they are strong in this respect compared 
to the BBC. TEPCO control over the plant is implied as a good thing because their version 
of events is not challenged. These features of Asahi reporting background danger and 
responsibility. In comparison, in the BBC the greater evaluation of risk and the inclusion 
of alternatives to official sources place the actions of humans controlling the situation 
under greater scrutiny. Importantly, in the BBC evaluations of the situation come from 
sources other than sources already invested in the disaster (TEPCO). I shall comment in 
more detail on the implications of these findings when I conclude in chapter eight.   
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In this chapter I have used the framework to look at trends in representation by media 
sources over a larger sample size. In the following chapter I switch focus, using the 
framework for a close analysis of three shorter texts, to show how agency reflects their 
institutional aims. 
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6. AGENCY IN OFFICIAL REPORTS INTO THE FUKUSHIMA DISASTER 
 
6.1: Chapter aims   
In this chapter I examine three official reports into the Fukushima disaster. I compare how 
the foreword of each report assigns blame and responsibility. The research question 
guiding this chapter is: 
 What is the relationship between representations of agency and attribution of 
responsibility for the Fukushima disaster? 
 
Comparing the findings of the reports I will analyse, Lukner and Sakaki conclude that 
“while some of the reports are one-sided in particular depictions, they generally identify 
the same fundamental problems (though TEPCO’s report is an exception on some points)” 
(2013, p. 3). My analysis supports this conclusion, but examines it in more detail. I am 
interested in how the reports may be “one-sided in particular depictions” and how 
representations of agency give different interpretations of causes and responsibility. The 
framework is used for a close commentary on the texts, to show how responsibility is 
diffused differently in each report and how this relates to the goals of the organisations 
that produced them. In each case I am critical of this diffusion of responsibility and argue 
it is a failure to clearly apportion blame. 
 
6.2: Chronology of reports into the Fukushima disaster  
There were three major reports into the causes of Fukushima. The bullet points below list 
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in chronological order the organisations that produced each report, dates of publication, 
the title of each report, and the length of each report foreword: 
§ TEPCO, published in December 2011, titled ‘Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis 
Report’, 486 words. 
§ The Japanese National Diet, published in July 2012, titled ‘The Official Report of the 
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission’, 649 words.  
§ The International Atomic Energy Agency, published in August 2015, titled ‘The 
Fukushima Daiichi Accident’, 980 words. 
The International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) report is in English. TEPCO’s 
report and The National Diet report are originally in Japanese but were intended for a 
global audience and thus have professional translations that accurately reflect the original 
contents. All of these reports are public documents available as pdfs on the respective 
bodies’ websites (links are in Appendix B).  
 
6.3: Difficulties with allocating responsibility for Fukushima  
When the consequences of Fukushima emerged, so too did the importance of 
responsibility. As I discussed in chapter two, this was a contested issue. The public 
became aware that things had gone wrong, and the questions were who, what and why. 
Reports into the disaster attempted to provide answers to these questions. The difficulty 
here is that for a disaster such as Fukushima there are numerous potential causes. Agency 
could rest with natural or human forces. It could rest with individuals, organisational 
structures, or wider culture. It might be a system, or people acting within that system. 
Alternatively, agency could fall on no one, or nothing in particular, and the disaster might 
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just ‘have happened’. It must be stressed, however, that the difficulty of determining 
responsibility does not make it any less important.  
 
How and where responsibility is placed has consequences for, among other things, the 
future of the nuclear industry, for energy policies, for the conduct of government business, 
and for industry regulation. This means an important issue in these reports is the degree 
to which they blame or exonerate those who potentially could be seen as culpable. Each 
of these reports is produced by or features the voices of parties that might be responsible: 
TEPCO (as plant operators), the government (in charge of nuclear regulation), and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (responsible for world standards in the nuclear 
industry). In this respect none of them could be seen as entirely neutral. Therefore, while 
the stated aim of each report was to investigate the causes of the accident in order to learn 
from them and prevent a similar occurrence in the future, another objective was perhaps 
to reclaim legitimacy and regain public trust.  
 
6.4: Approach to analysis of official reports  
I examine the foreword for each of these reports. These are a suitable length for close 
linguistic analysis. Although the foreword is relatively short, it is arguably the most 
important part of each report. It shows how the producers view the objective of the report 
and how they wish the contents to be interpreted. It summarises the report findings and 
contains what the producers view as the key points. Furthermore, forewords are the most 
widely and closely read part of a report because only experts and other interested parties 
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would be expected to read the full contents. Lastly, it is the information in forewords that 
is much more likely to be reported in the media.  
 
I examine the reports in chronological order. I begin with a brief background of the 
context of each report. I then apply each of the four sections of the framework to the 
forewords. For these forewords the total instances of action are fairly small, and I am 
interested in close analysis of individual texts rather than making comparisons between 
corpora. Therefore, in this chapter the tables show categories of agency as the percentages 
that they comprise of the total number of representations of each aspect of agency. For 
each report I comment on agency overall, but focus on two aspects. The first is the 
representation of specific actors that feature prominently (these differ slightly in each 
report). I discuss how the representations of agency of these actors relate to the objectives 
of each report. The second focus is the representation of responsibility for the disaster. I 
discuss how who or what is blamed is connected with the objectives of each report. 
Displaying the full text and commenting on every linguistic feature would be ideal, but 
unfortunately would be extremely cumbersome as the forewords are slightly too long to 
do this. However, I look in detail at key extracts and comment on the ideological work 
they perform. I use the framework to examine how the disaster is contextualised and how 
responsibility is represented. 
 
6.5: TEPCO report  
The first report was TEPCO’s Interim Investigation into the disaster, published on 
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December the 2nd 2011, approximately 9 months after the disaster began. By this time it 
was acknowledged that the cleanup work and financial compensation for the disaster 
would be enormous. TEPCO were aware that they would most likely be held financially 
liable (McNeill, 2012). It had become clear that radiation levels meant many people 
would never be able to return to their homes. Furthermore, serious problems at the plant 
were continuing and radioactive water was leaking into the Pacific, affecting the Japanese 
fishing industry. There was public anger at the consequences of Fukushima, particularly 
the plight of displaced residents waiting for compensation. Questions about the disaster 
had surfaced, but the degree to which natural and man-made causes played a part was 
uncertain, and Fukushima was mostly seen as resulting from the earthquake and tsunami. 
At this point there were no other official versions of what happened, so to a certain extent 
TEPCO had a chance to control the narrative. However, after this report was published 
more information about the disaster came to light, and this report came to be perceived 
as something of a cop-out which appeared to downplay TEPCO’s role in the disaster. It 
was criticised for eschewing responsibility and avoiding blame. Lukner & Sakaki argue 
this was partly because TEPCO feared later investigations would blame them (2013, p. 
6). 
 
The foreword is by Masao Yamazaki, Chairman of TEPCO’s Investigation Committee. 
As the organisation responsible for constructing and operating the plant, as well as 
responsible for the majority of the work to repair damage to the plant, TEPCO obviously 
had a lot invested in how the disaster was viewed. The narrative in this report is that the 
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disaster was an unforeseeable event. I look at agency in the foreword in general and more 
specifically at actions by TEPCO. The analysis shows how TEPCO’s responsibility is 
deliberately backgrounded. TEPCO refer to mistakes, but direct agency is absent. I argue 
that the report is a damage limitation exercise that seriously underplays TEPCO’s agency. 
This avoidance of reference to responsibility has been noted elsewhere, and is evident 
from a surface reading of the foreword. In this sense my analysis does not aim to provide 
any new conclusions about the report. Rather, it aims to specify the linguistic means by 
which agency is avoided, and demonstrate how the framework can be useful in doing this. 
All examples that follow come from the foreword (TEPCO, 2011). 
 
6.5.1: Coreness in the TEPCO foreword   
The table overleaf shows each category of Coreness, expressed as a percentage of all 
instances of Coreness in the foreword. The table includes instances in the foreword as a 
whole, as well as instances where TEPCO is the actor.  
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Table 6.5.1: Coreness categories in the TEPCO foreword 
Overall: 82 instances, 40% Dynamic and 60% Static. 
TEPCO: 36 instances, 42% Dynamic and 58% Static. 
	
The foreword is two-fifths Dynamic and three-fifths Static action. TEPCO is an important 
actor, being responsible for just under half of all instances of Coreness. Examining 
Coreness in detail shows two points of note. One is differences in the agency of TEPCO 
actions that could be viewed as positive and actions that could be viewed as negative. The 
other is how the effects of the disaster are represented with a life of their own and not as 
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TEPCO has a similar ratio of Dynamic to Static action as the whole text, so the agency 
of their actions is consistent with the overall tone of the report. However, differences 
appear when comparing the nature of actions which are Dynamic and Static. The pattern 
is that actions TEPCO does which can be interpreted negatively tend to be Static, so the 
agency is less Core. For example (Dynamic action in red, Static action in blue, lexis 
indicating TEPCO is the actor underlined):  
1. We	will	continue	to	work	as	hard	as	we	can	to	ensure	the	stable	cooling	of	the	reactors	
at	 the	 Fukushima	Daiichi	Nuclear	 Power	 Station,	 to	 reduce	 the	 release	 of	 radioactive	
materials	so	 that	 the	citizens	of	 Japan	can	 feel	secure,	and	to	enable	the	evacuees	 to	
return	home	as	soon	as	possible.	 	
The Dynamic actions with clearest agency are the Activation ‘continue to work’, and the 
Ellipses ‘ensure’, ‘reduce’ and ‘enable’, all of which emphasise TEPCO’s agency in 
dealing with the situation. The Static actions are one Descriptivation ‘as hard as we can’, 
and two Engaged actions, which are ‘stable cooling’ and the action which is undeniably 
negative – ‘release of radioactive materials’. Another example of this pattern is: 
2. TEPCO	 acknowledges	 that,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 severity	 of	 this	 accident,	 it	 is	 its	 social	
responsibility	 to	 conduct	 strict	 and	 thorough	 investigations	 and	 verifications	 of	 the	
accident,	 identify	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 accident,	 and	 reflect	 the	 lessons	 learned	 in	 its	
business	operations,	in	order	to	prevent	the	recurrence	of	similar	accidents.	
The Dynamic actions are ‘acknowledge’ and ‘prevent’, which portray TEPCO as agentive 
in apologising and taking steps to change things. The Coreness is reduced for the actions 
that imply TEPCO made mistakes and need to change, such as ‘reflect the lessons 
learned’. What is more, as Static representations these are inarguable and so assume 
lessons will be learned and things will improve. A final example of the trend is:  
3. This	interim	report	is	intended	to	compile	investigation	results	that	have	been	verified	so	
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far.	 The	 report	 is	mainly	 focused	on	 the	event	 causes	and	 their	preventive	measures,	
especially	 from	 the	 point	 of	 facility	 design.	 It	 describes	 preparations	 for	 accidents,	
damage	 to	 the	 facilities	by	 the	earthquake	and	 tsunami,	accident	management	work,	
event	progression	of	core	damage,	hydrogen	explosions,	and	so	on.	 	
All TEPCO’s actions which were inadequate or faulty are less Core: ‘preventive 
measures’, ‘facility design’, ‘preparations for accidents’, and ‘accident management 
work’. Again, they are Static entities rather than Dynamic actions that TEPCO took. The 
contrast between positive and negative actions in examples 1-3 is reinforced by looking 
at the vocabulary choices. The lexis used to describe negative actions is abstract: ‘lessons 
learned’, ‘event causes’, ‘preventative measures’, and ‘preparations for accidents’. This 
contrasts with the more precise lexis of the Dynamic actions ‘continue to work’, 
‘acknowledges’ and ‘verified’.  
 
It is also revealing to examine the three times in the foreword that the effects of the 
disaster are mentioned. The first one is this: 
4. TEPCO	had	 received	 support	 and	understanding	 from	many	people	with	 regard	 to	 its	
nuclear	power	generation.	However,	 the	accident	has	destroyed	such	public	 trust,	 for	
which	we	again	would	like	to	express	our	deep	apologies.	
When the actor is TEPCO the Dynamic actions are ‘receive support’ and ‘express 
apologies’. When the actor is the disaster the Dynamic action is ‘destroying public trust’. 
Hence, when a more Core representation of responsibility is used this is attributed to the 
‘accident’ rather than TEPCO. Responsibility is backgrounded because TEPCO are 
apologising for the ‘accident’s destruction of trust’, rather than for their own negligence. 
The same pattern is evident in the second extract: 
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TEPCO’s action is Dynamic ‘apologise’, modified by Static ‘deeply’, both positive. 
Again here the thing being apologised for is the ‘anxiety’ and ‘inconvenience’ of the 
disaster, rather than any action by TEPCO. The disaster itself performs the Dynamic 
Passive action ‘were released’. It is somewhat unclear as to who or what caused this 
‘accident’. It is also noteworthy that the actions of the public are ‘anxiety’ and 
‘inconvenience’, which are backgrounded as Engaged actions affected by the TEPCO 
apology. So as well as the use of Static action to background actions with a negative 
prosody, the lexical choices also downplay the hardships; using ‘anxiety’ to describe 
worrying about exposure to dangerous levels of radiation, and ‘inconvenience’ to describe 
a forced evacuation of one’s home appears to trivialise what happened. Similar 
backgrounding is evident in the final extract that mentions the disaster: 
6. Reflecting	 on	 the	 accident	 at	 the	 Fukushima	 Daiichi	 Nuclear	 Power	 Station,	 the	 risk-
reducing	measures	against	a	nuclear	disaster	consequently	turned	out	to	be	insufficient.	 	
The responsibility is ascribed to a Static Engaging action of ‘risk-reducing measures’, 
which does the Dynamic action of ‘turned out to be’. The most direct representation of 
TEPCO’s failure is the Descriptivation ‘insufficient’. In this way the representation of 
what TEPCO did wrong is less agentive Static actions, whereas the more agentive 
Dynamic actions are the neutral ‘turned out to be’ and the representation of their thinking 
about the disaster as the Ellipsis ‘reflecting’. In other words, instead of TEPCO admitting 
or recognising their failure directly, they ‘reflect’ on the ‘insufficiency’ of the inanimate 
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‘risk-reducing measures’.  
 
To summarise the patterns of Coreness in the foreword, when TEPCO performs what are 
likely to be positively evaluated actions of repentance and reflection these have stronger 
Coreness, but when they perform what might be negatively evaluated actions that were 
faulty or insufficient these have lower Coreness. Direct reference to causation and 
mistakes is avoided. 
 
6.5.2: Effect in the TEPCO foreword 
 
Table 6.5.2: Effect categories in the TEPCO foreword  
Overall: 34 instances.  
TEPCO: 22 instances. 
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at the plant, apologising for this situation, and avoiding blame. Analysis reinforces some 
of the arguments made above when discussing Coreness.  
 
Interactive actions are most common in this foreword. TEPCO Interactive actions are 
often technical in nature and to do with solving problems at the plant. For example, here 
is an extract examined before, this time looking at Effect (lexis indicating TEPCO is the 
actor underlined and Interactive action in red):  
7. We	will	continue	to	work	as	hard	as	we	can	to	ensure	the	stable	cooling	of	the	reactors	
at	 the	 Fukushima	Daiichi	Nuclear	 Power	 Station,	 to	 reduce	 the	 release	 of	 radioactive	
materials	so	 that	 the	citizens	of	 Japan	can	 feel	secure,	and	to	enable	 the	evacuees	 to	
return	home	as	soon	as	possible.	We	will	also	steadily	work	through	mid-	and	long-term	
projects	toward	decommissioning.	
TEPCO have strong Effect in terms of working to solve these problems, which suggests 
they are diligent and committed.  
 
TEPCO performs the majority of the Semiotic and Cognitive categories in the foreword, 
meaning they have most of the ‘psychological’ agency in the foreword. This is primarily 
about apologies and displaying repentance. When TEPCO does Semiotic actions this 
develops a theme of sincerity and honesty. For example (Semiotic action in red): 
8. TEPCO	had	 received	 support	 and	understanding	 from	many	people	with	 regard	 to	 its	
nuclear	power	generation.	However,	 the	accident	has	destroyed	such	public	 trust,	 for	
which	we	again	would	like	to	express	our	deep	apologies.	
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10. I	would	like	to	express	my	heartfelt	sympathy	to	all	of	the	people	who	were	affected	by	
the	devastating	earthquake	on	March	11	this	year.	 	
I have already discussed how example 8 represents the damage of the disaster as ‘public 
trust’ rather than anything material. Example 9 similarly equates the damage to the 
psychological factors of ‘anxiety and inconvenience’. Interestingly, in example 10 
sympathy extends to people affected by the ‘earthquake’ rather than the nuclear disaster, 
thus subtly conflating the natural disaster with the situation at Fukushima. The tone of the 
foreword implies that TEPCO is sorry about the situation more than sorry for the situation. 
Finally, it is worth looking again at another example that I discussed in Coreness, but this 
time in terms of Effect. This is the part of the foreword that comes closest to an acceptance 
of blame. Here TEPCO have a Cognitive action (red) and a Characteristic (red 
underlined):  
11. TEPCO	 acknowledges	 that,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 severity	 of	 this	 accident,	 it	 is	 its	 social	
responsibility	 to	 conduct	 strict	 and	 thorough	 investigations	 and	 verifications	 of	 the	
accident,	 identify	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 accident,	 and	 reflect	 the	 lessons	 learned	 in	 its	
business	operations,	in	order	to	prevent	the	recurrence	of	similar	accidents.	 	
This ‘social responsibility’ action by TEPCO has the least agentive Effect category of 
Characteristic, because it simply exists. TEPCO is slightly more agentive with the 
Cognitive action of recognising this responsibility. In other words, the nearest the 
foreword comes to an admission of responsibility is TEPCO’s Cognitive 
acknowledgement of a responsibility to investigate and learn, rather than a material action 
that caused anything to happen. Furthermore, this is an obligation to ‘prevent recurrence’ 
rather than obligation for the previous occurrence. This extract reads like a public 
relations exercise in which TEPCO co-opts the public desire for answers and represents 
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it as their own attitude towards the disaster.   
 
In summary, when TEPCO have strong Effect this is in repairing the situation rather than 
causing it, and when they have weaker psychological Effect this is feeling sorry for the 
situation rather than mistaken thinking which lead to the situation. The final, and telling, 
point to note is that there are no instances of the Effect category of Influence in this 
foreword!  
 
6.5.3: Intensity in the TEPCO foreword  
 
Table 6.5.3: Intensity categories in the TEPCO foreword  
Overall: 10 Increases and 1 Decrease. 
TEPCO: 6 Increases and 0 Decreases.  
	

















 146  
Intensity in TEPCO actions. Intensity is used to stress TEPCO’s sincerity and their efforts 
to solve problems. For instance (Intensification in red): 




In example 12 the Intensification of the TEPCO apology contrasts with the more neutral 
prosody of the residents’ ‘anxiety and inconvenience’. In the next example Intensity 
Increases emphasise TEPCO’s industriousness and commitment to helping the local 
population (Maximisation red underlined):  
13. We	will	continue	to	work	as	hard	as	we	can	to	ensure	the	stable	cooling	of	the	reactors	
at	 the	 Fukushima	Daiichi	Nuclear	 Power	 Station,	 to	 reduce	 the	 release	 of	 radioactive	
materials	so	 that	 the	citizens	of	 Japan	can	 feel	secure,	and	to	enable	 the	evacuees	 to	
return	home	as	soon	as	possible.	 	
TEPCO represent themselves as doing their utmost (‘as hard as we can’), and stress their 
concern for local residents (‘as soon as possible’). In this final example TEPCO’s 
commitment is Intensified, as is the accident itself:  
14. TEPCO	 acknowledges	 that,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 severity	 of	 this	 accident,	 it	 is	 its	 social	
responsibility	 to	 conduct	 strict	 and	 thorough	 investigations	 and	 verifications	 of	 the	
accident,	 identify	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 accident,	 and	 reflect	 the	 lessons	 learned	 in	 its	
business	operations,	in	order	to	prevent	the	recurrence	of	similar	accidents.	 	
The responsibility for ‘strict and thorough’ investigations strengthens the representation 
of TEPCO’s commitment. The Intensification ‘severity of the accident’ is interesting as 
well. When the seriousness of the accident is directly mentioned it is in relation to the 
scale of the accident rather than the effects of the accident.  
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To summarise, the actions by TEPCO with greater Intensity tend to be conscientious 
actions to redress problems and show remorse. They seem to perform a face-saving 
function of emphasising the correct attitude of contrition for the disaster. 
 
6.5.4: Freedom/Constraint in the TEPCO foreword 
 
Table 6.5.4: Freedom/Constraint categories in the TEPCO foreword 
Overall: 5 Freedoms and 7 Constraints. 
TEPCO: 2 Freedoms and 4 Constraints.  
 
Freedom and Constraint is important for the positive self-presentation of TEPCO. When 
TEPCO has Freedom it emphasises their commitment to dealing with the disaster and 
helping the public. For instance (lexis showing TEPCO is the actor underlined and 
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15. We	will	continue	to	work	as	hard	as	we	can	to	ensure	the	stable	cooling	of	the	reactors	
at	 the	 Fukushima	Daiichi	Nuclear	 Power	 Station,	 to	 reduce	 the	 release	 of	 radioactive	
materials	so	 that	 the	citizens	of	 Japan	can	 feel	secure,	and	to	enable	the	evacuees	 to	
return	home	as	soon	as	possible.	 	
TEPCO is agentive with the Ability to work ‘as hard as they can’, and as giving 
Permission to allow the public to ‘feel secure and return home’. Where TEPCO is subject 
to Constraint it is the four Impositions in the following extract (Impositions in blue): 
16. TEPCO	 acknowledges	 that,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 severity	 of	 this	 accident,	 it	 is	 its	 social	
responsibility	 to	 conduct	 strict	 and	 thorough	 investigations	 and	 verifications	 of	 the	
accident,	 identify	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 accident,	 and	 reflect	 the	 lessons	 learned	 in	 its	
business	operations,	in	order	to	prevent	the	recurrence	of	similar	accidents.	
TEPCO is obliged by its responsibilities to ‘investigate’, ‘verify’, ‘identify causes’ and 
‘reflect lessons’. As explained above, the nature of these Impositions is not compensation 
or redress for victims of the disaster, but instead obligation to learn and change, which 
has positive connotations. Importantly, when TEPCO is subject to Constraint this is a 
responsibility to fix the situation, not a responsibility for the situation.   
 
Examining the use of Freedom/Constraint also supplements an extract I commented on 
previously in example 6. This extract is important because it refers to responsibility for 
the disaster (actors underlined, Freedoms in red and Constraints in blue):  
17. Reflecting	 on	 the	 accident	 at	 the	 Fukushima	 Daiichi	 Nuclear	 Power	 Station,	 the	 risk-
reducing	measures	against	a	nuclear	disaster	consequently	turned	out	to	be	insufficient.	
Almost	all	of	the	equipment	and	power	sources	that	were	expected	to	be	activated	in	the	
case	of	an	accident	 lost	 their	 functions,	and	 thus,	 the	event	extended	 far	beyond	the	
existing	framework	for	safety	measures.	 	
The actors for the Constraints here are technological. The first Inability is ascribed to ‘risk 
 149  
reducing measures’ and the second Situational Constraint is ascribed to ‘equipment and 
power sources’. Where there is Freedom it is for the disaster - the Ability to do damage 
by ‘extending beyond safety measures’. There is a contrast between the agency of the 
disaster and the lack of agency of the plant. The failures at Fukushima are located in 
inanimate actors and not the humans controlling the plant.  
 
6.5.5: Summary of agency in the TEPCO foreword  
Looking at each aspect of agency develops similar themes of positive TEPCO self-
presentation. TEPCO is much more Core when performing positively evaluated actions 
of addressing problems and expressing remorse for the situation, and less Core when 
actions that led to the disaster are mentioned. Similarly, TEPCO have strong Effect in 
terms of solving the crisis and perform most of the Cognitive and Semiotic actions in the 
foreword, which express contrition. In addition, many of the actions with increased 
Intensity relate to fixing and apologising. TEPCO have Freedoms to control the situation 
and help people, and are Constrained in their responsibility to learn. The recurring theme 
is that when TEPCO has stronger agency it is in rectifying rather than causing Fukushima. 
This version of events backgrounds potential causes of problems and therefore their 
culpability. A point of note here is the framing of the disaster as an ‘unforeseeable event’. 
This strategy appears to attempt to conflate Fukushima into the narrative of the 
earthquake and tsunami, equating it with these other natural forces that caused so much 
damage.  
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In all, there seems to be a straightforward relationship between the portrayal of agency 
and the goals of the report. The analysis suggests that the TEPCO foreword is a kind of 
corporate public relations damage control exercise. As the company responsible for the 
plant, TEPCO were associated with the disaster, and thus one consideration was 
undoubtedly mitigating the implied blame. This is reflected in the heavy backgrounding 
or absence of agency for causes of the disaster, and foregrounding of agency in terms of 
rectifying the situation. Agency in terms of responsibility for the disaster is noticeably 
absent in this foreword. The question of responsibility is not addressed directly (as it is in 
the other reports to follow). 
 
6.6: The Japanese National Diet report 
The second report to be released was by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission, established by the Japanese National Diet. It was published 
on July the 5th, 2012, fifteen months after the disaster. The foreword is by Kiyoshi 
Kurokawa, Chairman of the Commission. This report had a big impact because of the 
damning criticisms it made of the nuclear village. Whereas previously there was a 
perception that the disaster was a once-in-a-million event, it shifted the view of 
Fukushima from a natural disaster to a human one. It was widely reported outside Japan, 
particularly the key phrases in the foreword ‘manmade disaster’ and ‘a disaster made in 
Japan’. This report was explicit in its criticism of institutional failings that led to the 
disaster. The extent of the failings identified was a severe shock to Japan, and the report 
had to negotiate this difficult and somewhat painful context.  
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I analyse actions in the foreword as a whole and actions by two specific groups. The first 
is actions attributed to the nuclear village – that is to say TEPCO, the nuclear industry as 
a whole, nuclear regulators and the Japanese bureaucracy (I shall capitalise as ‘Nuclear 
Village’ to show I am referring to this actor). The second is actions attributed to Japan as 
a nation. I do not look at the representation of the organisation producing the report (the 
Diet), because it features much less than in the other reports. In the analysis I argue that 
while there is direct blame attached to the Nuclear Village, two trends background 
responsibility. The most important is how responsibility is spread to the whole of Japan. 
The second is how criticism of this wider Japanese culture which led to the disaster is 
balanced with praise and situated within a positive context. I link this to the fact that this 
report delivered criticisms of major institutions in Japanese society and as such it may 
have been expedient to soften the blow in some way. I argue that this strategy diffuses 
responsibility away from the individuals and structures involved in the decisions that led 
to Fukushima, and that this ultimately blunts the criticism. All examples come from the 
foreword (The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 
2012). 
 
6.6.1: Coreness in the Diet foreword  
Table 6.6.1 on the following page shows Coreness categories for the foreword as a whole, 
as well as actions by the Nuclear Village and actions by Japan. 
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Table 6.6.1: Coreness categories in the Diet foreword  
Overall: 127 instances, 39% Dynamic and 61% Static. 
Nuclear Village: 45 instances, 40% Dynamic and 60% Static. 
Japan: 20 instances, 25% Dynamic and 75% Static.	 	
	
There is a ratio of roughly two-fifths Dynamic to three-fifths Static action (which is 
similar to the TEPCO report). There are a relatively high number of Embedded and 
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reading the foreword does not give the impression that information is being hidden, 
obscured or manipulated (as a surface reading of the TEPCO foreword did). Indeed, the 
criticism is clear. One indication of this clarity is that there is only one case where a 
passive action needs to be inferred. In the case of this foreword, then, with its densely 
packed information, it is instructive to look at how this summarising takes place, in terms 
of who or what is prioritised for blame. A close examination of Coreness shows two 
significant themes in the way that blame is apportioned. 
 
The first significant theme is attributing the disaster to an institutional mindset. This idea 






The Dynamic actions most clearly connected to an actor (‘our report catalogues’, ‘it 
examines’, ‘it provides’ and ‘this report cannot convey’) are all performed by the report 
itself. Where wrongdoing is represented the actor performing ‘left Fukushima unprepared’ 
is ‘errors and negligence’, and the actor performing ‘negligence behind the disaster’ is a 
‘mindset’. The tone of criticism is clear, but the action describing what went wrong is 
overwhelmingly Static and thus less Core - ‘errors’, ‘willful negligence’, ‘deficiencies’, 
and ‘response’. When the actors are specifically labelled, as ‘TEPCO, regulators and the 
government’, their action is Static - the ‘deficiencies’ in a ‘response’. The point 
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exemplified here is how weaker Coreness makes it harder to discern who exactly did what, 
so this kind of vague representation diffuses responsibility. I will explore this idea of 
blaming the disaster on a ‘mindset’ in more detail when analysing Effect. 
 
The second important theme is diffused responsibility onto Japan itself. The ratios of 
Coreness in actions by Japan are similar to those in the text as a whole, but with slightly 
more of the Static category Disengaged. Two sections of the foreword are important in 
developing the idea of collective responsibility. The first is this (Static actions by Japan 







The obvious thing here is the high level of Static action. When Japan is an actor in the 
first paragraph of example 19 the action is a Disengaged ‘ingrained conventions’ of 
Japanese culture. These ‘conventions’ are also all Disengaged (‘reflexive obedience’ and 
so on). The weak Coreness makes them background features to the overall argument, not 
actions that an individual performs. This is important in spreading and sharing the blame. 
These ‘ingrained conventions’ are ‘causes’ of the disaster, and the causes are represented 
with the least agentive category of Static action, a Relational ‘are to be found’. In short, 
this is an abstract representation of the ‘fundamental causes’ of the disaster, and can be 
compared with a more Core formulation such as “Japanese culture caused this accident”. 
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Where Japanese people are the actor in the second paragraph the action is again Static - 
a Relational ‘had been’ for this theoretical proposition. This sets up the claim that any 
other Japanese person would have done the same thing, further diffusing the blame 
because it makes everyone equally responsible. Agency is attributed to national 
characteristics, something presumably underlying but abstracted from individual actors 
or group decisions. 
 
A second section later in the foreword develops this theme of diffused responsibility. The 
two paragraphs in the following example refer to lessons that should be learned from the 
disaster: 





The Dynamic actions associated with Japan are two instances of ‘reflect’, which has 
positive connotations of learning. In contrast the ‘responsibility’ and ‘mindset’ are Static. 
This ‘mindset’ has previously been identified in the foreword as the cause of the disaster 
and as something that is shared among all Japanese, but it is also less Core with the Static 
Relational ‘can be found’. Action by Japan is thus less Core when Japan is responsible 
and more Core when Japan is learning lessons. The overall effect of examples 19 and 20 
is to take blame away from specific individuals by implying that anyone else would act 
the same. It reduces personal agency in the sense that everyone is a product of their culture. 
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6.6.2: Effect in the Diet foreword 
 
Table 6.6.2: Effect categories in the Diet foreword  
Overall: 61 instances. 
Nuclear Village: 20 instances. 
Japan: 6 instances.   
	
The interesting point is that there is more ‘psychological’ agency than ‘physical’ agency. 
Influence, Interactive and Instrumental together total 26.1% whereas Semiotic, Cognitive 
and Experience together total 41%. This means that there is less acting on the world, and 
more communicating about or considering it. One reason for the comparatively high 
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of Fukushima. The opening paragraph of the report clearly demonstrates this (Cognitive 
action in red, Characteristic red underlined): 
21. The	earthquake	and	tsunami	of	March	11,	2011	were	natural	disasters	of	a	magnitude	




Both instances of Cognitive actions are used with modality, defining how people should 
view the disaster in hindsight and claiming that it should have been previously foreseen. 
The Characteristic is a simple statement of the manmade nature of Fukushima. This 
section of the foreword is particularly important because it began a shift in perception of 
the disaster. The idea that Fukushima was caused by a natural disaster is rejected, which 
was a clear break with TEPCO’s previous report. As I noted previously, the phrase 
‘profoundly manmade disaster’ was widely quoted in media coverage of this report.   
 
Another important point about Cognitive action is that the Nuclear Village perform just 
over half of the Cognitive action in the foreword. This develops the idea discussed in 
Coreness about how responsibility is associated with a ‘mindset’. The previous analysis 
of Coreness showed how Static representations of action background this ‘mindset’, and 
looking at Effect adds to this by showing that when the Nuclear Village does act with 
strong Coreness this is often mental rather than physical. The following extract, although 
lengthy, illustrates this well (Cognitive action in red):  
22. With	such	a	powerful	mandate,	nuclear	power	became	an	unstoppable	force,	immune	
to	 scrutiny	 by	 civil	 society.	 Its	 regulation	 was	 entrusted	 to	 the	 same	 government	













This represents the Nuclear Village with weaker agency, as a ‘thinker’. This is important 
in terms of responsibility because the emphasis is on internal psychological processes, 
rather than a stronger Effect on the world which might have more concrete repercussions. 
In addition, it is instructive to consider the final sentence of example 22, which is the 
point at which responsibility is most explicitly addressed in the whole foreword. 
Causation here resides in a collective mindset and a duty. The disaster was a failure of 
thought as much as of action. It is worth bearing in mind here that the common sense and 
legal views of what constitutes responsibility tend towards physical actions rather than 
thought processes. 
 
Effect also plays a role in the positive portrayal of Japan. The percentages of Effect for 
Japan are fairly small, but close analysis shows how they perform a kind of face-saving 
function for the representation of the nation. For instance, this example emphasises the 
shock that was felt at the accident (Cognitive in red and Characteristic in red underlined):  
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23. How	could	such	an	accident	occur	 in	Japan,	a	nation	that	 takes	such	great	pride	 in	 its	
global	 reputation	 for	 excellence	 in	 engineering	 and	 technology?	 This	 Commission	
believes	the	Japanese	people	–	and	the	global	community	–	deserve	a	full,	honest	and	
transparent	answer	to	this	question.	 	
The Cognitive action is a positive national characteristic ‘take pride’. The Characteristic 
‘deserve’ accords respect to the nation. The next example explains why Japan uses nuclear 
power (Interactive in red):   
24. Following	the	1970s	“oil	shocks,”	Japan	accelerated	the	development	of	nuclear	power	
in	an	effort	to	achieve	national	energy	security.	As	such,	it	was	embraced	as	a	policy	goal	
by	 government	 and	 business	 alike,	 and	 pursued	 with	 the	 same	 single-minded	
determination	that	drove	Japan’s	postwar	economic	miracle.	 	
When Japan has stronger Interactive agency here it is to realise a desirable goal of ‘energy 
security’, meaning Japan has stronger agency when linked with positively-evaluated or 
understandable actions. It is a neutral representation (‘accelerated’) rather than one with 
negative connotations, and seeks to contextualise and justify the use of nuclear power as 
stemming from the objective of national development.   
 
To summarise, the foreword has comparatively weak Effect, and features many instances 
of thinking and existence. This creates a tone of ‘how the conditions for Fukushima arose’ 
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6.6.3: Intensity in the Diet foreword 
 
Table 6.6.3: Intensity categories in the Diet foreword  
Overall: 22 Increases and 2 Decreases. 
Nuclear Village: 8 Increases and 0 Decreases. 
Japan: 7 Increases and 0 Decreases.  
	
There are numerous Intensity Increases, and a notable percentage are Maximisations. This 
contributes to a serious and dramatic tone in the foreword. The patterns of Intensity are 
notable in two aspects. The first is the use of Intensity to emphasise human as well as 
natural factors in the disaster. For example (Intensification in red and Maximisation red 
underlined):  
25. The	earthquake	and	tsunami	of	March	11,	2011	were	natural	disasters	of	a	magnitude	
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as	a	natural	disaster.	It	was	a	profoundly	manmade	disaster	–	that	could	and	should	have	






The natural disaster is ‘cataclysmic’ in example 25 but the human negligence also 
produces ‘catastrophic’ consequences in example 26. The Maximisations give equal 
weight to human and non-human forces. In addition, the disaster is Intensified as 
‘profoundly’ manmade in example 25. As mentioned previously, a big part of the impact 
of this report was its stress on human factors. The use of Intensity to emphasise this 
suggests a change of narrative from natural to human causation is an important goal of 
the report.   
 
The second point to make about Intensity is how frequently it describes Japanese action. 
Japan is associated with 29.1% of the instances of Intensity in the text (by comparison, 
Japan does 15.8% of the instances of Coreness). Intensity often emphasises positive 
Japanese qualities. For instance, here is an extract I looked at when analysing Effect, but 
this time analysed in terms of Intensity (lexis indicating Japan is the actor underlined, 
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Here the positive Japanese qualities of engineering expertise are stressed. In chapter two 
on background to the disaster I explained that technical competence is a part of Japanese 
national identity and is something that exacerbated the shock of Fukushima. Example 27 
directly refers to this. Also of note is the Intensification of what the Japanese public 
‘deserves’. As well as praising Japan the Diet report stresses the rights of the Japanese 
public, so Intensity has an interpersonal function here. This can be seen again in the 




Examples 27 and 28 are both instances of the report stressing respect for the public. This 
seems to situate the report’s criticism in a more acceptable context for its audience. It has 
a mitigating function for a report that places blame on wider Japanese society, implying 
that although these are strong criticisms they are for a good cause. The following example 
is another extract I analysed when discussing Effect, but this time with Intensity 
highlighted. It intersperses criticism with positive national characteristics: 
29. Following	the	1970s	“oil	shocks,”	Japan	accelerated	the	development	of	nuclear	power	
in	an	effort	to	achieve	national	energy	security.	As	such,	it	was	embraced	as	a	policy	goal	
by	 government	 and	 business	 alike,	 and	 pursued	 with	 the	 same	 single-minded	
determination	that	drove	Japan’s	postwar	economic	miracle.	 	
With	such	a	powerful	mandate,	nuclear	power	became	an	unstoppable	force,	immune	




The use of Intensity here highlights Japan’s economic success. It situates the development 
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of the ‘mindset’ responsible for the disaster in a positive context of Japanese 
industriousness. There is an implication that things became lax because of this success. 
This seems to dilute the level of blame for what happened because it resulted from 
excusable motivations. The mindset arose from overconfidence, as opposed to something 
more sinister such as greed.  
 
Looking at these two features of Intensity gives an insight into the objective of this report. 
On the one hand, Intensity emphasises the extent of human agency in the disaster. On the 
other hand, it seems Intensity makes this criticism easier to swallow. I would argue this 
reflects how the report had to strike a balance between delivering an uncomfortable truth 
about national failings while also making this criticism palatable to the public.  
 
6.6.4: Freedom/Constraint in the Diet foreword 
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Table 6.6.4: Freedom/Constraint categories in the Diet foreword 
Overall: 9 Freedoms and 14 Constraints.  
Nuclear Village: 6 Freedoms and 4 Constraints. 
Japan: 0 Freedoms and 5 Constraints.  
	
The dominant Freedom in the foreword is Ability, and the dominant Constraint is 
Imposition. Freedom/Constraint develops three themes. Firstly, Abilities explaining what 
the Nuclear Village could have done to prevent Fukushima. Secondly, Impositions that 
diffuse responsibility. Thirdly, the use of Freedom/Constraint in explaining and justifying 
the context in which Fukushima arose. 
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Fukushima. Instances of Ability are important for this. For example, there are 
hypothetical examples of stopping the disaster (Ability in red):  
30. The	earthquake	and	tsunami	of	March	11,	2011	were	natural	disasters	of	a	magnitude	
that	 shocked	 the	 entire	 world.	 Although	 triggered	 by	 these	 cataclysmic	 events,	 the	
subsequent	accident	at	the	Fukushima	Daiichi	Nuclear	Power	Plant	cannot	be	regarded	
as	a	natural	disaster.	It	was	a	profoundly	manmade	disaster	–	that	could	and	should	have	
been	 foreseen	 and	 prevented.	 And	 its	 effects	 could	 have	 been	mitigated	 by	 a	 more	
effective	human	response.	 	
This is a case of underlining the manmade nature of the disaster. Furthermore, the report 
itself provides the Ability for people to understand and improve upon what happened: 
31. As	 the	 first	 investigative	 commission	 to	 be	 empowered	 by	 the	 legislature	 and	







The report itself is not often an actor. However, when it is an actor this often involves 
Freedom/Constraint. This seems to reflect the Diet report positioning itself with the 
authority to inform the public: it has the agency to define what happened. 
	
The second point is also related to defining the disaster. Impositions play a major role in 
representing how the disaster should be viewed and how it should be reacted to. For 
instance (Impositions in blue, actors underlined): 
33. This	report	singles	out	numerous	 individuals	and	organizations	for	harsh	criticism,	but	
the	goal	is	not—and	should	not	be—to	lay	blame.	The	goal	must	be	to	learn	from	this	
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disaster,	and	reflect	deeply	on	its	fundamental	causes,	in	order	to	ensure	that	it	is	never	
repeated.	 	





Importantly, the Constraint is a need to reflect, not act, and for all Japanese people to do 
this, not individuals. This idea that those responsible need to reflect and change is in all 
likelihood a common feature of post-crisis discourse. Again, it seems there is something 
of a face-saving element here, arguing that the priority is to make the best of a bad 
situation by learning from it rather than pursuing repercussions. The problem, however, 
is that the agency of who exactly needs to learn is widely diffused. The same theme is 





There is no specific actor here, just a generalised idea of ‘we’, which seems to refer to 
Japan. The specifically Japanese nature of the disaster is presented not as a neutral fact 
expressed without modification but as something which Japan is forced to admit. An 
Imposition on the behaviour of the nation stresses the importance of this interpretation of 
national causes of the disaster. 
 
The third point supports another theme I have discussed, about how positive Japanese 
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qualities contextualise the mistakes that contributed to Fukushima. Looking at Abilities 
and Impositions provides more detail on this point (Abilities in red and Impositions in 
blue, actors underlined): 
35. With	such	a	powerful	mandate,	nuclear	power	became	an	unstoppable	force,	immune	








Here nuclear power has the Ability to exceed control (‘unstoppable force’ and ‘immune 
to scrutiny’). It is significant that the actor is the concept of ‘nuclear power’, rather than 
a more human agent such as an organisation. Agency resides in an abstract force with 
unlimited power. How this situation arose is explained by contrasting Impositions. First, 
the juxtaposition between the Imposition on bureaucrats both to regulate (‘regulation’) 
and to promote (‘responsible for’). Second, the contrast between two other Impositions 
that bureaucrats are subject to, one clearly positive (‘duty to protect public safety’) and 
the other loyalty to a group (‘duty to defend the interests’). Loyalty to a group is a 
positively evaluated characteristic in Japan, as evidenced by the fact that this only became 
a problem when it was ‘carried to an extreme’. This provides another example of how 
negatively evaluated behavior is represented as arising from other positively evaluated 
behaviours. Again, such a narrative of societal pressure de-emphasises individual agency. 
For instance, as I outlined in chapter two when discussing the nuclear village in Japan, it 
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excludes other more selfish motivations bureaucrats may have, such as safeguarding 
one’s career by avoiding difficult decisions, or accommodating the wishes of the nuclear 
industry in order to secure a well-paid job upon leaving the civil service.   
 
6.6.5: Summary of agency in the Diet foreword 
The interplay of the four aspects of agency is interesting. This report is certainly clear in 
identifying human causes and blaming the Nuclear Village. Criticisms are expressed with 
strong Coreness, and emphasised with Intensity. However, a close look at Coreness 
showed a foregrounding of the judgment that mistakes were made, but a backgrounding 
of what exactly is judged as having gone wrong. There are large percentages of the less 
agentive categories of Effect in this foreword because of the emphasis on defining the 
disaster and explaining the thinking behind it, rather than specifying what physical actions 
led to the disaster. Actions most often have increased Intensity when positive cultural 
characteristics are mentioned. Constraints are about how people should view the disaster 
and respond to it.  
 
Overall, responsibility in this text rests on the Nuclear Village at a structural level, and on 
Japanese culture at a wider level. Although the Nuclear Village is clearly identified as 
responsible their agency is psychological, meaning it is a failure of thinking rather than 
(in)action. The diffusion of responsibility to the Japanese public is likewise a case of 
psychological responsibility. There is comparatively little physical agency for the Nuclear 
Village and Japanese people – those represented as the responsible parties. Blaming 
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deficiencies on one’s own culture is a bold and perhaps surprising line of argument. 
However, this criticism of Japanese cultural traits that caused the disaster is diffused 
because it is situated within other more positive Japanese traits, which in some way 
absolves or excuses actions. Crucially, the more a culture is to blame the less its people 
are. Japanese people are represented as products of their environment rather than actors 
with agency. The tensions seen here seem to stem from the conflicting objectives of the 
report in terms of delivering a damning verdict about widespread failure while also 
making these damning conclusions acceptable to the public. 
 
6.7: International Atomic Energy Agency report 
The IAEA report was released in 2015, approximately four years after the disaster, 
meaning there had been some time to reflect on Fukushima and institute changes in the 
Japanese nuclear industry. This report was not as significant a news item as the previous 
reports. For one thing, Fukushima was by this time less newsworthy, especially outside 
Japan. In addition, the report identifies failures that had been identified elsewhere. It is 
critical of the nuclear village culture that led to Fukushima, and so in this respect did not 
offer a radically different interpretation of the disaster. The foreword is by the Director 
General of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, who coincidentally is Japanese.  
 
The IAEA defines its role thus: 
“The IAEA is the international centre for cooperation in the nuclear field. The Agency 
works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote the safe, 
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secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies.” (International Atomic Energy 
Agency, About Us)  
This mission brief shows the motivations that may influence the IAEA representation of 
Fukushima. On the one hand, the IAEA has a responsibility to investigate thoroughly and 
honestly in order to fulfill their goal of promoting the safe use of nuclear power. However, 
it is also their mission to promote nuclear technology. If nuclear technology or those who 
use it are inherently flawed then nuclear power itself, and thus the IAEA’s raison d’etre, 
is put in doubt. This report therefore requires a balance between these two potentially 
contradictory objectives.  
 
In addition to analysing the foreword as a whole, I focus on three groups. The first is the 
IAEA, which includes the voice of the report and the Director General’s personal 
reflections. This helps to show the stance of the organisation itself. The second and third 
groups refer to what could be called the ‘world nuclear village’: that is to say nuclear 
power companies as well as the regulators and bureaucrats who support nuclear power. I 
separate this into actions by the nuclear village before the disaster and after the disaster 
(I shall refer to these actors as 'Nuclear Village Before’ and ‘Nuclear Village After’). This 
division will help to demonstrate the ideological work of the foreword. I argue that it 
constructs Fukushima as a lesson that has been learned. I show how representations of 
agency background danger and foreground improvements to safety. The report fulfills the 
IAEA’s institutional aim of supporting nuclear energy by neutralising the challenge that 
Fukushima poses and representing the nuclear industry as a professional organisation 
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dedicated to improvement. All examples come from the foreword (IAEA, 2015). 
 
6.7.1: Coreness in the IAEA foreword  
 
Table 6.7.1: Coreness categories in the IAEA foreword   
Overall: 173 instances, 41% Dynamic and 59% Static.  
IAEA: 45 instances, 58% Dynamic and 42% Static. 
Nuclear Village Before: 23 instances, 26% Dynamic and 74% Static. 
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The overall ratio is roughly two-fifths Dynamic to three-fifths Static action, the same as 
the previous two reports. Comparing the frequency of action by each of the three groups, 
the IAEA does 25.8% of total instances of Coreness in the foreword, the Nuclear Village 
Before does 12.6% of all instances, and the Nuclear Village After does 18.3% of all 
instances. The IAEA are a relatively frequent actor, and have a higher ratio of Dynamic 
action compared with the report as a whole. The voice of the IAEA is thus Core and 
foregrounded in the foreword. With regard to before and after the disaster, action by the 
Nuclear Village After is slightly more frequent and slightly more Core than action by the 
Nuclear Village Before. As the analysis will show, this reflects a focus on describing 
improvements in the nuclear industry and responses to Fukushima. A close examination 
of patterns of Coreness helps to show how the foreword deals with two key issues: 
responsibility for Fukushima and the danger of nuclear power. 
 
There are three paragraphs in succession that directly address responsibility for the 






Although this seems like a clear indictment of the failures that lead to Fukushima, two 
things reduce agency. The first is how the action causing the disaster is a Static Relational 
action ‘was…assumption’, and thus has weak Coreness. It is an abstracted mental state 
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rather than a specific human agent or organisation. What is more, this presupposes that 
the ‘assumption’ exists independent of any actor, obscuring the question of who made this 
assumption. In comparison, using a Dynamic action here would specify more clearly what 
was done wrong and would require an actor. The second important point is how subtle 
shifts in actor divert responsibility. The implied actor for the ‘assumption’ that led to the 
disaster is ‘Japan’. This assumption ‘was accepted’, so the action of ‘accepting’ by nuclear 
power plant operators, regulators, and the government is Dynamic, but with the less Core 
category of Passive. There is a shift from the existence of a nationwide assumption, to 
nuclear power plant operators ‘accepting’ this assumption (rather than ‘making’ it), which 
implies the nuclear industry are not responsible for this initial assumption. This begs the 
question that if the people responsible for operating nuclear power plants are not the 
source of a belief that the plants are safe, or are not in a position to know the plants are 
safe, then who is? Similarly, regulators and the government are blamed for ‘not 
challenging’ rather than ‘making’ an assumption, so the assumption again exists 
independently of the nuclear village. This act of ‘challenging’ is ambiguous between a 
physical or verbal action and is further backgrounded as a negative Passive - they ‘do not 
do’ something rather than ‘do’ something (such as ‘supported this assumption’). In the 
final sentence the actor switches back to ‘Japan’ not being ready for a disaster, rather than 
the Japanese nuclear industry not being ready for a disaster. In this way, the blame here 
lies at a national level as much as with specific nuclear organisations.  
 
The next two paragraphs continue thus: 
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37. The	 Fukushima	 Daiichi	 accident	 exposed	 certain	 weaknesses	 in	 Japan’s	 regulatory	
framework.	 Responsibilities	were	 divided	 among	 a	 number	 of	 bodies,	 and	 it	was	 not	
always	clear	where	authority	lay.	 	







The clearest agency here is with the Dynamic Activation of the disaster as ‘exposing 
weaknesses’. Aside from this there are three Inferable Passives and two Static Relational 
‘there were’ constructions. The actions with negative implications are Static - 
‘assumptions’, ‘weaknesses’ and ‘insufficient preparation’. This means that when 
criticisms are made of the Nuclear Industry Before these criticisms are less Core as Static 
action, and when they do act Dynamically they have to be inferred as the actor. Again, 
the responsibility is with the systems in Japan and not those creating these systems or 
making decisions within these systems.  
 
Following these three paragraphs about responsibility the focus of the foreword switches 
to improvements that have been made since the disaster. Whereas the nuclear industry 
had less Core responsibility when the causes of the disaster were represented, now the 
nuclear industry has clearer agency:  
38. Since	 the	 accident,	 Japan	 has	 reformed	 its	 regulatory	 system	 to	 better	 meet	
international	standards.	It	gave	regulators	clearer	responsibilities	and	greater	authority.	
The	new	regulatory	framework	will	be	reviewed	by	international	experts	through	an	IAEA	
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Integrated	Regulatory	Review	Service	mission.	Emergency	preparedness	and	response	
arrangements	have	also	been	strengthened.	 	




All the actions with positive connotations of making changes and improvements are 
Dynamic - three Activations and one Passive. The contrast with the sections of the 
foreword describing responsibility is stark; the Nuclear Village After is foregrounded 
with Dynamic action when making improvements, and the Nuclear Village Before is 
backgrounded with Static action when making mistakes. The difference is not a huge 
quantitative one, as the Nuclear Village Before has six Dynamic actions and the Nuclear 
Village After has ten. Rather, it is the positive nature of the Dynamic actions that is 
different. 
 
Interestingly, the one part of the foreword which has explicit human agency is the 
paragraph describing workers at Fukushima. It is worth examination (industry workers 
underlined, Dynamic red, Static blue):  
39. But	 I	 was	 deeply	 impressed	 by	 the	 courage	 and	 dedication	 of	 those	 workers	 and	
managers	who	remained	at	their	posts	after	the	tsunami	struck	and	who	struggled,	 in	
appalling	conditions,	to	bring	the	stricken	reactors	under	control.	They	had	to	improvise	
a	 response	 in	 circumstances	 for	 which	 they	 had	 not	 been	 trained,	 often	 lacking	
appropriate	equipment.	They	deserve	our	respect	and	admiration.	 	
The action here is overwhelmingly Dynamic. The clear Coreness foregrounds these 
nuclear workers as brave and dutiful. Undoubtedly, this was a consensus view of the 
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workers among the general public (Funabashi, 2012), as these workers put themselves at 
risk by entering a plant emitting lethal levels of radiation. However, the contrast between 
the strong agency of these nuclear workers who were seen as national heroes and the 
weak agency of the nuclear organisations who were seen as responsible for the disaster is 
striking. It could be argued the IAEA has an interest in nuclear workers being seen in this 
positive light because this reflects well on the industry.    
 
To sum up, an analysis of Coreness shows agency is strong when the nuclear industry is 
making improvements. Agency is weak when the nuclear industry is making mistakes, 
but strong when workers are dealing with these mistakes.   
 
6.7.2: Effect in the IAEA foreword 
Table 6.7.2 overleaf shows percentages of Effect categories in the text overall, and for the 
three specific groups of actors.  
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Table 6.7.2: Effect categories in the IAEA foreword 
Overall: 82 instances 
IAEA: 33 instances. 
Nuclear Village Before: 11 instances.  
Nuclear Village After: 7 instances.	 	 	
	
Two things stand out here. Firstly, the majority of the Semiotic, Cognitive and Experience 
action is done by the IAEA. Secondly, the Nuclear Village Before has fairly low agency. 
I will discuss three points in relation to this: how weak agency for the Nuclear Village 
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legal authority, and finally how the disaster itself is backgrounded. 
 
When discussing Coreness I found that the Nuclear Village Before had weak agency. This 
is supported by analysing Effect: the Nuclear Village Before has six Characteristics, two 
Cognitive and three Interactive actions. The greater percentage of Characteristics is 
because they are defined more often than they act on the world. For example:  






In each of these cases the actor is not directly stated but can be inferred as the nuclear 
village. Representing the nuclear village in this way defines the situation at the time rather 
than explains what was being done at the time. The way in which they have little concrete 
influence on the world, as argued previously, is a lack of agency for those responsible.  
 
The IAEA are the actor for many of the instances of Semiotic, Cognitive and Experience 
action in the foreword. This seems to be connected with the fact that they are an advisory 
body and as such need to establish the credibility of their authority in nuclear matters. 
Cognitive actions are to do with nuclear safety, such as:   
42. IAEA	 safety	 standards	embody	an	 international	 consensus	on	what	 constitutes	 a	high	
level	 of	 safety.	 They	 were	 reviewed	 after	 the	 accident	 by	 the	 Commission	 on	 Safety	
Standards.	A	few	amendments	were	proposed	and	adopted.	I	encourage	all	countries	to	
fully	implement	IAEA	safety	standards.	 	
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43. The	 IAEA,	which	provided	technical	support	and	expertise	 to	 Japan	after	 the	accident	
and	 shared	 information	 about	 the	 unfolding	 crisis	with	 the	world,	 has	 reviewed	 and	
improved	its	own	arrangements	for	responding	to	a	nuclear	emergency.	 	
The Cognitive actions are about deciding what to do. This emphasises the response to the 
disaster and the sense of taking action to correct it. It presents Fukushima as a lesson that 
the IAEA has learned from. The high level of Cognitive action lends the IAEA an air of 
expertise and legitimacy. When there are Experiences, these allow the writer to make 
evaluations. For instance:  
44. I	am	confident	that	the	legacy	of	the	Fukushima	Daiichi	accident	will	be	a	sharper	focus	





In example 44 the experience of ‘seeing’ serves as evidence of the ‘confidence’ in 
improvements. In example 45 the author’s feeling predicts how the report will be 
beneficial. Again, this lends an air of authority and credibility to the foreword, and again 
it presents Fukushima as a lesson that has spurred improvement. Similarly, the Semiotic 
actions underline the expertise of the IAEA. For instance:  
46. The	 IAEA,	which	provided	technical	support	and	expertise	 to	 Japan	after	 the	accident	
and	 shared	 information	 about	 the	 unfolding	 crisis	with	 the	world,	 has	 reviewed	 and	
improved	its	own	arrangements	for	responding	to	a	nuclear	emergency.	
47. I	 express	 my	 gratitude	 to	 the	 experts	 from	 many	 countries	 and	 international	
organizations	who	 contributed	 to	 this	 report,	 and	 to	my	 colleagues	 at	 the	 IAEA	who	
drafted	and	reviewed	it.	 	
Example 46 highlights the advisory role of the IAEA and example 47 expresses the 
author’s appreciation for the knowledge of IAEA members. Semiotic action also 
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contributes to the interpersonal message of the text. For instance:  
48. I	encourage	all	countries	to	fully	implement	IAEA	safety	standards.	 	
This underscores the IAEA’s mission role in promoting nuclear safety. A close look at the 
vocabulary here is very revealing. The IAEA ‘encourages’ countries to implement safety 
standards because they lack the power to enforce these standards. Moreover, the fact that 
they are ‘encouraging’ countries to improve safety seems to imply that all countries have 
not, or are not, doing so. To summarise, the relatively weak Effect aspect of agency in all 
these examples here is indicative of the IAEA’s role as advisors rather than supervisors.  
 
Moving from the three groups of actors, Effect is also revealing when looking at the 
agency of the Fukushima disaster itself. When the disaster is the actor it does no 
Interactive actions, and so is not represented with a physical effect on anything. For 
instance (Semiotic in red and Characteristic red underlined):   






The ‘exposed’ in example 49 could be interpreted as a Semiotic act of ‘showing’, or 
possibly an Instrumental ‘acting to represent’ (I believe the Semiotic interpretation is 
more accurate and classed it as such). In example 50 the action is also a Semiotic act of 
‘showing importance’. In example 51 Fukushima has a Characteristic in terms of what its 
legacy will be. Therefore, in this foreword the disaster has agency in terms of what it is 
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about rather than what it did. It is defined rather than acting in a physical manner to affect 
things. This is further evidence of how the IAEA report presents Fukushima as a lesson: 
it is described in terms of consequences and significance rather than damage and 
disruption. It is instructive to contrast these representations with the part of the foreword 





The agency is shifted here from the disaster to the public. The actual effect of the disaster 
is ‘immense human impact’ (with weak Coreness as a Static action), and the Cognitive 
action ‘should not be forgotten’ is attributed to a generic ‘we’. Further, the ‘human impact’ 
is exclusively about a temporary dislocation of people – evacuation and being unable to 
return. There is no mention of the other negative effects of the evacuation (detailed in 
chapter two), such as loss of livelihood, breakup of communities, psychological stress, 
suicides, and the patients who died being transported away from a hospital within the 
evacuation zone.  
 
In the analysis of the TEPCO foreword I discussed how it subtly attributed causation to 
the natural disaster, and how this conflation of natural and man-made factors reduced 
responsibility. The same phenomenon is in evidence in two cases in the IAEA foreword, 
in which responsibility for the disaster is explicitly represented by natural rather than 
human factors. One is the only instance in the foreword of the category of Influence 
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(which has the strongest agency):  
53. Caused	by	a	huge	tsunami	that	followed	a	massive	earthquake,	it	was	the	worst	accident	
at	a	nuclear	power	plant	since	the	Chernobyl	disaster	in	1986.	 	 	
This is a straightforward statement that the disaster had natural causes. More subtly, in 
the next example the chairman of the IAEA and foreword author Yukio Amano recounts 
his experience of visiting Fukushima:  
54. I	visited	the	Fukushima	Daiichi	plant	a	few	months	after	the	accident	and	saw	for	myself	
the	powerful	and	destructive	impact	of	the	tsunami.	
The author’s personal experience is represented with Instrumental ‘visited’ and 
Experience ‘saw’. Looking closely at this example, what he saw when he visited 
Fukushima was the ‘powerful and destructive impact of the tsunami’, rather than the 
impact of any human action. The disaster is conflated with the tsunami, rather than the 
plant or anyone behind its construction or operation. To briefly supplement this with a 
look at Coreness, the report author’s actions have stronger agency (the two Activations 
‘visited’ and ‘saw’), whereas the disaster’s actions have weaker agency (the two 
Descriptivations ‘powerful’ and ‘destructive’ and the Engaged ‘impact’). Again, there is 
a lack of agency for the disaster itself, as it has significance in what it communicates 
rather than significance in its effect on humans. 
 
6.7.3: Intensity in the IAEA foreword 
The table overleaf displays percentages of Intensity in the foreword. I do not include the 
three groups of actors because there are relatively few instances of Intensity, and because 
it is more instructive to discuss Intensity as a whole.  
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Table 6.7.3: Intensity categories in the IAEA foreword 
Overall: 23 Increases and 4 Decreases.  
	
Looking at the patterns of Intensity Increases, they play a role in emphasising three things: 
the scale of the disaster, the dedication of nuclear workers, and the progress of the nuclear 
industry post-Fukushima. 
 
Intensity is significant in relation to the scale of the disaster. There are four instances of 
Intensity Increases to describe the natural disasters that hit Japan and five to describe the 
nuclear disaster. For example, here are two extracts I examined previously when looking 





I argued above how natural and human causes are somewhat conflated. The Intensity 
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Here Intensity is connected with two things – the situation in Japan and the disaster. The 
scale of the assumption of safety in Japan is connected with the lack of preparedness in 
Japan. Again it is notable that the Intensity emphasis is associated with Japan, rather than 
the nuclear village. In addition, the size of both the natural and nuclear disaster is 
emphasised. Thus, while the report blames the Japanese for not foreseeing a big natural 
disaster, it also uses Intensity to emphasise how big this disaster was. This in some way 
mitigates the criticism as “you didn't see it coming but that couldn’t be helped”. The 
frequent use of Intensity to focus on the scale of the disaster contrasts with the 
representation of its impact on people. The only use of Intensity with respect to people is 
this: 
58. The	immense	human	impact	of	the	Fukushima	Daiichi	accident	should	not	be	forgotten.	 	
As explained already, the definition of this impact is mostly left unstated, save for the 
dislocation of population.   
 
The second notable feature is how Intensity contributes to the point discussed in analysis 
of Coreness about praise for nuclear workers: 
59. But	 I	 was	 deeply	 impressed	 by	 the	 courage	 and	 dedication	 of	 those	 workers	 and	
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managers	who	remained	at	their	posts	after	the	tsunami	struck	and	who	struggled,	 in	
appalling	conditions,	to	bring	the	stricken	reactors	under	control.	 	
The Intensification of the author’s feelings about the ‘courage and dedication’ of the 
workers encourages the audience to share this positive evaluation, and the Intensification 
of the adverse conditions emphasises the difficult job facing the workers. Here they are 
heroes devoted to their job. An alternative interpretation might, for example, argue it is 
natural and unremarkable that the people responsible for this disaster take responsibility 
for correcting their mistakes in order to limit the environmental damage of a nuclear 
meltdown. 
 
The third feature of note is how Intensity plays a role in emphasising nuclear industry 
progress. The closing statement of the foreword contains many instances of Intensity that 
contribute to this message. The following example is the final two paragraphs 
(Intensification in red, Maximisation red underlined, and Minimisation blue underlined):  
60. I	am	confident	that	the	legacy	of	the	Fukushima	Daiichi	accident	will	be	a	sharper	focus	
on	 nuclear	 safety	 everywhere.	 I	 have	 seen	 improvements	 in	 safety	 measures	 and	
procedures	 in	 every	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 that	 I	 have	 visited.	 There	 is	 widespread	





Continuous	 questioning	 and	 openness	 to	 learning	 from	 experience	 are	 key	 to	 safety	
culture	 and	 are	 essential	 for	 everyone	 involved	 in	 nuclear	 power.	 Safety	must	 always	
come	first.	 	
Intensity here highlights the improvements that have been made and lessons that have 
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been learned. Safety will be focused on more ‘sharply’, a ‘recognition’ of the need for 
this safety is emphasised, and the commitment to safety is as much as ‘humanly possible’. 
The chance of a similar ‘accident’ is Minimised, as is the likelihood of ‘complacency’ 
over safety. This is a clear example of how the foreword portrays Fukushima as a lesson. 
In this way, the IAEA’s stance and mission brief is underscored. Intensity therefore plays 
a role in highlighting the conclusion that the foreword wants the reader to take away. This 
was also something I found when discussing the role of Intensity in the conclusion to the 
Diet foreword.  
 
To summarise, Intensity contributes to three argumentative themes which to some degree 
exonerate the nuclear industry. Firstly, that there was a big natural disaster, which 
downplays the factors that allowed Fukushima itself to be a disaster. Secondly, that the 
workers were heroic in battling it, underlining the dedication and sense of responsibility 
of the nuclear industry, rather than their mistakes. Thirdly, that this is a disaster which the 
industry has learned from, and changes have been made to prevent its recurrence. 
 
6.7.4: Freedom/Constraint in the IAEA foreword 
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Table 6.7.4: Freedom/Constraint categories in the IAEA foreword 
Overall: 7 Freedoms and 10 Constraints. 
IAEA: 3 Freedoms and 0 Constraints. 
Nuclear Village Before: 1 Freedom and 2 Constraints. 
Nuclear Village After: 2 Freedoms and 2 Constraints. 
	
There are not many instances of Freedom/Constraint. However, two points worthy of 
attention are how IAEA Freedoms show their commitment to safety, and how Constraint 
contributes to the theme of lessons learned from Fukushima.  
 





















































There is a Decision (‘aims to provide’), which leads to Permission (‘so…can be acted 
upon’). The IAEA is agentive in taking decisions to help others achieve goals. The other 
Freedom is this Decision: 
62. IAEA	safety	 standards	embody	an	 international	 consensus	on	what	constitutes	a	high	
level	 of	 safety.	 They	were	 reviewed	 after	 the	 accident	 by	 the	 Commission	 on	 Safety	
Standards.	A	few	amendments	were	proposed	and	adopted.	
The IAEA decides to adopt the recommendations of their own Commission. This is 
represented not as an obligation to improve but as an agentive choice to do so, thereby 
underlining the IAEA’s commitment to safety. In contrast to these Freedoms, there is no 
representation of limitation on IAEA action. It is possible to imagine an alternative 
discourse that would involve Constraints. For example, Impositions expressed as IAEA 
duties to do more to ensure safety and to work harder, or Inability expressed as failure to 
do enough prior to the Fukushima disaster.   
 
The second noteworthy feature of the foreword is how Constraint is used together with 
Intensity. Here is the closing extract I discussed when looking at Intensity, this time with 
Constraint highlighted (Impositions in blue): 
63. I	am	confident	that	the	legacy	of	the	Fukushima	Daiichi	accident	will	be	a	sharper	focus	
on	 nuclear	 safety	 everywhere.	 I	 have	 seen	 improvements	 in	 safety	 measures	 and	
procedures	 in	 every	 nuclear	 power	 plant	 that	 I	 have	 visited.	 There	 is	 widespread	
recognition	 that	 everything	 humanly	 possible	 must	 be	 done	 to	 ensure	 that	 no	 such	
accident	ever	occur	again.	This	is	all	the	more	essential	as	global	use	of	nuclear	power	is	




Continuous	 questioning	 and	 openness	 to	 learning	 from	 experience	 are	 key	 to	 safety	
culture	 and	 are	 essential	 for	 everyone	 involved	 in	 nuclear	 power.	 Safety	must	 always	
come	first.	 	
There are four Impositions here, all in regard to safety. The combination of Intensity and 
Impositions reinforces the ‘lessons learned’ theme. Exactly who these Impositions apply 
to is somewhat vague, as they are expressed as general statements without specific 
referents. Presumably, this is for rhetorical reasons. Logically the Constraint should be on 
the nuclear industry and to a lesser degree regulators and governments, as they are the 
ones primarily responsible for safety. The formulation here, however, implies the 
Constraint is generally applicable in a universal sense. As shared impersonal obligations, 
the interests and responsibilities of the nuclear industry are aligned with the interests and 
responsibilities of the public as a whole. 
 
6.7.5: Summary of agency in the IAEA foreword 
The analysis shows how the IAEA report attempts to bring Fukushima into a narrative of 
lessons learned and changes made. It presents a break with the past, as highlighted by the 
differences between the nuclear industry before and after Fukushima. The foreword 
features increased agency when representing improvements that have been made and 
reduced agency when representing past behaviour. The narrative is that specific problems 
existed in Japanese systems, extreme events caused the disaster, and the disaster has been 
a spur to rectify these previous problems. In terms of the aims of this report, the frequent 
 190  
representation of the IAEA as thinking and communicating is in one sense natural as they 
are the authors of the report and so it could be expected that their voice is foregrounded. 
However, it also reflects how they have little power to affect the world. The agency they 
have here is in assessing the situation, more than acting to change it. There are more 
instances of internal actions than external ones that affect the world in a physical way. 
Lacking the power to enforce their recommendations, they instead represent the nuclear 
industry as aware of its responsibility to implement change. I would argue that there is a 
balancing act to be performed here. There is a need to learn from the disaster, but also a 
face-saving objective of showing that this learning has occurred and so distancing the 
nuclear industry from the failures that led to Fukushima.   
 
6.8: Comparison of agency in each report    
The question guiding this chapter was: 
§ What is the relationship between representations of agency and attribution of 
responsibility for the Fukushima disaster? 
I have argued that agency is backgrounded to different extents and in different ways in 
each foreword. I now summarise the focus of blame in each report, the degree of agency 
for those responsible, and how this reflects the body that produced each one. I then discuss 
similarities and differences between the three forewords.   
 
TEPCO represents the natural disaster as primarily responsible and argues the tsunami 
was beyond the scale of what could have been predicted. TEPCO’s foreword has the least 
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explicit agency of the three, as it obscures or avoids direct expressions of responsibility. 
As an actor, TEPCO has weak agency in actions that led to the disaster, and strong agency 
in actions of apologising and rectifying the situation. It is hard to avoid the conclusion (as 
others have argued) that this report is a whitewash: the goal of damage limitation seems 
to be reflected in the avoidance of agency for the disaster. The Diet report is more explicit 
in its criticism, and argues that a complacent mindset caused the disaster. The nuclear 
village and the wider culture that produced it have agency for the disaster. However, 
responsibility is diffused into structures, organisations and social context. It represents 
the circumstances that produced Fukushima as specifically Japanese. I argued that the 
Diet report’s goal of criticising weaknesses that led to the disaster is balanced with the 
need to make the depth of this criticism acceptable. For the IAEA report, blame rests with 
a combination of the natural disaster and to a greater extent the Japanese nuclear 
industry’s assumption of safety. Agency is weaker when describing nuclear industry 
action that led to the disaster, and stronger when describing post-Fukushima nuclear 
industry changes. There is a clear separation between before and after, thereby positioning 
Fukushima as a disaster of the past, and as a lesson. This approach seems consistent with 
the IAEA’s institutional aims of speaking for the nuclear industry and reestablishing its 
credibility. To summarise the approach of each report, TEPCO says sorry for the disaster, 
the Diet says the public should reflect on the disaster, and the IAEA says the industry has 
learned from the disaster.  
 
Comparing the representation of responsibility in these reports, the Diet and IAEA both 
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blame the thinking of organisations in Japan which are responsible for nuclear power. 
However, while the ‘mindset’ cited by the Diet and the ‘assumption’ cited by the IAEA 
are both failures of thinking, I would say that there is an important difference between 
them. A mindset implies more active control than an assumption, because an assumption 
is the result of thinking while a mindset is a way of thinking. In other words, an 
assumption is a mistake from the process of thinking, and a mindset is a mistake in the 
process of thinking. This would seem to be reflected in the greater agency (and thus 
blame) the Diet report gives the nuclear industry in Japan. However, an important 
difference between the two reports is that the IAEA solely cites Japanese nuclear culture, 
whereas the Diet broadens responsibility to Japanese national culture. In terms of 
similarities between the reports, the two stakeholders in nuclear power, TEPCO and the 
IAEA, put less agentive blame on those responsible. For both, the agency of the nuclear 
industry before the disaster is weaker than the agency of the nuclear industry after the 
disaster. In this sense both may be attempting to re-establish their credibility. Finally, the 
similarity between all three reports is a focus on structure and organisational factors rather 
than individuals and individual decisions.  
 
This summary brings up many points for discussion, and I shall expand on these when I 
conclude in chapter eight. My analysis so far has addressed trends in news coverage of 
Fukushima in chapter five, and differences in reports into the disaster in this chapter. In 
the final analysis chapter that follows I turn to the legacy of the disaster, by looking at the 
agency of Fukushima in the media debate on nuclear power.  
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7.	AGENCY OF THE FUKUSHIMA DISASTER IN MEDIA OPINION PIECES 
ON NUCLEAR POWER 
 
7.1: Chapter Aims  
In chapters five and six I argued that initial media coverage of Fukushima and 
investigations into Fukushima are important because they influence the interpretations of 
the disaster that emerge. In this chapter I follow up on this by examining representation 
of the Fukushima disaster in the media debate over nuclear power. I look at the agency 
attributed to the disaster by pro and anti-nuclear newspaper opinion pieces, to show how 
this reflects different interpretations of the disaster. The research question guiding this 
chapter is: 
 How does the agency attributed to Fukushima in media opinion pieces reflect pro and 
anti-nuclear arguments? 
 
I explained in chapter three that critical linguistics has often examined how differences 
in the agency attributed to key actors reflect ideological differences, and that it has often 
treated agency as a binary phenomenon that is absent or present. In this chapter I show 
how a more multifaceted approach to agency can be used to investigate ideological 
differences in opposing representations of the Fukushima crisis. Although the nuclear 
power debate involves many actors, for reasons of space and theoretical clarity I focus on 
a single significant actor: the disaster itself. This is also interesting in the sense that CDA 
usually treats agency as a human phenomenon, but focusing on the portrayal of a disaster 
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demonstrates how the agency of inanimate actors can be involved in a political dispute.  
 
The narrower focus of this chapter means it is slightly shorter than the previous two 
analysis chapters. I begin by explaining why the media representation of Fukushima is 
important. I then discuss the nuclear power debate in the media and how the disaster has 
been interpreted. Following this I describe the selection of source material and the 
analytical approach I take. In the analysis itself I use the framework to identify differences 
in the representation of Fukushima’s agency between pro and anti-nuclear power opinion 
pieces. I show that both sides attribute strong agency to Fukushima, but they attribute 
different levels of each kind of agency. I discuss how these differences contribute to the 
arguments used by each side and their competing conceptualisations of the disaster. My 
objective is not to argue in favour of any of these interpretations, but to illustrate the role 
of agency in constructing them. 
 
7.2: Nuclear power and Fukushima in the media  
7.2.1: The importance of media representations of Fukushima 
Nuclear power representation in the media is important because nuclear power is a 
complex and divisive issue, as I explained in chapter two. Stoett (2003) argues the nuclear 
industry’s biggest challenge is not one of technical or even cost difficulties, but of 
maintaining political legitimacy. For controversial issues like nuclear energy, the ability 
of media narratives to incorporate events such as Fukushima is paramount to the 
plausibility of these narratives (Butler et al., 2011, p. 6). Fukushima is a threat to the 
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future of nuclear power because it raises the question of whether a technologically 
advanced country can prevent and/or cope with a reactor meltdown. More generally, 
disaster discourse is important because disasters typically foster change and prompt new 
public behaviours (Sood et al., 1987, p. 14), and because disasters can re-open the debate 
over issues and allow new perspectives to compete with dominant narratives (Desai, 2012, 
p. 2). Media interpretations are also influential because nuclear power is a scientific issue 
of which the public may have limited direct experience, and so news sources play a 
mediating role in this kind of situation (Silverstone, 1999, p. 21). Although there is a 
conventional view that scientific knowledge is disseminated ‘downward’ from experts to 
members of the public, Myers argues this is a more fluid process, which involves the 
active construction of believable or discreditable identities for those who debate scientific 
issues (2003, p. 272-3).  
 
With these points in mind, the interpretation of Fukushima involves legitimating or 
delegitimating existing nuclear power systems and attitudes to nuclear power, and 
constructing plausible and trustworthy opinion on the topic. It should be noted that the 
more extreme claims of both pro and anti-nuclear power advocates concerning the 
disaster did not come true – significant loss of life did not occur and the damage has been 
contained, but there has been a tremendous financial and social cost. The fact that there 
is not a watertight case either way leaves room for interpretation in discourse over the 
significance of the disaster, and hence the importance of representations of agency. 
 
 196  
7.2.2: Representations of nuclear power and Fukushima in the media 
Interpretations of Fukushima are likely to be influenced by general attitudes to nuclear 
energy. Looking at the nuclear power debate in the media, Windisch (2008) observes that 
anti-nuclear views tend to essentialise nuclear energy as inherently bad, whereas pro-
nuclear views are more nuanced and stress the scientific nature of their arguments. Taylor 
(2013) distinguishes between anti-nuclear ‘survivalist’ opposition based on the 
cataclysmic threat it poses, and ‘political’ opposition over how nuclear power may 
undermine democratic social, economic, and political relationships. Summarising studies 
of public attitudes to nuclear power, Kubota finds that supporters of nuclear power value 
an improved standard of living, economic growth, and alleviation of the energy crisis, 
whereas opponents tend to be more post-materialist and are concerned with potential 
safety risks (2012b, p. 441-442).  
 
Turning to studies on the interpretation of Fukushima itself, Desai (2012) discusses media 
responses to Fukushima in the American press. He found that pro-nuclear views tend to 
interpret the disaster within an overall view of nuclear power as ‘progress’, and anti-
nuclear views tend to frame it in terms of a lack of public accountability in the nuclear 
industry. Fujigaki (2015) observes two competing media reactions to Fukushima around 
the world. One is the lesson that if disasters can happen in a high-technology country they 
can happen anywhere. The second is an opposite interpretation that Fukushima was a 
specific failing of Japan. Downer (2013) looks at how pro-nuclear discourse attempts to 
justify nuclear power after Fukushima. He identifies three narratives of what he terms 
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‘nuclear redemption’. The first is arguing the accident was exceptional and will not 
reoccur, the second involves distancing the disaster from foreign countries by portraying 
it as a uniquely Japanese disaster (as Fujigaki also observes), and the third is claiming 
Fukushima itself is unrepresentative of nuclear power in general so mistakes can be 
corrected. The observations in these studies indicate some lines of argument that might 
be expected to come up in the opinion pieces I analyse. 
 
The success or otherwise of these competing interpretations is important because they 
imply different degrees of action that need to be taken in response to the disaster – ranging 
from minor changes, to more substantial reform, through to the complete abolition of 
nuclear energy. The literature I have referenced deals with news content and forms of 
argument, but does not have a linguistic focus. As with the previous chapters on initial 
reporting and investigations into the disaster, there is commentary on the topic but little 
systematic linguistic analysis. My investigation of representations of agency thus 
contributes to a more specifically linguistic understanding of how Fukushima has been 
portrayed.  
 
7.2.3: Public and political impact of Fukushima 
The decade pre-Fukushima was dubbed a ‘nuclear renaissance’, characterised by 
increasing public support for both existing and new nuclear power plants, as well as 
growing political support for nuclear projects (Joskow and Parsons, 2012, p. 4-5). It might 
be expected that Fukushima would dent this upward trajectory, but this does not seem to 
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have been the case. Although Ramana (2011) and Kim et al. (2013) found public support 
for nuclear power declined after the Fukushima crisis, this decrease appears to have been 
temporary. Both Rosa and Dunlap (1994) and Stoutenborough et al. (2013) describe a 
"rebound" hypothesis for the previous Chernobyl and Three Mile Island disasters, 
whereby support decreased noticeably after each event and then slowly recovered again 
in the months and years following. Such a trend appears be in evidence now. For instance, 
in Britain a 2012 MORI poll found that public support for nuclear energy has “bounced 
back strongly” since a low point after Fukushima (Ipsos MORI, 2012). In the U.S. a 
Gallup poll found that the most relevant factor in public attitudes to nuclear power is the 
perceived abundance of alternative energy sources, rather than safety concerns prompted 
by nuclear incidents (Gallup, 2016). In terms of government policy, Jorant (2011) notes 
that since Fukushima the vast majority of countries have not changed their stance on 
whether or not to use nuclear energy (with the notable exception of Germany, which is 
considering plans to phase out nuclear power by 2022). Before the accident, a total of 547 
reactors were either proposed, planned or under construction throughout the world, and 
by early 2012 this number had increased to 558 (Holloway, 2012; cited in Downer, 2013).  
 
It would seem that either public opinion has not tipped significantly against nuclear power, 
or it has not changed enough to influence government policies. It could be argued that the 
damage Fukushima poses to the credibility of nuclear power has, at least to some extent, 
been mediated. My work investigates the role of media debate in this process.   
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7.3: Selection of texts and approach to analysis of Fukushima in media opinion 
pieces on nuclear power  
To find texts for analysis I searched the Opinion and Editorial sections of English-
language online newspapers from around the world. I searched using the separate 
keywords ‘nuclear power’ and ‘Fukushima’. I searched what would be considered 
broadsheet publications, such as The New York Times and The Guardian (rather than for 
example The New York Post and The Sun). This was primarily because these publications 
are likely to have more detailed analyses of the issue, and therefore more linguistic 
content to study. It also ensured some degree of genre similarity in the texts used. 
Although in one respect broadsheet media may have less influence on public opinion 
because of their lower readership compared with tabloid media, on the other hand they 
arguably have more influence because of their status and prestige. Pollock et al. argue 
that such higher-status framing of nuclear power is important because “a value-based 
interpretation favoured by elites and promoted by the media is faithfully reflected in how 
the mass public understands the issue” (1993, p. 31). These ‘elite’ discourses may be 
more persuasive and may have a filter-down effect. 
 
I included only articles which argued an explicit pro or anti-nuclear stance, based on my 
initial reading of the articles produced by the automatic search. I selected texts based on 
content, choosing those with more reference to Fukushima. I selected ten articles with 
pro-nuclear opinions (henceforth Pro) and ten with anti-nuclear opinions (henceforth 
Anti). The articles on each side come from different media sources and have a different 
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author, to ensure variety. One exception is that two anti-nuclear articles are by Kumi 
Naidoo, who was until 2015 the International Executive Director of Greenpeace, and as 
such offers a typical representation of anti-nuclear views. The other exception is that two 
anti-nuclear articles come from the UK Guardian. I did this to increase the overall 
instances of representation of action by Fukushima in anti-nuclear pieces to a similar 
number as pro-nuclear ones. Tables 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 below show in chronological order 
the news sources, publication dates, titles, attributed authors and lengths of the articles. 
Links for the articles are listed in Appendix B. 
 
Table 7.3.1: Pro-nuclear articles 
Source	 Date	 Title	 Author	 Words	
The	 Los	 Angeles	
Times	
15,3,2011	 Talk	about	a	meltdown.	 Goldberg,	J	 684	
The	Mail	 	 16,3,2011	 Yes,	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 are	
dangerous.	 But	 for	 Britain,	 the	





19,3,2011	 Nuclear	 Support:	 Fukushima	














The	Mercury	News	 7,6,2011	 Don’t	 rush	 to	 abandon	 nuclear	
energy	
Moore,	P	 600	






Al	Jazeera	 11,3,2012	 The	Fukushima	Syndrome	 Freer,	M	 911	
The	 Washington	
Post	










Table 7.3.2: Anti-nuclear articles  
Source	 Date	 Title	 Author	 Words	







22,3,2011	 Nuclear	Energy	Isn't	Needed	 Naidoo,	K	 749	
The	Times	of	India	 23,3,2011	 Lesson	 from	 Japan	 disaster:	 Go	
easy	on	nuclear	energy	
Kaira,	R	 921	
Al	Jazeera	 13,6,2012	 Breaking	up	the	nuclear	family	 O'Connor,	R	 636	
The	Guardian	 11,3,2013	 Fukushima	 disaster:	 holding	 the	
nuclear	industry	liable	
Naidoo,	K	 796	
The	Guardian	 	 12,3,2013	 Two	 years	 on,	 America	 hasn’t	





10,3,2014	 Three	 years	 later,	 the	 lessons	 of	
Fukushima	are	uglier	than	ever	
Hiltzik,	M	 820	










The	Japan	Times	 4,2,2017	 Dream	 of	 cheap,	 clean	 nuclear	
power	is	over	
Smith,	N	 789	
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These articles cover a time span from when Fukushima began up to February 2017. A 
lengthy time span was necessary to find articles that fit the (relatively strict) criteria of 
being broadsheet, sufficiently lengthy, taking an explicit stance on nuclear energy, and 
appearing in different media sources. These criteria help make the sample texts that I 
analyse as comparable as possible. The combined word counts for the ten articles on each 
side are reasonably similar: Pro total 7,975 words and Anti 8,773 words. A ten article 
sample from each side of the debate is enough to cover the different interpretations of 
Fukushima that each side makes. 
 
I used the framework to identify all representations of action by Fukushima. The actor 
‘Fukushima’ includes the disaster, its consequences, and the plant, as exemplified in 
Table 7.3.3. below. 
 








around	 them,	 knowing	 that	 they	 and	 their	 anti-radiation	 suits	 are	 all	 that	 stand	
between	 the	 world	 and	 the	 second-worst	 nuclear	 accident	 in	 history.	 (The	
Independent,	2011)	
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In the analysis I go through each of the four sections of the framework. As in chapter 5, I 
am again comparing two corpora. I therefore present normalized frequencies per 10,000 
words of the categories of agency for each side. I look at how these features of agency 
contribute to different interpretations of Fukushima. I discuss trends in each side, 
providing two examples for each point I make.  
 
7.4: Agency for Fukushima   
7.4.1: Coreness 
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Table 7.4.1: Normalized frequencies of Coreness categories for Fukushima  
Pro: 73 instances, 58% Dynamic and 42% Static.  
Anti: 83 instances, 40% Dynamic and 60% Static. 
	
Pro represents action by Fukushima with stronger Coreness, as there is more Dynamic 
action in Pro and more Static action in Anti. In addition, Pro features greater frequencies 
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categories of Static action with weaker agency. By contrast, Anti has a more even spread 
of categories.  
 
It is interesting that Pro gives stronger Coreness to Fukushima. It might be assumed that 
they would background the action of Fukushima, as it is perceived by the public as a 
‘disaster’. However, it seems the stronger Coreness for Pro is because there is a greater 
need to impose their interpretation of the event. This requires clear representations of 
action by Fukushima. For example, in terms of Dynamic action, there are higher 
frequencies of the category Activation in Pro. Activation has strong Coreness, so looking 
at instances of this category helps to shows the main interpretations of Fukushima made 
by each side. Pro-nuclear articles make more arguments that might be considered counter-
intuitive. For Pro, the disaster has clear Coreness in showing what can be learned. It has 
agency as a lesson, and what is learned will help in the future. For example (Activation 





are	 hard	 to	 evacuate	 safely	—	 should	 not	 be	 built	 where	 tsunamis	 are	 likely	 to	 reach.	
(Myhrvold,	2011)	
Example 1 shows a lesson about poor management of the facility, and example 2 a lesson 
about the location of plants. Importantly, these are things that can be changed and 
improved. Another argument in Pro that is perhaps counter-intuitive and thus requires 
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foregrounding is the idea that the performance of the plant should be viewed in context 
as a success. For instance:  
3. Perhaps	the	standard	shouldn't	be	whether	Japan's	reactor	was	"invulnerable"	but	whether	
it	 succeeded	by	 taking	such	a	beating	without	 threatening	much	human	 life?	 (Goldberg,	
2011)	
4. In	fact,	the	disaster	shows	how	safe	nuclear	reactors	actually	are.	(Windridge,	2011)	
This line of argument holds that the disaster was not as bad as expected considering the 
circumstances. The wordings “perhaps the standard shouldn’t be” in example 3 and “in 
fact” in 4 suggest that the writers feel this interpretation might not be immediately obvious. 
A third line of argument that requires clear expression is that the damage caused by the 
disaster was limited. For instance: 
5. Yet	even	in	the	gloomiest	scenario,	what	happens	at	Fukushima	will	not	kill	one	per	cent	of	
the	 numbers	 that	 are	 already	 confirmed	 or	 suspected	 dead.	 (The	 New	 Zealand	 Herald,	
2011)	
6. So	far,	only	tiny	quantities	of	radiation	have	leaked	into	the	atmosphere.	(Hastings,	2011)	
Example 5 downplays the potential human damage from Fukushima compared with 
casualties from the tsunami, and example 6 downplays the radiation threat. Each of the 
three ideas illustrated here might be seen as counter-arguments to initial impressions of 
Fukushima. Stronger Coreness is needed to foreground these points.  
 
In contrast, in Anti there is a lower frequency of Activation, and the arguments are more 
straightforward. In Anti the lesson of Fukushima is the danger of nuclear power, and 
Fukushima is proof of their belief that nuclear power needs to be abolished. For instance: 
7. For	me,	this	thought	is	again	followed	by:	If	it	can	happen	in	Japan	that	has	much	stricter	
safeguards	in	place,	where	accountability	is	not	at	a	premium	and	most	importantly,	there	






In example 7 the lesson of Fukushima is the impossibility of preventing disaster, and 
example 8 stresses the negative effects of the disaster. The comparatively lower frequency 
of Activation for Fukushima suggests that for Anti there is less need to impose their 
interpretations of the disaster. For Anti the fact of the disaster is taken for granted as 
sufficient evidence of the strength of their argument.  
 
Moving to Static action, Anti has much more frequent Engaged and Disengaged actions. 
This is because action by Fukushima is often represented as negative effects, and these 
negative effects are often included as background context to the overall points in anti-






10. Adding	 insult	 to	 the	 social	 injury	 of	 dislocation,	 hardship	 and	 the	 mounting	 "atomic	
divorces"	of	families	on	the	edge,	the	public	is	being	forced	to	pay	for	the	clean	up	–	a	clear	
failure	of	the	law	to	hold	the	nuclear	industry	liable	for	its	disasters.	(Naidoo,	2013)	
Fukushima’s actions are generalised as negative impacts, and these generalisations frame 
the overall arguments. This reinforces the point above about how Anti assumes a negative 
interpretation of what happened, without the need to explicitly argue this is the case. In 
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Pro such representation of action by Fukushima is noticeable by its absence, because Pro 
attempts to put Fukushima in context rather than evaluate its effects. In contrast to the 
more agentive categories of Static action (Engaged and Disengaged) in Anti, Pro has a 
higher frequency of the least agentive Static category of Relational. This is because Pro 







Relational action involves little sense of an actual process, and so presents the disaster as 
something which can be evaluated or commented on. In examples 11 and 12 the intensity 
of the disaster is downplayed, which supports the point made above about how Pro refutes 
the potential danger of Fukushima. In addition, the greater frequency of this kind of 
evaluation by Relational action supports the idea that for Pro there is more need to put 
their own interpretation on the disaster, rather than being able to assume a negative 
interpretation (as Anti seems to do).  
 
7.4.2: Effect 
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Table 7.4.2: Normalized frequencies of Effect categories for Fukushima   
Pro: 49 instances.  
Anti: 41 instances.  
	
The points of note here are the high frequencies of Influence for both sides, slightly more 
Instrumental action in Anti, and more Characteristics in Pro. I shall discuss these three 
things, as well as differences in the way that each side employs Interactive and Semiotic 
action. Taken together, an analysis of these differences shows how Anti has stronger 
Effect.   
 
Both sides include a comparatively large ratio of Influence (compared with what I found 
in media reporting of Fukushima and reports into Fukushima). Influence has the strongest 
























 210  









The things which are affected are emotions, as in example 13, and attitudes, as in example 
14. Example 13 suggests that the public has been emotionally manipulated and is reacting 
unreasonably, and thus the damage should be viewed in proportion. Example 14 suggests 
the public does not fully understand nuclear issues. In contrast, for Anti the Influence 





For Anti Fukushima has financial, physical and social effects: in 15 people are made to 
leave their homes, and in 16 families and communities are broken. The extent of the 
disaster is clear. The contrast between Pro and Anti is between causing ‘mental’ or 
‘material’ changes in others.  
 
Turning to Interactive action, although Pro has a similar frequency of Interactive action 
to Anti, many of these instances are actually negative cases. For instance:   





Example 17 contrasts the deaths from Fukushima with the deaths from the tsunami, 
implying that damage from the disaster is acceptable. Example 18 acknowledges risk but 
emphasises the absence of human casualties. So when Fukushima has material effects in 
Pro this is often downplaying or denying these effects. In comparison, Interactive action 
in Anti is actual harm: 






These are straightforward descriptions of potential human harm (example 19) and harm 
to farming and industry (example 20). This negated physical agency in Pro and actual 
physical agency in Anti illustrates the difference between acceptable and unacceptable 
levels of damage. The focus on material damage in Anti also supports the point made 
above about how Influence in Anti is ‘real’ effects on people.  
 
Both sides feature high frequencies of Instrumental action, primarily to describe technical 
processes. There is no difference in the level of agency, but there is a difference in what 
this agency shows. In Pro the emphasis is on how the plant is working as expected. For 
instance: 
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21. Reactors	designed	half	a	 century	ago	 survived	an	earthquake	many	 times	 stronger	 than	




Example 21 assesses the plant’s performance as better than could have been expected, 
and example 22 focuses on what went right (the automatic plant shutdown in the event of 
an earthquake). These examples construct a positive interpretation of what happened – 
evidence of the strength and safety of nuclear engineering. In contrast, for Anti the 








Example 23 attributes the disaster to sloppy nuclear oversight and example 24 emphasises 
the gravity of the situation. The key point for Anti is the occurrence of nuclear accidents 
– the fact that Fukushima happened is proof of the fallibility of nuclear power.  
 
Although Semiotic action has less agency in terms of Effect on the world, this category 
is worth examining because it is the clearest expression of each side’s interpretation of 
the disaster: Semiotic action is about what Fukushima ‘shows’. For instance, in Pro: 
25. Rather	 than	 undermine	 public	 faith	 in	 nuclear	 energy,	 this	 incident	 should	 highlight	 its	
safety.	(Hastings,	2011)	 	




Fukushima shows that nuclear energy is safe enough in 25, and Fukushima does not 
constitute evidence that it is not safe enough in 26. By contrast, for Anti what is 
communicated by Fukushima is the problem of the current energy system: 
27. The	Fukushima	disaster	highlights	the	need	for	change.	(Naidoo,	2013)	
28. Fukushima	shows	us	that	there	is	no	simple	solution	to	the	world's	energy	crisis.	The	debate	
about	 how	 we	 can	 safely	 and	 ethically	 power	 our	 economies	 must	 continue.	 (The	
Independent,	2011)	
In examples 27 and 28 the message of the disaster is the need to abandon nuclear power. 
This contrast here is a straightforward difference between Fukushima being sufficient 
evidence (or not) of the need for serious change. As I noted when looking at Coreness, 
again here the Pro line of argument seems more counter-intuitive and the Anti one seems 
simpler.  
 
There is a greater frequency of Characteristics for Pro. As mentioned when discussing 
Coreness, this is because there is more need to state the lack of damage. For example:	 	
29. Currently,	there	is	too	much	"I	know"	and	"This	is	what	I	firmly	believe",	frequently	from	
influential	people,	 in	cases	where	there	 is	no	 incontestable	right	or	wrong.	Fukushima	 is	
one	of	them.	(Freer,	2012)	
30. The	damaged	reactors	are	ruined,	but	so	what?	(Goldberg,	2011)	
Example 29 argues that conclusions about Fukushima are premature, and 30 states that 
the destruction of the reactor itself is not a serious loss. The greater frequency of 
Characteristics in Pro means there are more cases of action by Fukushima which does not 
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affect the world. There is more agency in the sense of embodying things rather than doing 
things. This supports the point discussed in Coreness that there is a greater need for Pro 
to attach evaluation to Fukushima action (thereby refuting opposing evaluations). In 
contrast, in Anti Characteristics are less frequent, and often support an opposite idea that 






Example 31 argues that safeguards against disasters are impossible, and 32 stresses the 
multitude of potential problems with nuclear technology. Such arguments support the 
anti-nuclear interpretation of Fukushima as a lesson that disasters are inescapable and 
nuclear power is inherently dangerous.  
 
7.4.3: Intensity  
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Table 7.4.3: Normalized frequencies of Intensity categories for Fukushima 
Pro: 16 Increases and 4 Decreases. 
Anti: 16 Increases and 2 Decreases.  
The combined frequencies of Intensity Increases are similar, but Intensity is more 
powerful in Anti due to more frequent Maximisations. The stronger Intensity in Anti 








This is simple: Intensifying the actions of Fukushima reinforces the argument that the 
damage is too heavy. Greater agency reflects how for the Anti side nuclear disasters are 
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Although Intensity in Anti is more powerful, the high frequency of Intensity Increases in 
Pro is also worthy of comment. If pro-nuclear articles were trying to background the 
impact of Fukushima they might be less likely to use Intensity to emphasise the scale of 
the disaster (a similar point as I made when discussing the stronger Coreness in Pro). 
There is, however, a difference. In Anti, Intensity unambiguously emphasises the 
negative evaluation of Fukushima. In Pro the seriousness of the disaster is acknowledged 
with Intensity Increases, but this severity is contextualised in an overall argument. For 
instance (Intensification in red): 






Intensity Increases occur with a caveat, as shown by the words “although” in example 35 
and “for all” in 36. It would seem that the high frequencies of Intensity in action by 
Fukushima in Pro are indicative of the need to recognise the scale of the disaster, but the 
context in which Intensity is employed serves to somewhat mitigate this scale. In simple 
terms, such formulations have a “yes it’s bad, but . . .” quality to them. This develops the 
Pro interpretation that the disaster should be viewed objectively. The same theme can be 
seen with the slightly greater frequencies of Intensity Decreases in Pro. These downplay 
the damage of the disaster. For example (Deintensification in blue and Minimisation in 
blue underlined): 





The negative effects of Fukushima are reduced in terms of radiation (example 37) and 
human toll (example 38). This downscaling of agency further supports the Pro 
interpretation that the scale of damage is acceptable.  
 
7.4.4: Freedom/Constraint  
 
Table 7.4.4: Normalized frequencies of Freedom/Constraint categories for 
Fukushima 
Pro: 3 Freedoms and 3 Constraints. 
Anti: 0 Freedoms and 3 Constraints.  
There are low frequencies of this aspect of agency. The point of note is the contrast 
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between the performance of the plant as a success or a failure. For instance, in Pro 
(Freedom in red): 
39. Reactors	designed	half	a	 century	ago	 survived	an	earthquake	many	 times	 stronger	 than	
they	 were	 designed	 to	 withstand,	 immediately	 going	 into	 shut-down	 (bringing	 driven	
nuclear	reactions	to	a	halt).	(Windridge,	2011)	
40. Perhaps	the	standard	shouldn't	be	whether	Japan's	reactor	was	"invulnerable"	but	whether	
it	 succeeded	by	 taking	such	a	beating	without	 threatening	much	human	 life?	 (Goldberg,	
2011)	
For Pro the plant has the agency to ‘survive’ or ‘resist’ the natural disaster. As I discussed, 
this interpretation requires stressing because it calls on a somewhat more objective or 
dispassionate judgment that Fukushima was not as bad as might have been expected. In 




In examples 41 and 42 the plant lacks the agency to ‘survive’ or ‘stay intact’. As with 
other Anti arguments, this might be considered a more common sense view of the disaster, 
and it develops an interpretation that Fukushima shows why nuclear power is inherently 
unsafe. In short, the difference here is between the agency to escape damage in Pro, and 
the lack of agency in falling victim to damage in Anti.  
 
7.4.5: Summary of differences in agency for Fukushima  
I found differences in each aspect of agency, and I shall comment on these for each side 
in turn, starting with Pro. Pro represents the action of Fukushima with stronger Coreness 
than Anti, and I argued this is because in the wake of a perceived disaster pro-nuclear 
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arguments need to impress their view more than anti-nuclear ones do. It seemed that rather 
than backgrounding Fukushima, Pro actively addresses the disaster and puts their 
interpretation on it. There is a similar frequency of Intensity Increases in Pro as Anti, but 
in Pro these are more likely to be Intensifications than Maximisations. In other words, 
Fukushima does have this aspect of agency, but not to the same level as Anti. I argued 
this indicates an acknowledgement of the disaster while also putting it in perspective. 
Effect is less agentive in Pro, due to representation of a lack of physical damage, and also 
due to more representation of alternative views of the disaster. For Freedom/Constraint, 
Pro has slightly more agency in terms of the Freedom to overcome the challenge of 
natural forces. Together, all these points reflect how pro-nuclear arguments acknowledge 
Fukushima as a disaster, but seek to reinterpret it and provide context. Many of the 
extracts are about refuting opposing arguments. Pro is concerned with the effect of 
Fukushima on thinking as well as on the real world. The arguments are as likely to address 
the perceptions that nuclear disasters generate as the damage they cause.  
 
For Anti Fukushima has weaker Coreness. I linked the more frequent Static action in Anti 
to the fact that these texts include more representation of the generalised negative effects 
of the disaster as background information. This weaker Coreness seems to be because 
Anti treat their interpretation of Fukushima as a given and do not need to state this as 
clearly as Pro. In contrast, Effect is stronger in Anti because actions by Fukushima more 
often represent the damage it has caused on the world. Similarly, Intensity is more 
agentive than in Pro in order to underline the scale of the disaster. Together, the greater 
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Effect and Intensity means that Fukushima affects the physical world in a more concrete 
and unequivocal way compared with Pro. Constraint is less agentive because this shows 
the inability of nuclear plants to withstand disaster - it is about what went wrong at 
Fukushima. In all, these features of agency reflect a common sense interpretation of what 
happened as a serious disaster, and as would be expected anti-nuclear arguments use 
Fukushima as evidence of their position.  
  
To summarise as succinctly as possible, for Pro Fukushima’s agency is as an event 
requiring interpretation, and for Anti its agency is as a damaging occurrence. In the 
concluding chapter that follows I shall elaborate on the implications of this. 
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8: CONCLUSION 
To recap, my aims in this thesis were to argue for a more multifaceted approach to agency 
in CDA, present a framework for the study of agency, and then use this framework to 
investigate the question “What does the investigation of agency reveal about ideological 
differences in the representation of the Fukushima disaster?”. I now expand on the 
findings from each of the three research questions about areas of discourse on Fukushima. 
In chapters five, six and seven the focus was on applying the framework, meaning these 
chapters were more technical in nature. Here I concentrate on the implications of these 
findings and how this contributes to an understanding of the disaster and of nuclear power 
in general. Following this I evaluate the framework, discussing its advantages and 
limitations, and mentioning how it might be further developed. Finally, I discuss the wider 
implications of my work for an understanding of disaster discourse, and suggest other 
areas in which the framework can be used for investigating agency. 
 
8.1: Results of research questions 
8.1.1: How do representations of agency reflect a more neutral or critical reporting 
stance? 
I now discuss the implications of the reporting styles of the Asahi Shimbun and the BBC, 
and of their representation of TEPCO and the Fukushima plant, for interpretations of the 
disaster. I shall also discuss the implications for disaster reporting more generally.  
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I noted that differences in each aspect of agency reflected a more descriptive reporting 
style in Asahi and a more evaluative reporting style in the BBC. Asahi had a greater focus 
on the situation occurring, whereas the BBC had more assessment of potential danger. 
My analysis strongly supports others who have commented on media reporting of 
Fukushima, in that the Japanese news source was characterised by less representation of 
risk, less evaluation of events, greater reliance on official sources, and a technicalisation 
of the disaster. I noted that for the BBC this was not necessarily over-exaggerating the 
disaster, because evaluation was not exclusively about bad effects, but the difference was 
that the potential for danger featured more in the BBC. These differences are important 
in terms of the agency of ‘risk’, and by extension questions of responsibility. Without the 
kind of evaluation provided in the BBC it is harder to judge danger in Asahi, harder to 
contextualise information about what is happening, and harder to look critically at what 
might be going well or badly. In this respect the analysis supports the idea that Japanese 
media were not being sufficiently critical.  
 
The reporting of the two main actors, TEPCO and the Plant, has consequences for future 
interpretations of responsibility. Their representation affects the narrative that emerges of 
how the disaster is handled and how blame may be allocated. I found that in Asahi action 
by TEPCO is more Core and has more Effect, which represents them clearly with physical 
control over the situation. I argued this could either present TEPCO as exacerbating or 
improving the situation at the plant, and concluded that the uncritical nature of reporting 
favoured TEPCO’s version of events and thus suggested the latter view. In Asahi TEPCO 
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has control over the plant in some way, and this control is implied as a good thing because 
their version of events is not challenged. In contrast, in the BBC TEPCO actions have 
comparatively less agency because the response of TEPCO is not such an important part 
of reporting.  
 
Like TEPCO, the Plant featured more heavily in Asahi reporting. I found representation 
of the Plant to be the major difference between each source, as it had clear differences in 
every aspect of agency. Interestingly, in Asahi the greater Coreness and Effect of the Plant 
foregrounded it as an actor and gave it power. Conversely, however, there was weaker 
agency due to many Constraints, so less sense of affecting its own destiny. The 
Constraints portray the plant as suffering and suggest an inevitability to the lack of control. 
The result of this combination of different aspects of agency is to foreground the plant as 
an actor affecting the world, but one for which processes are more likely to be represented 
as happening and going wrong on their own, while also representing the plant without 
intensity and without self-control. While it is true that equipment failed, the focus on 
inanimate responsibility suggests Fukushima is a technological issue. The problem is 
located not so much with the response as with the equipment.  
 
In terms of the narrative of Fukushima that emerges, if the Plant is agentive, this implies 
it can be responsible. It also requires a certain level of public understanding of technical 
details to recognise the human agency behind this. I argued this gives the mechanical 
aspect of the disaster a kind of (non-human) agency of its own, similar to the agency 
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attributed to physical forces in a natural disaster. On this point, Harwell observes that 
media coverage of natural disasters can be prone to an absence of human agency, and that 
a crisis is often represented as the most active agent with a life of its own (in Knapton and 
Rundblad, 2014, p. 4). In my case I found that in some sense reporting in Asahi presents 
the Plant itself as a natural disaster. This phenomenon is particularly important 
considering how after the disaster the line of argument taken by the nuclear industry was 
that Fukushima was an unforeseeable accident. Representing the Plant in this way makes 
such an argument seem more feasible. An uncritical reporting style presenting the disaster 
in non-human terms may have contributed to those who were responsible being somewhat 
let off the hook. Reporting the circumstances of a disaster is important, but reporting the 
context that produces these circumstances is equally important. 
 
There are implications here for how a disaster is portrayed in the news. The descriptive 
style of Japanese media coverage has strengths in terms of not inciting unnecessary panic, 
but weaknesses in terms of not probing the issue in detail. Avoiding panic is a worthy 
goal in times of crisis, and indeed the Japanese were praised for their calm response to 
the triple disaster (Kaufmann and Penciakova, 2011; Morris-Suzuki, 2017). Over-
exaggeration can be dangerous, and there is a cruel paradox in that while no one has died 
from radiation at Fukushima, many have died as a result of the relocation and anxiety that 
the radiation caused. The question is how to strike a balance. Panda (2012) explains how 
the dilemma facing the authorities was that the public needed to be informed but also 
needed to be reassured. He concludes that the choice to not be fully transparent, although 
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well-reasoned, ultimately weakened public trust in official statements (2012, p. 64). I 
would concur with this view, especially considering how the long-term damage of 
withholding information is equally if not more harmful than the short-term damage of 
doing so.  
 
This is particularly pertinent in light of what later emerged about the extent of the disaster 
and the degree of human causation. Official evaluations of the situation at Fukushima 
turned out to have downplayed the danger, and the situation continued deteriorating. 
Contrary to official assessments, it turned out that a nuclear meltdown was in fact 
occurring, and the Japanese Cabinet secretly considered scenarios in which radiation 
leakage and weather conditions would have meant Tokyo would have to be evacuated 
(Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, 2014, ix). 
The problem here is that if mainstream media are not balancing official statements with 
independent sources or alternative views it can have a pernicious effect in making the 
public lose faith in what they are being told.  
 
On the one hand this criticism may be easier to make in hindsight. Perhaps for a Japanese 
audience who are the potential victims of the disaster a more detailed factual account of 
current events is what is relevant for them, rather than a focus on determining blame. 
However, the alternative to providing complete information would seem to have much 
more sinister implications. For the victims of a disaster, understanding the causes of this 
disaster and the responsibility for it are essential. As Kobayashi (2013) argues, public 
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confidence in the press was undermined by a perceived lack of scrutiny and lack of trust 
in officials. Tokita (2017) argues this lack of confidence in the media and public bodies 
has persisted among a section of Japanese society. Pizziconi has argued that the 
institutional handling of Fukushima “irrevocably eroded the trustworthiness of the 
Japanese government and energy regulators and with it the hegemonic authority of the 
whole discourse of safety, cleanness and economy” (2015, p. 173). While it may be too 
early to state that trust has been ‘irrevocably eroded’, faith in institutions and traditional 
sources of authority has certainly been damaged. 
 
8.1.2: What is the relationship between representations of agency and attribution of 
responsibility for the Fukushima disaster? 
I found diffusion of responsibility to different extents in all three report forewords, and 
argued that each one is problematic in its own way. This merits detailed discussion, 
because I am arguing these are failings of official reports that seek to explain to the public 
the causes of a disaster with significant human, natural and economic consequences. I 
shall address each report individually, and then comment overall.  
 
The TEPCO report suggests that Fukushima was an unforeseeable accident borne of 
insufficient plant design strength. There is human agency in the foreword in terms of 
TEPCO actively solving and apologising for problems, but not in terms of anything that 
caused the disaster. In comparison, the natural disaster has strong agency, and Fukushima 
is significant as an example of the destructive power of nature. I linked this to the aims 
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of the report, in that the lack of explicit agency strongly supports the criticism of this 
report as an attempt to avoid corporate responsibility and head off the burden of paying 
financial compensation. Hopson, for instance, is typical of many when he describes 
TEPCO’s claim the disaster was unpredictable as “a well-chosen mantra for a well-oiled 
system of irresponsibility” (2013). The report is particularly troubling considering how 
much information subsequently came to light about TEPCO’s knowledge of the 
possibility of an earthquake and the decisions they made to not implement safety 
improvements.  
 
The Diet report was seen as independent and rigorous, and is certainly the most critical 
of the three. However, I believe there are serious problems with the way it allocates 
agency. In this foreword the disaster is significant as a wake-up call to the nation. The 
message of the Diet report reads as “we’ve got to take a look at ourselves”, something 
which may well be characteristic of post-disaster discourse in general. It argues the 
disaster was the result of a complacent mindset among the nuclear village, and that this 
mindset extends out into Japanese society. Human agency is strong and clear, but this is 
a comparatively more ‘psychological’ agency. The nature of the failure that led to 
Fukushima is foregrounded in terms of clear action, but is presented as a weakness of 
thought rather than concrete material action. It is a case of actively thinking incorrectly, 
rather than actively failing to act. As the background in chapter two showed, it was 
certainly the case that the nuclear village was a system that prioritised institutional 
interests and profit over safety. However, the de-emphasis of individual agency is 
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problematic in that blaming structural systems provides an excuse for the actions of 
people who should have known (or did know) better. Whatever the degree of structural 
influence on specific events, the danger of such amorphous responsibility is that it loses 
sight of individual motivations within those systems. In the case of Fukushima, for 
instance, factors that led to the disaster included nuclear utilities downplaying risk to 
avoid costly safety measures, close links between government and industry leading to 
regulatory capture, financial subsidies and public works projects allocated to 
communities that accepted nuclear power in return for political support, and the influence 
of advertising revenue from nuclear utilities on favourable media coverage of nuclear 
energy. As I argued previously, none of these are culturally specific, and all are financially 
motivated.  
 
I also noted that in the Diet report the focus on structural failure is diffused to Japanese 
culture as a whole. I linked this to the need to mitigate a shocking message to the nation 
and allow the criticisms in the report to be more easily accepted. However, this message 
that all Japanese share the need to reflect seems both irresponsible and unfair. If it is the 
duty of all Japanese people to think about their role in the disaster this implies they are 
all responsible. Writing before Fukushima occurred, Silbey puts this point thus: “Invoking 
culture as both the explanation and remedy for technological disasters obscures the 
different interests and power relations enacted in complex organizations” (2009, p. 343). 
The institutions and structures that contributed to Fukushima were not established by 
individual citizens, and it is unrealistic to believe an individual citizen can be responsible 
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for specialised areas of expertise such as nuclear safety. I also argued the foreword is 
problematic because it contextualises ‘bad’ behaviour in ‘good’ Japanese traits, and 
ignores other more universal and more purely selfish motivations. This takes away 
personal agency in the sense that everyone is a product of their culture, and it provides an 
easy excuse for responsible parties. To a certain degree, this kind of collective 
responsibility lets everyone off the hook: if each person is as guilty as the next there is no 
real need to feel blame.   
 
Turning to the IAEA foreword, it is critical of the failures in Japan and says the disaster 
was the result of a false assumption among the Japanese nuclear village. Human agency 
is present, but is much stronger in post-disaster changes to the nuclear industry than pre-
disaster negligence that led to the disaster. Nuclear village responsibility is generalised, 
and is represented as deficiencies in thinking rather than concrete actions. The Fukushima 
disaster itself has agency in terms of showing the need for maintaining safety standards. 
In this way the report presents Fukushima as a ‘lesson’. (This is also a line of argument I 
noted when analysing the representation of Fukushima in pro-nuclear opinion pieces.) 
For the IAEA themselves, I attributed the clear and psychological nature of their agency 
to the need to cement their status as an authority in this field, as they are a technical body 
whose authority rests on expertise and knowledge. This further underlines the credibility 
of their judgment that the disaster has served as a lesson. A more troubling aspect of the 
foreword was how a close linguistic analysis showed that while the IAEA foregrounded 
global advances in the nuclear industry, these were presented as a given, sidestepping the 
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question of whether improvements have actually been made. I linked all of these points 
to the tension the IAEA faced when responding to Fukushima, in being an ostensibly 
independent professional body needing to describe failings of the nuclear industry, while 
also needing to promote the same industry. The message of Fukushima as a ‘lesson’ seems 
to be a way of reconciling these two aims.  
 
Although I have criticised the way that agency for the disaster was diffused to different 
degrees in each of these reports, it should be noted that these were investigations into the 
causes of the disaster rather than legal inquiries designed to apportion blame. In one 
respect, then, the priority is identifying mistakes in order to avoid a repetition of such an 
event in the future. Nevertheless, as I argued when discussing initial reporting of 
Fukushima, the public need to know what caused a disaster as much as what can be 
learned from it. The success or otherwise of change relies on a full understanding and 
acknowledgement of who did what wrong, and not just why things went wrong. The 
danger is that the less clear it is who is to blame, the harder it may be to rectify what 
happened, and the question is how much learning can take place if blame is not squarely 
assigned. To reiterate, the TEPCO report was widely criticised, but the Diet and IAEA 
reports were treated with authority as solid investigations with solid conclusions. This is 
what makes a critical analysis of the latter two more important. The similarity in these 
two reports is that structure is emphasised as the context that led to the disaster, and the 
failures cited are failures of thinking rather than acting. The nature of this criticism might 
be paraphrased as “The nuclear village thought it was okay” rather than “The nuclear 
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village decided not to make improvements”. The framework I have used in this thesis 
highlights the crucial difference in agency here. Both are Core representations, but 
“thought it was okay” is a Cognitive action about a generalised situation, whereas 
“decided not to make improvements” is an intentional Decision about an Interactive 
action. 
 
The representations of Fukushima in these reports are important for the overall nuclear 
power debate, because they suggest an interpretation of the disaster as a specific Japanese 
phenomenon rather than a universal one. Going back to the argument of Fujigaki (2015), 
the narrative of Fukushima as a Japan-specific problem lessens its applicability to other 
nations. It provides a way for the nuclear industry in other countries to dissociate 
themselves from the practices in Japan. I explained in chapter two how the Chernobyl 
disaster was rationalised by distancing Soviet practices from those in other places. The 
idea of Fukushima as a disaster ‘made-in-Japan’ lends itself to a similar defence. The way 
in which agency is located in structural/social systems rather than individual motivations 
shuts down alternative avenues for blame, and discourages the kind of deep structural 
reform that might challenge the institutions that contributed to the disaster. In simple 
terms, the response could be paraphrased as “The system was like this and so it led to a 
disaster”, rather than “So and so did this and so it led to a disaster”. A further problem 
with such a line of argument is that it implies there is an infallible system of nuclear power 
generation which can be achieved in the future, and there is no accounting for how a 
flawed or random human element might affect these systems.  
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What is more, none of these reports addresses the wider implication of market-based 
competition between energy companies, which involves an inherent tension in balancing 
the need for profit with guarantees of public safety. In the case of Fukushima TEPCO 
failed to take appropriate safety measures because they deemed them too expensive. An 
alternative representation of agency might therefore emphasise the agency involved in 
the decisions of individuals within a profit-driven system to make money at the expense 
of public wellbeing. As I have argued, this desire for profit is clearly not a unique 
Japanese cultural characteristic. Similarly, the unwillingness of bureaucrats and 
regulators to fulfill their duties by challenging the nuclear industry is portrayed as a 
cultural phenomenon. This excludes individual motivations such as safeguarding one’s 
job by not rocking the boat, avoiding the uncomfortable conflict involved in making 
unpopular decisions, or ensuring a lucrative private job with energy utilities upon 
retirement. The Fukushima disaster was not the fault of one person: there were multiple 
causes, actors and institutions involved. However, they were at root human causes. People 
made the decisions that led to the disaster, and this involved specific choices made by 
individuals at different stages. This factor seems to be backgrounded in these reports.  
 
8.1.3: How does the agency attributed to Fukushima in media opinion pieces reflect 
pro and anti-nuclear arguments? 
To briefly summarise, I found that Coreness is stronger in Pro articles because of the 
greater need to foreground their definition of the disaster, and weaker in Anti because 
action by Fukushima is presented as Static taken-for-granted entities. I found Effect to be 
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stronger in Anti articles because of the frequent representation of harmful real-world 
consequences, and weaker in Pro because of more frequent communicative and 
psychological action by Fukushima. I found Intensity to be stronger in Anti because 
Fukushima is represented as a more extreme event. I found Freedom/Constraint to be 
more agentive in Pro because of an interpretation of Fukushima as surviving the tsunami 
in Pro, versus succumbing to it in Anti. I linked these overall trends to how Anti articles 
are more likely to represent Fukushima as a physical phenomenon serving as evidence of 
their argument, whereas Pro articles make slightly more complex counter-arguments with 
more need to define how Fukushima should be viewed.  
 
Considering the relevance of my analysis to an understanding of the nuclear debate, it 
would seem to reinforce some of the themes in the literature I discussed at the start of 
chapter seven. My findings support the points made about anti-nuclear arguments 
containing less nuance than pro-nuclear ones (Windisch, 2008). This characterisation of 
pro-nuclear arguments as more objective and scientific is seen in the appeal of pro-nuclear 
arguments for proportionality in judging the scale of the disaster. Pro-nuclear articles 
sought to put a more specific interpretation on Fukushima, whereas anti-nuclear ones took 
a simpler line that it was a ‘disaster’. I also found evidence of the ‘survivalist’ strand of 
anti-nuclear opposition (Taylor, 2013), as seen in the strong agency that anti-nuclear 
articles give to the danger posed by Fukushima, which portrays it as a threat to humankind. 
Finally, my analysis provides evidence for Downer (2013) and Fujigaki’s (2015) 
observation that pro-nuclear views of Fukushima argue it is unlikely to reoccur, portray 
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it as uniquely Japanese, and argue Fukushima does not represent nuclear power in general. 
This was certainly the case among the texts I analysed.  
 
Based on the articles I examined, I would add another observation about interpretations 
of Fukushima. They can be characterised by three main differences. These are not 
absolute and to some degree blend into each other, but they are direct opposites between 
the pro and anti-nuclear sides. One is whether Fukushima serves as a lesson on how to 
improve things in the future, or as a lesson that nuclear power is inherently dangerous. In 
terms of agency this is seen in how Semiotic Effect in Pro emphasises the message of 
Fukushima, whereas the greater Interactive Effect in Anti emphasises the harm of 
Fukushima. The second difference is about whether the extent of the damage from 
Fukushima is acceptable or not. This is evidenced by the stronger Effect and Intensity in 
Anti, both of which highlight the scale of the disaster. The third difference concerns 
whether what happened should be viewed in perspective as a relative success, or should 
be viewed as a failure. The ‘success’ interpretation is shown in the greater Coreness in 
Pro to foreground more complex arguments about the disaster, compared with less Core 
representations of negative effects as background information in Anti.  
 
Clearly, Fukushima represents a problem for the nuclear industry. Although both sides 
offer differing assessments of its severity, both accept that it is a disaster. Whether what 
happened is represented as evidence of inherent failure or as an obstacle to be overcome 
is a discursive battle over the applicability of the disaster to the future of nuclear power. 
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If future accidents cannot be prevented, if the consequences of such disasters are far-
reaching, and if nuclear plants are vulnerable to natural disasters, then Fukushima might 
show nuclear energy is not a feasible option. If the opposite is true, then Fukushima might 
represent an unfortunate event in the generally successful history of nuclear energy 
production. Jessop (2012) argues there are crises ‘in’ or ‘of’ the social order. If the 
problem can be solved without a significant reshaping of that order it is a crisis ‘in’ that 
order, but if it can not be addressed it is a crisis ‘of’ that order. In these terms, pro-nuclear 
articles attempt to define Fukushima as a crisis ‘in’ nuclear energy and anti-nuclear 
articles attempt to define it as a crisis ‘of’ nuclear energy. For one side it is an unfortunate 
anomaly in a generally well-functioning system, and for another it is proof of the 
weakness of the current system. In other words, anti-nuclear arguments are likely to take 
the form “Nuclear power is unacceptable because of what happened” whereas pro-nuclear 
arguments are likely to take the form “Nuclear power is acceptable despite what 
happened”. 
 
8.2: Assessing the Action-Agency framework  
One reason for looking at three different areas of discourse was to allow more 
opportunities to test out the framework. To recap, I aimed to make a framework that 
encompassed various aspects of agency and also measured levels of agency. I now 
summarise the strengths of the framework, discuss its limitations, and mention some 
possible areas of further development.  
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8.2.1: Framework uses 
The framework offers a detailed treatment of the power of actions and adds to existing 
CDA techniques by expanding both the concept and linguistic scope of agency. Meaning 
is seldom tied solely to one linguistic feature, and agency is seldom manifested in just 
one way. From an analytical standpoint the framework provides three benefits: it allows 
us to look at a lot of language, to look from different angles, and to find levels of detail.  
 
First, the four sections cover a broad range of language and so capture much of a text’s 
ideological work. I argued that the four aspects of agency are independent of one another, 
and this interplay of different facets of agency is important because actors can have more 
of one and less of another kind of power. For example, in my analysis of the Japanese 
Diet report into Fukushima the nuclear village had strong agency through clear Coreness, 
but weaker agency in terms of being Cognitive in Effect. This meant their actions were 
powerful in terms of being foregrounded but weak in terms of material result. Another 
example is the representation of the nuclear plant in reporting of the disaster by the Asahi 
Shimbun. I noted how the Plant was represented with strong Coreness but also with a lot 
of Constraint, meaning its actions were clear but it was also lacking a sense of control. 
Second, looking at four angles of analysis means they can supplement each other, and so 
better capture the multifaceted nature of agency. For instance, when looking at official 
reports into Fukushima I found that in the conclusions there were many instances of 
Intensity and Freedom/Constraint working together. I showed how they reinforced each 
other in highlighting what should be done in response to the disaster. Third, the 
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framework builds on the idea of identifying sociosemantic categories by also 
distinguishing levels of agency in these categories. This allows a finer-grained analysis. 
For example, when comparing pro and anti-nuclear representations of Fukushima in 
media opinion pieces I noted that although both used more Intensity, Anti used more 
extreme Intensity than Pro. This more nuanced approach was particularly useful when 
analysing specific textual extracts, such as in chapter five where I exemplified how 
slightly weaker levels of Coreness in Asahi reporting of Fukushima subtly backgrounded 
the danger it posed.  
 
For a researcher, the framework provides a language to discuss and support claims about 
agency in a text. For example, my analysis of TEPCO’s report into the Fukushima disaster 
concurred with the widely held view that it was an avoidance of responsibility. This much 
was clear to readers, so in this sense no ‘ideological manipulation’ was uncovered. 
However, the framework allows us to see exactly how and why this was the case, by 
pinpointing the linguistic means of reducing agency. What is more, applying the 
framework offered observations that were not necessarily intuitive. For instance, the fact 
that both pro and anti-nuclear opinions gave Fukushima a lot of agency was surprising, 
as I would have expected pro-nuclear opinions to represent the disaster less powerfully 
than anti-nuclear ones. Another example is how the differences between Asahi and BBC 
reporting of Fukushima were not immediately obvious on a surface reading, but were 
more apparent after analysing framework categories. In other words, the differences were 
degrees of agency rather than the existence of agency, and much of the analysis was a 
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detailed prising apart of these different degrees. Another point of note is that using the 
framework means agency does not need to be treated as an exclusively human property. 
Looking at representations of the Fukushima plant in reporting of the disaster and looking 
at representations of the disaster itself in nuclear power opinion pieces showed how 
inanimate agency is as critically relevant as animate agency.   
 
Although my application to three different areas of discourse for three different goals 
showed the framework as versatile, I feel it may be particularly suited to analysis of 
shorter texts. This is because the multifaceted nature of agency requires a close reading, 
and also because applying all four parts of the framework is time-consuming. What is 
more, a wider treatment of agency touches upon more points of potential interest and so 
there is simply more to discuss. For example, the many instances of Constraints on the 
Fukushima plant in Asahi reporting of the disaster showed how the plant was presented 
as a victim of circumstance, and this kind of observation would not come up in a standard 
transitivity analysis. A final point to make is that my analysis in this thesis went through 
each part of the framework separately and thoroughly, as I was concerned with 
methodically testing and exemplifying the framework. An equally valid alternative would 
be to discuss the interaction of all four aspects of agency together. Rather than presenting 
charts with frequencies of each category, the framework could be used more ‘informally’ 
to provide a basis for commentary on a text, or a basis from which to choose only what 
aspects of agency are most relevant to the objective at hand. 
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8.2.2: Framework limitations 
As I discussed at the end of chapter four, the compromise in choosing a flexible 
framework such as this one is that some degree of interpretation is required to implement 
it. As I explained in the introduction, in my second Module I tried out Van Leeuwen’s 
sociosemantic framework and found that flexibility can be problematic if analytical 
categories are too loose, so I had identified this as a potential weakness in my framework. 
After extended application I do not feel this has been the case. I would, however, say that 
in the Freedom/Constraint section of the framework the categories of Decision and 
Situational seem fuzzy because they are essentially semantic in nature. This is because 
aside from expressions such as “decide to…” and “choose to…” English does not have 
specific structures for explicitly signaling the concept of ‘intentional’ action that the 
category Decision encompasses. Rather, this concept seems more often to be implied in 
future tense expressions such as “going to . . .”. The same issue with trying to interpret 
semantics comes up when identifying the concept of ‘caused to be unable to act’ that is 
measured by Situational Constraints. This is a broad semantic concept that cannot be 
related to particular grammatical constructions. Therefore, while the aspects of agency in 
the framework usually map onto linguistic realisations, these two cases require more 
interpretation.  
 
On a more general scale, as I also discussed at the end of chapter four, some instances of 
language use do not fall easily into categories. In particular, interpretative difficulty 
increases with lexicogrammatical complexity. For instance: 





This example contains complex clause relations and multiple representations of action. 
Although such complexity is the exception rather than the rule, the range and subtlety of 
representations of agency is more evident (and thus capturing it more necessary) in such 
complex formulations. A similar point about the difficulty of interpretation is made by 
KhosraviNik, who argues that the sociosemantic approach assumes there are pre-existing 
social meanings that transfer to language, which may simplify the interaction between 
discourse and society by treating it only at a textual level (2010, p. 58). This applies to 
the framework here in that it might not be the case that the levels of agency distinguished 
by the framework are interpreted the same way by everyone. 
 
A different kind of limitation concerns how the framework classifies action, but not actors. 
Actor referents are not included, and actor referents are another significant way in which 
agency can be highlighted or downplayed. The reason that I have not gone into this aspect 
is that Van Leeuwen’s social actor framework (2008, Chapter 2) deals with this topic very 
effectively. It has been widely employed (e.g., Caldas-Coulthard and Moon, 2010; Reyes, 
2011; Don and May, 2013), attesting to its usefulness, so this area is already well covered. 
A related issue to note is a limitation in my methodology. The style of analysis I undertook 
involves linking actions to actors, and sometimes this requires inferring the actors that 
are responsible for actions. As I mentioned in chapter four, this is a difficulty whenever 
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inferences are necessary: it is hard to know for certain if the reader and writer are making 
the same connections.  
 
The points discussed here are some broader methodological issues with the role of 
interpretation in text analysis that are relevant to my work. I do not feel that these points 
invalidate the analysis, but it is important to recognise these limits. 
 
8.2.3: Framework expansion 
Making an accessible and workable analytic framework necessitates drawing a line at a 
certain level of detail, but it is worth considering other ways in which the agency of 
actions could be classified. One issue is how verb tense and aspect might affect agency. 
This is an interesting idea, but is fairly abstract and beyond my present scope. Another 
possibility is adding a way to assess the effect of figurative language, or the level of 
concreteness or abstraction, on agency. I addressed this point in my second Module, and 
argued that it is hard to systematically connect the effects of a figurative representation 
to its impact on agency. To recap my comments, I noted that the effects of figurative 
language, such as making a representation more powerful, often fall under other sections 
of the framework, and so the impact of metaphor can usually be accounted for. 
Nevertheless, this intuitively feels important and if there were a more specific way to 
account for this phenomenon it might prove useful. 
 
More concretely, there are features of verbs that could be analysed in more detail. For 
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instance, the framework does not address the issue of Ergativity, which although perhaps 
theoretically complex, is important for the representation of causation. What is more, the 
ranking of clause complexes is not addressed. While including this would make analysis 
more cumbersome, it is an important aspect of Coreness. Another point to make is that I 
found analysis of Effect sometimes echoed the observations made in analysis of Coreness, 
because the verbal representations of Effect are also classified under Coreness. This was 
especially the case when a text tended to describe an actor rather than describe what they 
did, as this resulted in both weak Coreness and weak Effect. With this in mind an 
interesting possibility is to expand the idea of Effect to include grammatical metaphor. So 
for example, to classify the nominalisation ‘discussions’ as a Semiotic action or the 
adjective ‘considerate’ as a Cognitive action. An example of how this has been done is 
Juznic (2012), which is a contrastive study of nominalisation in Italian and Slovene. 
Juznic classifies nominalisations in each language according to Halliday’s process types. 
However, the reason I did not apply this idea is that I had tried it previously in my Masters 
dissertation. I found that in practice this frequently requires much mental gymnastics, and 
as such one’s interpretation can stray too far into subjective territory. Nevertheless, this 
remains an interesting angle for development.  
 
8.3. Research implications 
I finish by considering how the work in this thesis relates to wider issues in CDA. I first 
discuss the representation of disasters and crises. I then suggest other areas of discourse 
for which the framework would be suited, before commenting on approaches to agency 
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and responsibility in general.  
 
8.3.1: Disaster and crisis discourse  
Discourse on Fukushima involves the interpretation of an accident and the institutional 
response to it. It is a good case study in disaster and crisis management discourse, because 
of the threat it poses to the legitimacy of the nuclear industry. Fuoli & Paradis describe 
two strategies that an organisation which is perceived to have broken trust can use to 
construct themselves as competent, honest, and benevolent. The first is to “neutralize the 
negative” by engaging with discourses that represent potential distrust, and the second is 
to “emphasize the positive” by creating a trustworthy identity (2014, p. 57-58). These 
strategies can be seen in TEPCO’s report into the Fukushima disaster. I noted in the 
analysis that it attempts to head off potential criticism by presenting Fukushima as a 
natural disaster and by backgrounding responsibility, while it also attempts to create a 
positive image by offering sincere apologies and by foregrounding efforts to repair 
damage. Similar strategies can be seen in the IAEA report, which I argued is mostly about 
emphasising changes in the nuclear industry and representing Fukushima as a lesson 
learned. It addresses criticism by portraying untrustworthy nuclear village behaviour as a 
specifically Japanese phenomenon, and attempts to create trust by stressing three points: 
(assumed) safety improvements among the nuclear industry, the dedication of nuclear 
workers to fixing mistakes, and the technical expertise of the IAEA. Fuoli & Paradis argue 
that renegotiating trust through discourse is particularly important when the deceived 
party (in this case the public) cannot monitor the company’s actions (2014, p. 52). This is 
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particularly relevant in the case of Fukushima because the public had little knowledge of 
TEPCO’s operations and had no access to the disaster site. It is also the case with the 
IAEA report as, for technical as well as security reasons, the public cannot be expected 
to have detailed knowledge of the operations of the nuclear industry.  
 
Another discussion of corporate crisis discourse is Suchman (1995), who describes three 
strategies that organisations can use for repairing legitimacy. The first of these is to offer 
normalising accounts which separate the bad incident from larger assessments of the 
organisation as a whole, which again seemed to be the case for the TEPCO report. The 
second is to describe structural changes that address the aspects of the organisation that 
were problematic or at fault, which very much seemed to be the case with the IAEA 
investigation into the causes of Fukushima. The third is simply to not panic. The points 
raised by Fuoli and Paradis, and by Schuman, can perhaps be broadened to apply to what 
I observed in pro-nuclear arguments about Fukushima. For instance, the idea of 
neutralizing negatives can be seen in the way that pro-nuclear arguments try to reassure 
the public that a similar disaster will not happen again, and the idea of not panicking can 
be seen in the frequent pro-nuclear appeal for a rational evaluation of the disaster.  
 
Another aspect of crisis or disaster discourse relevant to my work is blame allocation. An 
assumption shared by most literature on calamities is that blame assignation occurs in 
technological but not natural disaster situations (Blocker and Sherkat, 1992). This 
underscores how the interpretation of a disaster as natural or manmade can be a political 
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question. In my analysis of reports into the disaster I discussed how the more Fukushima 
was represented as a natural disaster the less blame seemed to be attached. Stallings 
(1988) explains that disasters can be seen as a social process that involves pre-impact, 
emergency and post-impact phases, and in the case of a technological disaster this post-
impact phase is marked by social conflict over what happened and what should be done 
much more than for a natural disaster. Jessop (2012), whose ideas about crises ‘in’ or ‘of’ 
a social order I discussed previously, argues that crises can be seen on a continuum. Some 
appear ‘accidental’ because they are attributable to natural or ‘external’ forces. The other 
end of the continuum is what he terms ‘form determined’ crises, that are antagonisms 
associated with specific social forms, such as capitalism. This difference of interpretation 
is one of the discursive struggles over Fukushima. For pro-nuclear arguments Fukushima 
was a one-off anomaly and a lesson to be learned from, whereas for anti-nuclear 
arguments Fukushima was a ‘form determined’ crisis arising from the flaws of the nuclear 
power system.  
 
I have used Fukushima as a case study for the media representation of a disaster, official 
accounting for a disaster, and the later contextualising of a disaster. My discussion 
addressed how different stakeholders may present or argue for different levels of human, 
technological or natural agency, and how this might reflect their interests and beliefs. I 
showed how agency was at times attributed to inanimate actors, and argued this 
downplayed human factors and encouraged a lack of accountability. This is relevant to 
discourse on other kinds of disasters in which responsibility is at stake. Recent examples 
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of natural disasters in which the institutional response was seen as inadequate include the 
2005 Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the 2010 Haiti earthquake. It is also relevant 
to cases where individual or structural weaknesses contributed to a disaster, such as the 
Grenfell Tower fire in 2017. Another kind of disaster would be the financial crash of 2008, 
which might for example be represented as the fault of individual risk-takers, or as a 
failure of regulatory oversight. It would be interesting to compare how much the 
ideological differences that I observed in the interpretation of Fukushima are evident in 
discourse on disasters such as these. 
 
8.3.2: Investigating responsibility  
In addition to the disasters and crises just mentioned, the obvious application of the 
framework I have presented is for investigating other issues in which responsibility is 
important or contested. A few brief examples will show the potential scope.  
 In an international context this could include incidents where agency is disputed, like 
Russian involvement in Ukraine, or Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea. It 
is also relevant to discourse on military affairs, which is often concerned with justifying 
a certain course of action, such as in Syria or other conflicts in the Middle East.  
 Responsibility is also central to interpretations of history, as the telling of history is 
about who did what in the past. This is particularly the case in countries struggling to 
come to terms with divisive pasts, such as South Africa or Northern Ireland. 
 Another obvious area of application is politics. Chilton argues that politics is basically 
done through language, and in political discourse "agent responsibility is frequently at 
issue" (2004, p. 49). What is more, the idea of ‘spin’ might be seen as discursive battles 
over public perceptions of credit for success, and avoidance of blame for failure.  
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 In the social arena responsibility includes issues such as the portrayal of criminality, 
and allegations of corruption or scandal. For instance, at the time of writing sexual 
misconduct in Hollywood is a topical issue. Representations of agency may also be 
particularly relevant to the specific legal language used to establish guilt or innocence.  
This list is by no means exhaustive, but intended to demonstrate how representation of 
action is vital to discursive power struggles in a wide variety of areas. 
 
8.3.4: Approaching agency in critical linguistics   
I have argued that the representation of power is fundamental to CDA, and at the core of 
this is action. I have proposed moving from a view of agency as intentional and individual 
human causation to a wider conception as the power of actions. It is important to get 
agency analysis right because only looking at one aspect can miss the complexities and 
subtleties of its manifestation. A four-sectioned framework allows a more detailed 
analysis: the clarity of action, the materiality of action, the extremity of action, and the 
freedom of action all potentially index the power of an action. I believe this view of 
agency as multifaceted is more realistic, and makes its study more widely applicable. In 
the three analysis chapters I have shown how the portrayal of agency is important in 
discourse struggles because it ties together representations of what happened with 
evaluations of who did, could, or should have done something. 
 
I would suggest this kind of more nuanced approach to power in language has a lot to 
offer CDA. As I discussed when explaining my choice of nuclear power as a topic of 
investigation, many studies have successfully highlighted the role of language in issues 
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which involve relatively straight-forward power abuses. However, there is a need to 
address topics that do not easily fall into clear-cut oppositions. Many important social 
issues involve a complex balance between different arguments and opinions. What is 
more, hegemonic power is about negotiation of consent rather than imposition of force, 
and as such involves linguistic representations of power relationships and authority that 
may be less overt. Analysis should take into account these subtler ways in which power 
may be expressed. Contemporary discourse increasingly involves ‘versions’ of agency, 
and ‘spin’, and in areas of linguistic struggle it may be more common to present an 
interpretation of action that reflects a certain stance than to simply suppress action. 
Approaches which reflect binary power relationships of powerful and non-powerful will 
miss many of the less obvious and arguably more important effects of language. While it 
is certainly useful to unpack omissions and absence, it is harder and perhaps more relevant 
to identify how and where levels of agency are different. Rather than asking “Who did 
what to whom”, it may be more appropriate to ask “Who did how much of what to whom?”  
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Appendix A: Action-Agency Framework Applied to an Example Text  
 
The action-agency framework is exemplified here. It is applied to the foreword to the 
TEPCO report into the Fukushima disaster. The text is marked up according to each of 







	 	 	 	 Red	underlined:	Projection	
	 	 	 	 Red	italicized:	Activation	 	
	 	 	 	 Red	bold:	Embedded	
	 	 	 	 Red	underlined	italicized	bold:	Ellipsis	 	 	
	 	 	 	 Orange	underlined:	Facilitated	
	 	 	 	 Orange	italicized:	Passive	 	
	 	 	 	 Orange	bold:	Inferable	passive	 	
Static	categories	
	 	 	 	 Blue	underlined:	Engaging	
	 	 	 	 Blue	italicized:	Engaged	
	 	 	 	 Blue	underlined	italicized:	Disengaged	
	 	 	 	 Purple	underlined:	Descriptivation	
	 	 	 	 Purple	italicized:	Relational	
	
I	would	 like	 to	 express	my	heartfelt	 sympathy	 to	 all	 of	 the	people	who	were	affected	by	 the	
devastating	earthquake	on	March	11	this	year.	 	
Reflecting	 on	 the	accident	 at	 the	Fukushima	Daiichi	Nuclear	Power	 Station,	 the	 risk-reducing	
measures	against	a	nuclear	disaster	consequently	turned	out	to	be	insufficient.	Almost	all	of	the	
equipment	and	power	sources	that	were	expected	to	be	activated	in	the	case	of	an	accident	lost	






the	citizens	of	 Japan	can	 feel	 secure,	and	to	enable	 the	evacuees	 to	 return	home	as	soon	as	
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the	 recurrence	 of	 similar	 accidents.	 Based	 on	 this	 recognition,	 TEPCO	 set	 up	 a	 “Fukushima	
Nuclear	 Accident	 Investigation	 Committee”	 this	 June,	 and	 has	 been	 conducting	 such	
investigations	and	verifications.	 	
While	 the	 first	priority	was	put	on	 the	accident	 recovery	work,	 investigations	and	analysis	of	
various	records	and	interviews	with	over	250	employees	have	been	conducted	under	the	very	
limited	chance	of	field	surveys	because	of	high	radiation	condition.	 	










TEPCO	had	received	support	 and	understanding	 from	many	people	with	 regard	 to	 its	nuclear	
power	generation.	However,	the	accident	has	destroyed	such	public	trust,	 for	which	we	again	
would	like	to	express	our	deep	apologies.	 	








	 	 	 	 Red	underlined:	Influence	
	 	 	 	 Red	italicized:	Interactive	
	 	 	 	 Blue	underlined:	Instrumental	
	 	 	 	 Blue	italicized:	Semiotic	
	 	 	 	 Green	underlined:	Cognitive	
	 	 	 	 Green	italicized:	Experience	
	 	 	 	 Yellow	highlighted:	Characteristic	
	
I	would	 like	 to	 express	my	heartfelt	 sympathy	 to	 all	 of	 the	people	who	were	affected	by	 the	
devastating	earthquake	on	March	11	this	year.	 	
Reflecting	on	 the	accident	at	 the	Fukushima	Daiichi	Nuclear	Power	Station,	 the	 risk-reducing	
measures	against	a	nuclear	disaster	consequently	turned	out	to	be	insufficient.	Almost	all	of	the	
equipment	and	power	sources	that	were	expected	to	be	activated	in	the	case	of	an	accident	lost	






the	citizens	of	 Japan	can	 feel	 secure,	and	 to	enable	 the	evacuees	 to	 return	home	as	 soon	as	





the	 recurrence	 of	 similar	 accidents.	 Based	 on	 this	 recognition,	 TEPCO	 set	 up	 a	 “Fukushima	
Nuclear	 Accident	 Investigation	 Committee”	 this	 June,	 and	 has	 been	 conducting	 such	
investigations	and	verifications.	 	
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While	 the	 first	priority	was	put	on	 the	accident	 recovery	work,	 investigations	and	analysis	of	
various	records	and	interviews	with	over	250	employees	have	been	conducted	under	the	very	
limited	chance	of	field	surveys	because	of	high	radiation	condition.	 	










TEPCO	had	received	 support	and	understanding	 from	many	people	with	 regard	 to	 its	nuclear	
power	generation.	However,	the	accident	has	destroyed	such	public	trust,	for	which	we	again	
would	like	to	express	our	deep	apologies.	 	




(This text contains no instances of Influence.) 
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I	would	 like	 to	express	my	heartfelt	 sympathy	 to	all	of	 the	people	who	were	affected	by	 the	
devastating	earthquake	on	March	11	this	year.	 	
Reflecting	on	 the	accident	at	 the	Fukushima	Daiichi	Nuclear	Power	Station,	 the	 risk-reducing	
measures	against	a	nuclear	disaster	consequently	turned	out	to	be	insufficient.	Almost	all	of	the	
equipment	and	power	sources	that	were	expected	to	be	activated	in	the	case	of	an	accident	lost	






the	citizens	of	 Japan	can	 feel	 secure,	and	 to	enable	 the	evacuees	 to	 return	home	as	 soon	as	





the	 recurrence	 of	 similar	 accidents.	 Based	 on	 this	 recognition,	 TEPCO	 set	 up	 a	 “Fukushima	
Nuclear	 Accident	 Investigation	 Committee”	 this	 June,	 and	 has	 been	 conducting	 such	
investigations	and	verifications.	 	
While	 the	 first	priority	was	put	on	 the	accident	 recovery	work,	 investigations	and	analysis	of	
various	records	and	interviews	with	over	250	employees	have	been	conducted	under	the	very	
limited	chance	of	field	surveys	because	of	high	radiation	condition.	 	
Following	 the	 investigation,	 the	 committee’s	 conclusion	was	 consulted	 on	with	 the	 “Nuclear	
Safety	and	Quality	Assurance	Meeting	Accident	Investigation	Verification	Committee,”	consisting	
















(This text contains no instances of Minimisation.) 
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I	would	 like	 to	express	my	heartfelt	 sympathy	 to	all	of	 the	people	who	were	affected	by	 the	
devastating	earthquake	on	March	11	this	year.	 	
Reflecting	on	 the	accident	at	 the	Fukushima	Daiichi	Nuclear	Power	Station,	 the	 risk-reducing	
measures	against	a	nuclear	disaster	consequently	turned	out	to	be	insufficient.	Almost	all	of	the	
equipment	and	power	sources	that	were	expected	to	be	activated	in	the	case	of	an	accident	lost	






the	 citizens	of	 Japan	can	 feel	 secure,	 and	 to	enable	 the	evacuees	 to	 return	home	 as	 soon	as	








While	 the	 first	priority	was	put	on	 the	accident	 recovery	work,	 investigations	and	analysis	of	
various	records	and	interviews	with	over	250	employees	have	been	conducted	under	the	very	
limited	chance	of	field	surveys	because	of	high	radiation	condition.	 	
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